Why Punjabi Establishment wants to Sell Taliban as Pashtuns Resistance erroneously.

Kaptan Taliban Khan PTI 

With a mix of horror and disbelief I watched the footage from Matanai where a school van was ambushed by militants. Even for senses numbed by scores of bombings every year, this came as a shock because the victims were children (aged between 8 to 14 years), and were deliberately targeted. One would think that even the most shameless of villains would not be low enough to own these killings, but within hours the Tehreek I Taliban Pakistan (TTP) proudly claimed full responsibility. Bravo!

The footage of the aftermath showed faces smitten with fear, a little girl, hardly six or seven lay in a state of shock; her blank expression and her blood soaked shirt spoke volumes about the horrors that she went through. Some of the survivors did speak to the media and the noticeable thing about their interviews was that they were either in Pashtu or in heavily accented Urdu.

It is important to highlight the accents and thus ethnicity of these children because the same are often ignored by those who perceive Taliban violence as a Pashtun backlash. Take the Chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek I Insaaf (PTI) for instance; in one of his sermons on YouTube titled “Imran Khan Explains War of Terror and Pakistani Taliban”, he declares the Taliban to be a “Pashtun Resistance”. But, how exactly does a Pashtun Resistance claim mostly Pashtun victims is something that Mr. Khan didn’t elaborate upon.

To prove this argument, references are often made to episodes of Pashtun resistance from the past. But the difference between Taliban leadership and historical figures such as Faqir of Ipi becomes very obvious if one considers their respective target selection. Mullah Powindah, Pir Roshan and Faqir of Ipi were not known for targeting Pashtuns, as all of them had a strong nationalistic bias; i.e. a Pashtun bias. The Taliban however, do not have any of that as proven by the fact that their victims are predominantly Pashtun. It should be obvious that when an insurgency fights in the name of an ethnicity then it does NOT target that ethnicity; the ETA is not known for killing Basques and neither was the Tamil Tigers known for killing Tamils. For this reason, it is downright disrespectful to term Taliban violence as a “Pashtun backlash”, because the Pashtuns themselves are its biggest victims.

While one feels disappointed with the former cricketer, one is absolutely horrified when the same logic is echoed by a group of Pakistan’s “Foreign Policy Elites” (FPE). A recent report by the Jinnah Institute (JI) and the US Institute for Peace (USIP), titled “Pakistan, the United States and the end game in Afghanistan” builds its case on the very same assumption. While the FPE rightly point out that a settlement in Afghanistan should not result in “negative spillovers” or cause “resentment” among Pakistani Pashtuns, their recommendation for ensuring that is quite perplexing, as they want inclusion of the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura in any post US setups in Afghanistan.

If such an arrangement is considered necessary for appeasing Pakistani Pashtuns, then the FPE need to move beyond books of history & genealogy, and instead concentrate on recent news reports, electoral results, and opinion surveys. The Pashtuns of Pakistan have been categoric in rejecting the Taliban; in 2008’s general election, the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) voted overwhelmingly for anti Taliban parties i.e. the ANP and the PPP. The PEW research survey for 2010 predicts that only 7% of KP approve of the Taliban, while the same is 15% for Pakistan and 22% for Punjab. Furthermore, TTP’s targeting of elected leaders in KP as well as that of the tribal elders of FATA, clearly indicates that the Taliban feel threatened by those who represent Pashtun consensus. This anti Taliban sentiment should be expected, given the chaos and destruction that the TTP has brought upon Pashtun lands.

If our FPE think that the alliance between the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be taken care of through some strategic parlaying, then they are sadly mistaken. Whether it’s supporting the Uighars in China, or the refusal to handover Osama, the Afghani Taliban have proven that when it comes to the Global Jihadi fraternity, strategic concerns are not that important to them. Thus, it should be obvious that if the Taliban get strengthened in Afghanistan, then the strengthening of the Pakistani ones is inevitable.

Lest one forgets, this September had quite a few reminders of what that strengthening could entail. Besides the attack on the 13th in Matanai that killed 5, on the 16th a suicide bombing in Dir claimed 27 lives, on the 19th another 8 were killed in Karachi, and on the same day 6 died in an attack on CD shops in Peshawar, and if that was not enough, then on the 20th they lined up 26 Shias in Mastung and gunned them down; and then ambushed two more who were on their way to the scene of the massacre. A sum total of 74 Pakistanis killed in 7 days for the “crimes” of working for the Government, listening to music and being Shia.

The underlying motivation for this violence is ideological, and this ideology is not likely to change whether the United States leaves Afghanistan tomorrow or doesn’t in the next ten years. It is also an ideology that declares a majority of us Pakistanis i.e. the Barelvis and the Shias to be Wajib Ul Qatal (dead men walking), and legitimizes the destructions of schools, shrines, Imam Bargahs and mosques. With the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network espousing the same ideology, their strengthening in Afghanistan should raise alarm bells for anyone concerned about Pakistan’s security interests.

If the potential “resentment” of Pakistani Pashtuns weighed heavily on the minds of our FPE, then the safety of the same Pakistanis should have had an even bigger impact, an impact that is certainly not evident in the conclusions to this report. For this reason, the Foreign Policy Elites need to reconsider their definition of Pakistan’s national interest. It is recommended however that before doing so, this group puts itself in the shoes of the parents of Matanai, it is very likely that the word “pragmatism” might have a different meaning then.

SOURCE: https://iopyne.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/elitist-misconceptions/

When Pashtun Deaths are Treated with Nod of Approval -Discriminating Among the Dead

When Pashtuns and Baluchi Deaths are a Favored  Policy 

In an ideal world all lives should be valued equally, but when the reaction to the loss of a life varies with the ethnicity, nationality, color or religion of the deceased, then for sure we have reached a less than ideal state of affairs. We Pakistanis are very quick to protest such behavior, especially when it comes to the Western media’s response to issues involving the death of Muslims.

But it so happens that for us Pakistanis, showing indignation is limited to issues where it doesn’t mean much. Many among us were heartbroken by the plight of the stranded in Gaza and fully supported the forced breaching of their economic blockade, but at the same time we are completely oblivious to the plight of our fellow Pakistanis in Kurram agency, who have also been cut off from essential supplies.

An area that is in desperate need of Pakistani indignation, is our media’s discriminatory coverage of the Taliban onslaught; a bomb blast in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or FATA somehow does not result in the same level of urgency and priority as a bomb blast in other parts of the country.

An example of this is the difference in coverage between two recent suicide attacks, one of which was in Darra Adam Khel on the 5th of November while the other was in Karachi on the 12th of November. If the loss of human lives is the measure of the importance of these incidents, then in that respect our media associated a much lower weight to the dead in Darra Adam Khel.

The 16 dead in Karachi resulted in dedicated talk shows, awareness loops and the suspension of regular programming. On the contrary, the 61 dead in Darra Adam Khel, were met with a considerably colder response; the suspension of regular programming was for a much shorter time and none of our major media pundits chose to dedicate their shows to the issue.

Back in 2009, I had the opportunity to put this question to the owner of one of our leading news channels. He simply replied that since he was running a business, he had to cater to his demand, implying that the indifference that comes on the screen is a reflection of the indifference that is felt by a majority of Pakistanis.

The probable reason for this could be the smoke screen that is created by Taliban apologists in politics as well as media. At its core are misperceptions about the supposedly stubborn nature of Pakhtuns. These perceptions have gone beyond the realm of racially motivated jokes, and are fast becoming an explanation for the persistence of the Taliban phenomenon. The Taliban conquered FATA is still seen by many as being the land of the free, where people are so angry with drone attacks that they have decided to head to Karachi and Lahore to exact revenge. While these points could result in short term political gains, in the long term the persistence of these beliefs has major consequences for the future of the Pakistani identity.

This selective indifference i.e. shoulder-shrugging on bombings in the North and revulsion on those in the South, is creating a divide between the Pakhtuns and Non-Pakhtuns of Pakistan. It is no secret that the Taliban are predominantly a Pakhtun movement. Naturally, in case of bombings in non Pakhtun areas the first response is to blame Pakhtuns for the attack. However this realization could be countered by equally highlighting the death and destruction brought about by the Taliban in Pakhtun areas. A lesser emphasis on these attacks robs the ordinary Pakhtuns of a legitimate defense that rather than being the perpetrators, they are in fact the biggest victims of Taliban atrocities, accounting for almost 70% of the dead in 2009. Furthermore, on the other side, this selective indifference causes resentment among Pakhtuns, who feel abandoned by the rest of Pakistan.

The fight against Talibanization is being fought on two fronts, i.e. the physical and the ideological. On the physical side we are dealing with an enemy that is becoming increasingly sophisticated; the number of killed per attack has risen from 1.3 in 2006 to 3.31 in 2009. This increased devastation, which is predominantly caused by the Taliban, should have resulted in a major victory on the ideological front, i.e. in terms of a loss in Taliban popularity. But according to the latest PEW research survey, Taliban approval has actually increased from 10% in 2009 to 15% in 2010.

The provincial breakup of the survey shows that at 22%, Punjab has the highest approval rate for the Taliban, a feat that could not have been achieved without the Taliban-neutral stance of its main political parties. The emphasis on drone strikes and indifference towards terrorist attacks within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, wrongly paints the Taliban as Pakhtun resistance to United States and thus creates support for their antics, but then the extra emphasis on attacks in non Pakhtun areas turns that misguided sympathy for the Pakhtuns into resentment against them.

Some might argue that comparing Karachi to Darra Adam Khel would be to ignore the importance of the former to Pakistan. While this argument would make sense if we were talking about natural disaster, in the case of the Taliban, the destruction between the two is interlinked. A peaceful Darra Adam Khel is a pre-requisite for a peaceful Karachi.

source: https://iopyne.wordpress.com/2010/12/07/discriminating-among-the-dead/

After the Dead Saudi King Grandson of Mullah Wahab ( Father of Wahabism ) What,s Next ?

The king is dead being grandson of Mullah Wahab father of Wahabism ( Deobandism in Indian Sub Continent ) and being Kinds from Daughter of Mullah Wahab who Married Ibn-Saud, Guarantees being a King of a Dictator saudi state an committing Human Rights Abuses on its citizen and Women Particularly . Tale of Abuses and Corruption and its Support by USA and Israel in Particular . 

Grand son of Mullah Wahab and King of Saudia Abadullah 

IT COULD hardly have come at a more challenging time for Saudi Arabia. On January 23rd Saudi state television announced that the 90-year-old ruler King Abdullah had died, nearly a month after being hospitalised for pneumonia. De facto ruler for two decades, Abdullah had nominated his successor, his half-brother Salman (see picture below), who was quickly elevated to king. King Salman's rule may not be long: he is 79 and, some say, suffering from dementia—though the palace vehemently denies this.

Ruling the kingdom is no small job. King Salman has inherited a realm that is the world’s top oil exporter at a time when prices have plunged; is home to Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina at a time when jihadist violence is at a peak; and has been dragged into turmoil in the region. At home, things are scarcely better: the country of 30m is the only one in which women cannot drive thanks to the struggle between reformists and conservatives. And the public accounts no longer balance without dipping into the country's, admittedly huge, reserves.

Sick Demented 79 Year old current Great Grand son of Mullah Wahabi King of Saudia 

Few reckon the new monarch will rock the boat. A former governor of Riyadh, he is thought to be similarly minded to Abdullah, albeit a little more conservative, and will be advised by the same people.

But challenges abound. Abroad, Saudi has taken a more activist stance of late, and not always with much success. The attempt to build a rebel army to oust President Bashar al-Assad of Syria failed; and Saudi Arabia is now involved in a war against the jihadists of Islamic State. Officials are particularly alarmed by America’s attempts to strike a deal with Iran, with which it vies for power, over its nuclear programme. Iran, champion of the Shia minority, has been expanding its influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The new king will have instant decisions to make after Yemen’s government fell to Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, overnight. Saudi Arabia had led attempts for a peaceful transition in the country after the toppling of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.

Saudi citizens are worried about blowback at home from Yemen, Islamic State and Iran. The Shia regime in Tehran has been critical of Saudi Arabia for guarding its market share of the oil trade by refusing to cut production to stop the price fall. This is starting to cause a pinch at home. In December Saudi Arabia said its budget deficit would rise to $39 billion in 2015, almost 5% of GDP. Thousands of graduates need work, and most seek jobs in the bloated public sector rather than in the fledgling private one. Decades-old talk of diversifying the economy has risen again.

Indeed domestically the obstacles are greater. By Saudi standards, Abdullah was a moderniser, appointing the first female government minister and in 2013 appointing 30 women to the Shura Council. These moves drew protests from the puritanical Wahhabi clerics and parts of the devout population, as well as reformers who point out that women are still unable to drive or fraternise with men who are not relatives. Free speech is curbed. A number of Saudis are pushing for religion to have less of a grip on the public sphere, the results of which are strict laws on blasphemy and a ban on cinemas.

After the Arab protests, Abdullah sent armoured vehicles to help crush Bahrain’s uprising by the island's mainly-Shia population against the Sunni ruling family. He kept his own population, especially the Shia in the east, quiescent by spending millions on government wages and housing, and setting up a Facebook page for citizens to air their grievances. How long Saudi Arabia's ageing rulers can continue such tactics is in question, and not just because of the cost. One of Abdullah’s great legacies has been funding scholarships that have sent thousands of young Saudis to study in Western universities where, some at least, have picked up democratic ideals.

By appointing Salman as his crown prince, Abdullah also avoided the looming difficulty of passing the crown down a generation in a system where power has been handed down between the sons of Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia in 1932. On taking the throne King Salman affirmed that his crown prince will be the youngest brother of the generation, Muqrin, a 69-year-old former pilot, intelligence chief and governor of Medina, who was last year appointed deputy crown prince by Abdullah.

Family Tree of Grand Sons of Mullah Wahabi from His daughter Married to Ibn-Saud 

Perhaps to avoid the next generation jostling for power, Salman quickly moved to appoint a nephew (descended of the his own Sudairi line) as deputy crown prince: Muhammad bin Naif, the interior minister, who has shown an iron fist when dealing with terrorism. To deal with the inevitable struggle for the crown, Abdullah in 2006 set up an allegiance committee composed of representatives of each of the sons of the founder. Unlike the current generation, who recall their Bedouin roots, many see many of the next generation as profligate, flashy and irresponsible, having grown up in times of great wealth. During his rule Abdullah cut the allowances to the thousands of princes and princesses, much to their chagrin.

Oil Status 

Oil Production over the Years and Budget of Saudia 

For both Saudis and foreign allies such as America, perhaps the toughest issue facing Saudi Arabia is the puritanical Wahhabi form of Islam that it has fostered; the Al Sauds rule in a pact with the Wahhabi clerics. Abdullah removed the most extreme teachings in school textbooks after the September 11th 2001 attacks on America, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers turned out to be Saudis. But recently voices near and far have been pointing out the contradiction between Saudi joining the coalition against Islamic State while implementing harsh punishments at home for transgressions of its devout religious strictures. The most striking example is the 1,000 lashes handed down to Raif Badawi, a liberal blogger who called for more freedom of thought (the flogging has been suspended after the first 50 lashes, on health grounds). The question for the outside world is whether the Saudi ruling family is part of the problem, or the best defence against the extremists.

Clarification: This article was changed to include the views of the Saudi palace.

source: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21640601-middle-east-after-abdullah-king-dead?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d

Saudi Customs not Related to Islam being Shoved down Throats of Muslims as Islam .

Mrs Obama without Hijab in Saudia Arabia 

COMMENTATORS, mainly non-Saudis, made a hullabaloo when Michelle Obama, America’s first lady, turned up in Saudi Arabia on January 27th in colourful, loose-fitting clothing and no headscarf. The oil-rich kingdom is known for its women being swathed in long, black cloaks known as abayas, usually paired with the hijab (headscarf) or niqab(which leaves a slit for the eyes), or a burqa (which covers the body from head to toe, with a mesh for the eyes). So what do women, Saudi and foreign, actually have to wear in Saudi Arabia?

The key to understanding Saudi customs is the country's history. When the modern nation was founded in 1932, it was based on an 18th-century pact between the ruling Al Saud monarchy and a devout bunch of clerics who followed a fiery version of Islam, dubbed Wahhabism (after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab). Ever since, Saudi Arabia’s laws have been based on this creed’s strict version of sharia, or Islamic law, which in reality incorporates many desert traditions that have been cloaked in Islam. The full covering for women is considered to be one of these customs. But today it is enforced by the religious police and zealous volunteers.

While all versions of Islam suggest a woman should dress modestly, often covering her hair and body, Saudi Arabia is one of the only Muslim-majority countries that legally imposes a dress code (Iran is another). Women, foreign and local, must wear an abaya (a few get away with long coats) in public places. Muslim—often equated with Saudi—women are said to have to wear a headscarf; foreigners needn’t. The face need not be covered, much to the chagrin of some hardliners. There are margins and uncertainties, too. The western coastal of Jeddah is far more relaxed than Riyadh, with abayas often brightly coloured or worn open to expose the clothing beneath. At home with relatives, in compounds and all-female settings, women can shed their outer layers. At some posh private Red Sea resorts, they go in bikinis. While many women head to aeroplane lavatories just before landing, not being fully covered is tolerated in the airport.

The strict dress code doesn’t mean there is no room for personal expression or fashion.Abayas come in different cuts, colours, styles and fabrics, from plain black to ones with cartoon characters on the back, and from cotton daywear to lacy or frilly ones fit for an evening out. Most women have a wardrobe of options; abaya shops abound. Moreover, women can wear whatever shoes they like, from trainers to Jimmy Choos. The accessory business is booming in Saudi Arabia as bags, sunglasses and jewellery become the markers of taste. A number of women are heavily made up. Some suggest that defeats the point. As with other rules in the kingdom, many young people find ways around them. But asurvey in January 2014 found that conservative attitudes remain pervasive among the population: despite half the sample saying women should be free to choose what to wear, two-thirds reckoned women should wear the niqab and another 11% the burqa—stricter forms of dress than the one currently enforced.

source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains-20?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ee/tr/saudiarabiasdresscodeforwomen

ISIS Is Now Operating in Afghanistan formed from Pakistani Taliban Factions

Could a new front line emerge in South and Central Asia?

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Afghan officials confirmed for the first time this week that the terror organization ISIS, which controls large stretches of territory in Iraq and Syria, is operating in Southern Afghanistan. According to BBC sources, Islamic State fighters have been battling Taliban forces in the southwestern province of Helmand with about 20 people from both sides killed and injured.

The Associated Press reports that Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former corps commander under the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, had a falling out with the Taliban leadership in the Pakistani city of Quetta, after which he replaced White Taliban flags with the black flags of the Islamic State, donned black battle fatigues, and pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Saudi Style Beheadings by ISIS and Taliban are thier Trade Mark 

The Wall Street Journal reports of a 16 minute propaganda video published last Saturday, which purportedly shows a former Pakistani Taliban spokesman pledging his allegiance to the terror group Islamic State and claiming that a number of Taliban field commanders have defected with him. “We are gathered here with commanders from 10 units. They all want to pledge their allegiance to the caliph of all believers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” proclaims the former spokesperson, Shahidullah Shahid, according to Wall Street Journal reporters who have seen the video.

from White Taliban Flag to a Black Flag a Copy of Saudia Flag 

Afghan officials do not seem to be excessively worried that the group will gain traction with Afghans. The BBCquotes the Governor of Nimruz province: “Once they fought under al-Qaeda name, then as Taliban, and now IS, they are the same people with the same programmes.” A key difference, however, is that the Taliban does not endorse the pan-Islamic model of global jihad that ISIS does, and usually confines its operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A December UN report noted that there had been an increase in the activities of al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan over the past year. The report singles out ISIS as constituting a challenge to the fragmented Taliban movement, whose spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, has not been seen in public since 2001. The report notes that Afghan security forces have retrieved ISIS propaganda material from insurgents.

The report also emphasized that, “Taliban leadership was concerned that the success of ISIL in parts of northern Iraq would draw young people who were potential Taliban recruits to join ISIL in Iraq.” It said that two prominent supporters of the Taliban have publicly endorsed the leader of the terror group Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Most interestingly, the UN report noted that several Afghan media articles have reported that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had lived in Kabul under the Taliban regime under the alias Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and that he worked closely with al-Qaeda groups in the country at that time.

While could just be motivated by opportunism inspired by the recent successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the emergence of this new militant force in Afghanistan could pose a challenge to efforts by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to re-launch peace talks with the insurgents. As The Diplomat reported last week, the Taliban has rejected Ghani’s recent peace overtures and turned down cabinet positions in the new Afghan government.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-is-now-operating-in-afghanistan/

Making the Sacrifices in Afghanistan Worthwhile will the Natural Resources of Afghanistan be Used for Afghans ?

Ahead of a major conference, what needs to be done to justify the sacrifices made in Afghanistan?

By Ikram Afzali

As David Cameron prepares to welcome the nations of the world to the first major conference on Afghanistan since its tumultuous election earlier this year, many of his fellow-citizens will be asking themselves if the 13 years of U.K. military engagement in Afghanistan have been worth it.

As an Afghan, I would give the prime minister a simple answer: “It depends.” It depends on what happens in the next few years and whether we are able together to finally make progress on building the foundation that is needed for a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. And one of the most important parts of this foundation, will be tackling the cancer of corruption and the systemic abuse of my country’s natural resources.

Afghanistan is rich. Experts estimate we have around $1 trillion of minerals, as well as plentiful reserves of oil and gas. Our mountains produce a rainbow of precious stones, from rubies and lapis to emeralds. We have oil and gas, lithium, copper, gold and iron. This is a treasure that belongs to all Afghans.

Enormous hope has been invested in these resources to fund the Afghan government and fuel the Afghan economy. The international community is relying on them to free them from the burden of funding the Afghan government and especially the Afghan military. Afghans are relying on them to provide desperately needed jobs, development and growth. But there is a great danger that these riches will instead be a poison for Afghanistan.

Across the country, widespread illegal mining continues to fund the Taliban and armed militias involved in terrible abuses. The income minerals should be producing for the national budget instead lines the pockets of corrupt officials, politicians, commanders and mining companies. Scratch under the surface in some parts of the country and the fighting is much more a result of competition to control the mines than it is of competing ideologies. There is a great danger that these resources will lead to a chronic cycle of conflict and humanitarian crisis.

If we want our natural resources to fulfil their promise, we should surely be taking every available measure to mitigate this clear and present danger. And that is exactly what a coalition of more than 40 Afghan and international civil society organisations, are asking Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani and Afghanistan’s donors to do.

Cameron, as the co-host of the London conference, must step up and take the lead for the international community. In a letter to the Prime Minister ahead of the conference, we’ve made the case that “stronger natural resource governance is not a side issue: it is a critical precondition for the stability and prosperity we are all working for.”

We’ve asked both him and Ghani to re-enforce their promises to create strong laws and strong policies to regulate our natural resources. We’ve asked them to put some flesh on the bones of that promise, by agreeing some of the basic measures that will go into fulfilling it. We’ve asked for transparency, we’ve asked for accountability, we’ve asked for the rights of communities living in mining areas to be respected.

These are basic protections: publication of contracts, of payments between companies and the government, and of the true, beneficial owners of mining companies. This is about introducing rules to allocate mining concessions fairly and transparently; ensuring communities are involved in the benefits of mining and can have their concerns addressed; preventing environmental and social damage, and making sure abusive armed groups are kept out of any involvement in the sector.

We believe our new government is serious about making sure Afghans are not robbed of the resources that are their birth right, but they now need to deliver on their commitments. We want to be open to businesses and investment, but not to exploitation and abuse. We want to develop our natural resources – but from a position of pride and strength, not by lowering our standards and ignoring abuses.

And Cameron also needs to deliver on his commitments. He has already said he will push the agenda of greater transparency and honesty in Afghanistan’s extractive industries “as far and as fast as we can.” Now there is a chance to get agreement on practical, concrete measures to do exactly that.

Just last month, Cameron said that Britain has ”paid a very high price” for the war in Afghanistan. Afghans themselves have paid an even higher price. The only justification for all this sacrifice is if it can provide the space for Afghans to build a lasting peace. Afghanistan can still pull itself out of decades of conflict, but we need the international community to help us seize that chance. We need them to help us to build up our abilities and back us in the fight against corruption and conflict.

Tackling this challenge is not easy. But Cameron should know that, in the end, it is the only thing that will make the great sacrifices we have all made truly worthwhile.

Ikram Afzali is the Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan civil society organisation campaigning against conflict and corruption.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/making-the-sacrifices-in-afghanistan-worthwhile/

China Hosted Afghan Taliban for Talks in China.

Has China quietly begun brokering talks between Afghanistan’s government and the Taliban? Is china Gaining Access via Pakistan Links with Afghan Taliban for Interests of China in Afghanistan. 

By Shannon Tiezzi

Pakistani and Afghan media are reporting that Afghan Taliban leaders visited China for talks with Chinese officials late last year. Pakistan’s The News International, citing a report from the Afghan Islamic Press,reported that two Taliban representatives traveled to China in November. The purpose of the trip was to “share the Islamic Emirate’s stance with China,” according to a Taliban official. The delegation was reportedly led by Qari Din Muhammad, who is based at the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar (and has been involved in Afghan peace talks before).

The visit by Taliban members came on the heels of the 2014 Istanbul Process ministerial conference, held in China on October 31. That meeting coincided with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s inaugural visit to China, with Beijing pledging to provide Afghanistan 2 billion RMB ($327 million) in aid through 2017. Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to open “a new era of cooperation in China-Afghanistan relations” while Ghani indicated Kabul’s interest in working with China during the Afghan rebuilding process.

China-Afghanistan cooperation is determined largely by the stability of the security situation – and here the Afghan Taliban remains a major threat. Accordingly, in November 2014 China offered to mediate talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, a plan that would greatly increase Beijing’s involvement in the political side of the Afghan rebuilding process (to date, China’s interest has been mostly economic). According toReuters’ report, based on Chinese government documents, the proposed forum would bring together officials from the Afghan, Pakistani, and Chinese governments as well as Taliban leaders. Under the plan, China “would invite the Taliban to China if Afghanistan agreed to it,” one Afghan official told Reuters.

Around the same time, Ambassador Sun Yuxi, China’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the BBCthat China “would welcome the Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but … the agenda must be proposed by President Ashraf Ghani.”

The reports emerging now from Afghan and Pakistani media suggest that China in fact hosted Taliban representatives last November, shortly after China’s proposal was first discussed at the Istanbul Process. It’s unclear to what extent Kabul was involved in these talks. Neither China nor the Afghan government has commented directly on the reports, but both sides have sent positive signals. According to Afghan Channel One TV, a spokesman for Afghanistan’s High Peace Council said, “We welcome such visits and praise them. We want to launch inter-Afghan talks.”

When asked about the reported Taliban delegation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “supports the ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ process toward peace and reconciliation and wishes to play a constructive role to that end.” Hong declined, however, to confirm that Taliban leaders had visited China.

Insecurity in Afghanistan is a major concern for China, which fears terrorists and militants gaining a stronghold on its western border. China’s Xinjiang province faces its own security vulnerabilities, which would be exacerbated by a prolonged conflict between the Taliban and Kabul. That immediate security concern may be why China is taking the on the unaccustomed role of mediator in internal Afghan peace talks.

Similar U.S. efforts to broker peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government achieved little, and it’s entirely possible China’s own initiative will lead to nothing. That’s what makes the talks so surprising – Beijing is not given to taking high-profile foreign policy risks. The behind-the-scenes nature of the process so far, with no formal recognition of a two-month-old meeting, speaks to intentionally lowered expectations for the Afghan peace talks, at least so far. Beijing, Kabul, and even the Taliban themselves have little to gain from trumpeting negotiations before there’s any sign talks are making progress. But keep an eye on China and Afghanistan in 2015 – this could be the relationship (and the year) that determines Afghanistan’s future.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-hosted-afghan-taliban-for-talks-report/

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma, If he is to succeed, Afghanistan’s president will need to come to grips with the country’s ethnic tensions. 

By Ali Reza Sarwar

With his impressive background, which includes a stint as a senior official at the World Bank and a ministerial post, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani would not appear to be short of qualifications for leadership. Yet, the president appears on course to be just another Afghan leader who is unable to rule the troubled country. When Ghani delivered his lofty inaugural speech on September 29, 2014, following a disputed election and power-sharing deal, expectations were high. The president made a strong argument in support of what he called the “triangle of stability” – economy, security and human resources – promising to restore Afghanistan’s valuable ancient geopolitical and economic position as the “crossroads of Asia.”

More than 100 days after taking the office, however, and Ghani is bogged down in a serious political crisis, one that draws a gloomy picture of the fragile unity government. He has only in the last few days been able to form a cabinet, leaving Afghanistan’s major public institutions, including ministries, independent departments, and commissions without leaders for months. A recent survey conducted by Afghanistan’s popular private TOLO TV and an independent civil society, shows that Ghani’s popularity has fallen dramatically, with only 27.5 percent of respondents satisfied with his leadership. With insecurity and political uncertainty looming, a number of parliamentarians have asked for Ghani’s impeachment for “treason,” blaming him for Afghanistan’s current state of disarray.

What has gone wrong? Why is this impressively credentialed leader unable to fix Afghanistan? Traditionally, Afghanistan’s woes have been blamed on crippling corruption, weak governance, dismal economic conditions, and worsening security coupled with foreign intervention. While these are certainly painful realities, the root cause of political crisis lies in ethnic politics and the breakdown of consensus among diverse ethnicities in regard to the persistent Pashtun dilemma.

The Pashtun Dilemma

Constituting around 40 percent of the population, Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are on the front lines of the war on terrorism, both as perpetrators and victims. The Taliban that is behind the bulk of the brutal militancy both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are mainly Pashtuns and derive their support from strongholds in tribal areas across Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borders. The mainstream Pashtun intelligentsia in both countries have been mostly uncertain over whether to sympathize with the Taliban as a nationalist movement seeking to restore traditional Pashtun dominance in Afghan politics and to some extent in Pakistan, or to condemn them as an extremist and externally infiltrated militancy that have dragged Pashtuns into an asymmetric confrontations with the U.S.-led coalition at a massive cost in human life.

Despite the Taliban’s indiscriminate attacks on Pashtun areas, including the last year’s suicide bombing in a market in Paktika province that killed 89 people, some leading Pashtun thinkers support the Taliban as a nationalist movement that could restore Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan, which they believe declined following the fall of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 and the following decades of the Soviet invasion and civil wars. For instance, in his article, the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Anwar Ul-Haq Ahady, a former finance and commerce minister under Karzai and an influential Pashtun thinker, believes that the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, was “more significant than the fall of communism. The rise of the Taliban generated optimism among the Pashtuns about the reversal of their decline.”

The view that the Taliban could serve as a powerful Pashtun nationalist movement with the ability to reverse the post-Taliban inter-ethnic relations and political landscape of Afghanistan remained largely visible in during the administration of President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was frequently criticized by the opposition for his lenience towards the Taliban, yet he continued to compromise and push for negotiation. For its part, the Taliban categorically rejected talks, humiliating Karzai as a “puppet and unauthorized” to negotiate. At the grassroots level, particularly in non-Pashtun circles, there has been a difficult debate over whether Karzai would have been as willing to compromise if the Taliban had been a non-Pashtun movement.

Ghani’s Test of Leadership 

Ghani, a Pashtun himself, already seems incapacitated by the Pashtun factor. If he is to get to grips with the problem, he will need to address several important issues.

First, it should be realized that the war on terror is being fought mainly in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this reality constrains the political status of Pashtun in both countries. To overcome this, Pashtun leaders and intelligentsia, including Ghani himself, need to draw a stark line between the Taliban as a radical movement linked to global terrorist networks, and the legitimate cause of Pashtuns for justice. Fail to do that and Pashtuns will only be more isolated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and forever in conflict with non-Pashtun groups and the international community. Breaking with the Taliban should also not be limited to the official level; the debate should move to the heart of Pashtun tribes and traditions that continue to provide the Taliban with sanctuaries and new recruits.

Second, the dynamics of ethnic relations and politics have fundamentally changed in Afghanistan and Pashtuns must face the reality that the time for a despotic monarchy or factional regime like that of the Taliban has passed. In the worst possible scenario, the collapse of Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy and unity government could lead to chaotic civil war, but it will not permit the emergence of a Pashtun-dominated government, just as it will not allow a government that excludes Pashtuns. Pashtuns will need to renegotiate their relationship with other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and this will inevitably mean giving up some of the privileges they enjoyed in earlier times.

Ghani could play a pivotal role in pushing this message among Pashtuns, but he seems to be replicating the failings of his predecessor. Like Karzai, Ghani is uncertain whether to consider the Taliban enemies or political dissidents. For the moment, he believes they are political opponents, a designation that would baffle many Pashtuns and all non-Pashtuns who have suffered under the Taliban’s violence. Ghani has been clear on his desire to reach a diplomatic settlement with Pakistan, and has also increased his contacts with nationalist Pashtun leaders in Pakistan. In fact, he recently hosted them in Kabul, a risky move that will have infuriated Pakistan’s government and intelligence agency given Pakistan’s long obsession with Pashtun nationalism.

Clearly, there will be no peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the region without the genuine participation of Pashtuns. Yet Pashtuns’ failure to engage constructively with non-Pashtuns in a democratic process that rejects the Taliban will only lead to their isolation. Ghani is the one man who could achieve this engagement, and he will need to do so if he desires to escape the fate of other Afghan rulers.

Ali Reza Sarwar is a Fulbright Graduate Fellow at Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government and Public Service where he is completing a master’s degree in Intelligence and National Security. Reza graduated from the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) where he was also in charge of the university’s enrollment management plan.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/ashraf-ghani-and-the-pashtun-dilemma/