Showing posts with label Pashtuns. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pashtuns. Show all posts

Monday, January 22, 2018

Waziristan Tribe In FATA Threatens to return to Pakhtunkhwa and Protest If Landmines Not Cleared





TANK, Pakistan -- A Pashtun tribe in northwest Pakistan endured Taliban bombs, Pakistani military sweeps, and displacement for years to return to what they hoped would be a peaceful homeland.

But an estimated half a million Mehsuds are once again threatening to abandon their towns and villages in South Waziristan if authorities fail to clear landmines and unexploded ordinance from the mountainous regions.

A major Mehsud jirga or tribal council this week warned the government to either protect their children from being blown up in landmine explosions or brace for unprecedented protests and a mass exodus of Mehsud tribespeople into Pakistani cities.

Qayyum Sher, a former Pakistani military officer and Mehsud tribal leader, says government efforts to rehabilitate his community amount to nothing if it continues to fail to protect them from the scourge of landmines.

“We are calling on the [Pakistani] army to cleanse this region from mines if they want us to live a peaceful life here,” he told Radio Mashaal. “We Mehsuds are united in demanding an end to frequent incidents where men, women, and children are either killed or lose their limbs to landmines.”

Saeed Anwar, another Mehsud tribal leader, says during the past year landmines have killed or maimed more than 70 children. Many Mehsuds returned to their homeland after a Pakistani military offensive forced them to abandon their homes in 2009. Most sought shelter in the hot and arid plains of neighboring Tank and Dera Ismail Khan.

“I think this situation [the prevalence of landmines] is a violation of international laws and conventions,” he said. “We are adamant that if the authorities fail to cleanse Waziristan from landmines, we will abandon it altogether.”

The Mehsud ordeal began soon after a handful of extremists from among the community became leaders of the Pakistani Taliban movement after the demise of the hard-line Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan in late 2001. Over the past 16 years, hundreds of thousands of Mehsud civilians have paid a heavy price as militants killed tribal leaders and targeted civilians while they also became collateral damage in military offensives that ultimately forced them to leave their homes.

The community now appears to have learned hash lessons from their past silence over their suffering. Anwar says they plan to protest until authorities succumb to their demands. “How can we live in a place where the lives and limbs of our children are not safe?” he asked.

Anwar pledged that the corridors of power in Islamabad will now have to listen to their demands. He accused Islamabad of treating them as lesser citizens, saying that when a landmine killed seven Mehsud children last year, authorities only offered them the equivalent of $150 in Pakistani currency in compensation while the victims of a fuel tanker accident in Punjab Province received more than $27,000 in compensation.

“Even when killed by unexploded ordinance that are left behind after military sweeps, our dead are worth less than Punjabis trying to collect fuel from an overturned tanker,” he said. “It is the government’s responsibility to clear all these mines.”

Sherpao Mehsud, the head of a welfare organization in South Waziristan, says his fellow tribespeople returned to their homeland after the government assured them of complete security.

“For nearly 10 years, we suffered in every nook and cranny of Pakistan,” he said. “We demand that Pakistan’s chief of army staff immediately dispatch professional military demining teams to clear Waziristan from the curse of landmines.”

Pakistani authorities have not commented on the demining demands. But senior Pakistani officials usually project the return of the displaced tribespeople as a major success. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, nearly 75,000 displaced families have returned to South Waziristan.

Activist Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen says some students from his community are eager to protest to bring attention to the deadly threat of landmines in Waziristan.

“We are ready to launch a sit-in in Islamabad until authorities move to address this problem,” he told Radio Mashaal.

Hundreds of Mehsud tribal leaders are now scheduled to meet on January 22 to devise a final strategy for pushing the government to respond to their demands.

Abubakar Siddique wrote this based on Radio Mashaal correspondent Sailab Mehsud’s reporting from Tank, Pakistan.

Gandhara Rferl

source : https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistan-waziristan-landmines/28983454.html





Sunday, March 1, 2015

Living Hell of Chitral Residents-Story of Lowari Tunnel

Why Punjabi Establishment run by Racist Punjabi's who always thinks of Plans to Belittle and Make Pakhtunkhwa Backward and slave to Punjabi's ,  have delayed the Lowari Tunnel Project that was Approved in 1970,s but is still not completed and is Made to Stall Deliberatively , as its in Situated in Pakhtunkhwa and Connects the Mardan and Dir to Chitral and it cuts down Journey Time to Chitral from 14 Hours to 5 Hours only . 


Victims of Punjabi Racism who Wants to Punish Chitralis and Also Change the Route of Pakistan China Economic Route has Stalled the Lowari tunnel More Shorter then Gilgit , Abbottabad Route which is not in straight line with Kashghar and longer then the Gilgit , Chitral and Dir Mardan Route , which Amritsar Indian Born Ex- Sikhs Punjabi Nawaz Government had selected to Serve Lahore .
They Plan to delay this Tunnel to 2020 , from its Planned Completion in 2010 already Passed and Chitralis and Dir Residents are cut off and live in Hell , Read this Incredible Story of People of Pakhtunkhwa Pushed to Living hell by Prejudiced Punjabi's . 

Pakistan Lowari: Frozen travelers trapped by an unfinished tunnel

By M Ilyas Khan

Water dripping from the top of the crumbling, cave-like opening of an unfinished tunnel in northern Pakistan forms into icicles, accentuating the bite of a freezing January morning.

About a kilometre down the valley behind, a large huddle of passenger vans, trucks and cars waits for the tunnel to open. They have been here for many endless hours.



Bi Weekly Lowari Tunnel Traffic 



In one rented vehicle is the coffin and body of an old woman on way to her own funeral, but she is running late.

On the other side of the mountain, in her home village, people have already gathered for the burial.

Anxiety is writ large on the face of her son, Wali Ahmad, a soldier in the Pakistani army and a resident of Chitral district, located on the far side of the 8.6km (5.2-mile) Lowari tunnel.




Faces of  Ordeal 

Wali Ahmed worries that he might not get his mother's body to her own funeral on time

"My mother died in Peshawar. Now we have to take her home for burial. We don't know if they will open the tunnel in time for us to make it there in daylight," he says.

It's at least three hours' drive to his village of Golen from where he's standing. It's already approaching midday, and the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush range shut off the winter sunlight from most of Chitral's 34 branch valleys after 4pm.

At a little over 7,000 feet (2,500m) above sea level, the tunnel is the only exit route in winter for the 500,000 population of Chitral.

Dozens of loaded trucks are parked every few kilometres along the rocky, broken mountain road that winds up from the town of Dir to the tunnel.

Some drivers have lit gas cylinders beneath the engines to keep them warm and prevent the pipes from bursting due to freezing temperatures.

Mohammad Qasim Khan, a resident of Drosh area in Chitral, is the head of another party waiting for the tunnel to open.

"My daughter's just been operated for appendicitis, and my cousin got a rod fixed in his left leg which suffered a fracture," he says.



Faces of Misery 

In need of rest - but they are stuck in a car waiting for the chance to get through

"They can't stand the cold and the wait, but we are told the tunnel is closed. We drove some eight hours from a hospital in Peshawar, and now we've been stuck in this wilderness for more than six hours. There's no food or heating here, and there are no toilets."

It is the same story on the Chitral side of the tunnel - residents taking sick relatives to hospitals in Peshawar, students and job seekers trying to make it to their appointed interviews, and workers with jobs in the Gulf fretting over whether they'll be able to catch their flights from Peshawar and Islamabad.

All these people are caught in a gridlock that started when the government suddenly decided to reschedule work on the tunnel ahead of this winter.

The fortunes of the people of Chitral have fluctuated with the fortunes of the Lowari tunnel project.


Lowari Tunnel has been delayed for last 40 Years 



In summers, a road built by the British over the 10,230ft (3,140m) Lowari Pass links them to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, of which Chitral is a part. But the pass closes in mid-December due to snow.

Two other passes - one connecting Chitral to the Afghan province of Badakhshan, and the other linking it to Pakistan's north-eastern Gilgit-Baltistan region - are more than 12,000 feet high and also remain snowbound in winters.

The region's only natural all-weather route passes through its south-western town of Arandu into Afghanistan, and follows a southward route via the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Ningarhar into Pakistan's Peshawar valley.

But that is no longer an option.

"The Arandu route closed when a Pakistani military operation in the Swat region in 2009 pushed Islamist militants into the Kunar region," says Shahzada Iftikharuddin, Chitral's representative in Pakistan's national parliament.

"This happened when the Americans wound up their bases in the Kunar region, making it possible for these militants to set up sanctuaries there. A number of Chitrali travellers were held and beheaded by them in 2010."



Chitral Scouts have helped maintain security along this perilous route


The tunnel was commissioned in late 2005, and by 2008 the construction contractor, Sambu JV of South Korea, had dug the 8.6km tunnel all the way through. But funding for the project stopped when a new government took over.

Over the next few years, this unfinished tunnel remained open for winter traffic.

In 2011, when some funds became available and work commenced, public use of the tunnel was restricted to three alternate days in a week. This catered to the needs of the locals and there was no crisis.

But after the first snow in late November this year, the commuters were shocked to discover that a new standard operating procedure (SOP) permitted three days of transit through the tunnel only every two weeks instead of one.

Hundreds of people were stranded in the snow. Those with money had to spend weeks in Dir town's hotel rooms. Others slept in their vehicles or turned back.



Commuters walk along the ridge to try and find out what the delay with the tunnel is



In Chitral, food supplies became scarce, sparking protests that finally forced the authorities to revise the SOP and open the tunnel twice a week - on Saturdays and Sundays - for six hours a day.

The authorities defend the new arrangement as the only viable balance between human suffering and project completion.

"The project cost has escalated from 5bn rupees to 18bn, and we have to pay penalties to the contractor for idle hours," says Hameed Hussain, the project director of Lowari tunnel.

Besides, six hours of public traffic pushes carbon levels inside the tunnel beyond human tolerance.

"We need an extra four to five hours to ventilate the tunnel before the workers can get to work safely," he says.



Inside of Unfinished Tunnels since 1978 



And there is still a lot of work to do.

At the moment, there is no proper lighting in the tunnel, no exhaust system and no emergency services.

Most of the tunnel is still without the shotcrete lining, retaining walls or a metalled road. Water seepage from the ceiling and walls forms into puddles on the floor.

In addition, the widening process leaves the tunnel floor strewn with debris, causing traffic jams inside the tunnel and endangering those travelling in open vehicles.

Mr Hussain says he recovered four persons from a truck that had broken down inside the tunnel last week. All of them had fainted.

But bound by towering mountains on all sides, the people of Chitral are just too desperate not to take a chance with this drive through hell.



Naila Shahid


Naila Shahid missed an interview for a job she was sure she would get because of the snows and the tunnel

And those who can't make it, rue it.

Naila Shahid is one of them.

A graduate in environmental sciences, she had to miss an interview for an assistant professor's job at a university in Dir district because that would mean living in a hotel room for a whole week - a social and financial impropriety.

"I was on top of the merit list. I received a call to appear for the interview. I knew I couldn't make it because the tunnel would have closed by the time I was finished and would next open only on the following Saturday," she says.

"There is no male member of the family available to accompany me for a week in a strange land. I cried last night. This job would have helped me enroll for a doctorate."

The new deadline for the tunnel's completion is 2017. Until then, every time the snows block the passes, many funerals are likely to be missed, many careers suffer setbacks and many tears are shed in Chitral.


Lowari Tunnel Traffic 
source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25972898

Pashtuns of Baluchistan Victim of Identity Crises and Political Power

Pakhtuns in Balochistan are  90% of Its Population 
Talimand Khan


Ignoring Pakhtuns, the Balochistan issue is mainly presented through the prism of Baloch’s eroded autonomy and lack of control over their resources

Pakhtuns in the province of Balochistan are victims of linear injustice. The most painful and mind-boggling aspect is the blurred understanding of the Balochistan issue among the common Pakistanis as well as intelligentsia. The Balochistan issue is mainly presented through the prism of Baloch’s eroded autonomy and lack of control over their resources in post-independence era. Yet, unlike Pakhtuns, living in the Balochistan province they do not face loss of identity, autonomy and status as major stakeholders.

Perhaps, Pakhtun is the only ethnic group, particularly in Balochistan, whose sufferings began with the advent of the British in the subcontinent and continues hitherto. In the post-independence era, especially in the 1970s, another layer of injustice was added by depriving them of whatever was left by the colonial power.

Baluchistan a Wrong Name and Misnomer and Creation of British : 

Before the British occupation, the name of Balochistan never existed in history to represent a geo-physical entity that was named by the British as British Balochistan and later by Pakistan as the province of Balochistan in the Constitution of 1973.

The Baloch and Brahvi were predominantly living in four princely states — 

1. Kalat, 
2. Kharan, 
3. Lasbela 
4.and Makran. 

Lasbela was  enjoying internal autonomy with a predominantly Baloch Tribal areas ( Still Under Article 247 as tribal Areas ) , Baluchis People of these tribal Areas although a Minority gave the name Baluchistan to this new British Created area . 

1. Marri,
2. Bugti,
3. Chagai
4. and Sinjrani

Khan of Kalat as Head Baluchistan Under Pashtun Durrani Afghan Empire before 1841. 

State of Kalat and its Khan of Kalat , was was Vasal of Afghanistan under ther Durrani Empire of Pashtuns, In the aftermath of the first Anglo-Afghan War, on October 6, 1841 the British handed over Quetta to Khan of Kalat on the occasion of his coronation.

Previously the State of Kalat under Khan of Kalat , remaining as a vassal of the Afghan kingdom of Pashtuns Durrani who,s rule also extended to Sind Karachi and over India till Delhi and Lahore .

State of Kalat carried immense strategic importance for the British expedition in Afghanistan.The British got Nasirabad and Nushki on lease from the Khan of Kalat. The strategic importance of Nushki was to extend railway line to the border of Iran.

The British also extracted the areas of Pishin, Sibi, Chaman, Shahrig, Shora Rud, comprising 95 percent Pakhtun population from Afghanistan that were called assigned districts under the infamous Gandamak Treaty signed on May 26, 1879 at Jalalabad Near Peshawar .

Pashtuns were now Named as British Balochistan a Missnomer although not still being considered a Province as Yet but area joined with NWFP / Pakhtunkhwa and being seperated from Durrand Line from Afghanistan to which it Previously Belonged . 

Ultimately, on November 1, 1887, the areas with 90 per cent of Pakhtun population were declared as Chief Commissioner Province of British Balochistan.

The British officer and later colonial governor of the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sir Olaf Caroe, admitted it was a misnomer given by the British. He suggested that it should be named British Afghanistan while Sir Herbert Aubrey Francis Metcalfe (agent to governor general for British Balochistan 1943) said that it should be named as British Pathanistan instead of British Balochistan.

In 1947, the members of the official jirga and Quetta municipality decided on behalf of the Chief Commissioner Province of the British Balochistan to join the state of Pakistan, whereas the lower and upper house of the Kalat State repudiated the accession of the Khan of Kalat in favour of Pakistan.

Until June 30, 1970, the Chief Commissioner Province of the British Balochistan and the Baloch areas, mostly comprising the princely states, never remained as one administrative unit in the history.

In 1952, the princely states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela were named as Balochistan States Union. In 1955, the Chief Commissioner Province of British Balochistan was named as Quetta Division and three states Kalat, Kharan and Makran of Balochistan States of Union along with Chagai, extracted from the Chief Commissioner Province, were declared as Kalat Division. Both the divisions had equal representation in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. The State of Lasbela was merged into the Karachi Division and Nasirabad was merged into Jacobabad Division that were later returned to Balochistan after the scrapping of one unit.

Further Implementing the British Polices by Punjabi Establishment 

On July 1, 1970, the one unit scheme was abolished by Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan. Consequently, the predominantly Pakhtun populated Quetta Division of the former Chief Commission Province and Baloch majority Kalat Division, along with Lasbela and Nasirabad, were merged into the province of Balochistan.

Pashtuns Lost their Identity and became Baluchistan Occupants now, but the final Blow came in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto time when it was separated from NWFP/ Pakhtunkhwa and NAP/ ANP did not Protest.  

Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai quit the National Awami Party (NAP) in protest over accepting the merger of Pakhtun belt into the Baloch areas and naming them as the province of Balochistan. He formed the Pakhtunkhwa National Awami Party before his martyrdom on December 2, 1973. His son, Mahmood Khan Achakzai, is carrying forward his father’s legacy of democratic struggle.

Political Compromise under a Barrel of a Gun 

Ironically, instead of correcting the injustice committed by the colonial power and the subsequent undemocratic forces, the Constitution of 1973 also endorsed the anomaly adding another ethnic and political fault line to the polarised society of Pakistan.

The leadership of the then NAP, particularly its Pakhtun leaders, either committed a political mistake or made a political compromise by agreeing to the scheme.

The Pakhtun in Balochistan perhaps also seem to be the victim of constituency politics as Pakhtun nationalist leaders from the north were more concerned about the identity and autonomy of the then NWFP and mostly gave a cold shoulder to the identity and autonomy of the southern Pakhtun in Balochistan.

The mainstream media and intelligentsia also ignored this important aspect that added another layer to the problem. Such a blurred understanding would render any solution to the current conflict a superficial one. A lack of attention and preference might be due to a political and democratic struggle adopted by the Pakhtun for attaining their identity and autonomy that seldom attained attention in Pakistan.

It is a rare political issue which is not contested by the Baloch and Pakhtun as the former also recognise the Pakhtun’s rights to identity and autonomy. For instance, Dr Wahid Baloch writes in his essay, “The Solution of Balochistan Problem”, published in The Pakistan Christian Post, “Balochistan’s boundaries need to be redrawn based on historical, ethnic and linguistic line and all Pashtun areas of Balochistan should be joined with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.”

However, making a choice should be the intrinsic democratic right of Pakhtuns whether they opt for a separate unit referred to as “Southern Pakhtunkhwa” by them or prefer to merge with other Pakhtun areas as a unit representing their historical ethnic identity on this side of the Durand Line.

Instead of redressing the colonial era injustices after independence, our security paranoid establishment further confounded the fault lines. Pakistan needs to bridge every fault line rather than take on only terrorism to bring peace and political stability. Needless to say that terrorism is just one manifestation of the flawed security paradigm.
source: http://tns.thenews.com.pk/pakhtuns-in-balochistan/#.VPIvR_mUega

Sunday, February 1, 2015

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma
Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma, If he is to succeed, Afghanistan’s president will need to come to grips with the country’s ethnic tensions. 
By Ali Reza Sarwar


With his impressive background, which includes a stint as a senior official at the World Bank and a ministerial post, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani would not appear to be short of qualifications for leadership. Yet, the president appears on course to be just another Afghan leader who is unable to rule the troubled country. When Ghani delivered his lofty inaugural speech on September 29, 2014, following a disputed election and power-sharing deal, expectations were high. The president made a strong argument in support of what he called the “triangle of stability” – economy, security and human resources – promising to restore Afghanistan’s valuable ancient geopolitical and economic position as the “crossroads of Asia.”

More than 100 days after taking the office, however, and Ghani is bogged down in a serious political crisis, one that draws a gloomy picture of the fragile unity government. He has only in the last few days been able to form a cabinet, leaving Afghanistan’s major public institutions, including ministries, independent departments, and commissions without leaders for months. A recent survey conducted by Afghanistan’s popular private TOLO TV and an independent civil society, shows that Ghani’s popularity has fallen dramatically, with only 27.5 percent of respondents satisfied with his leadership. With insecurity and political uncertainty looming, a number of parliamentarians have asked for Ghani’s impeachment for “treason,” blaming him for Afghanistan’s current state of disarray.

What has gone wrong? Why is this impressively credentialed leader unable to fix Afghanistan? Traditionally, Afghanistan’s woes have been blamed on crippling corruption, weak governance, dismal economic conditions, and worsening security coupled with foreign intervention. While these are certainly painful realities, the root cause of political crisis lies in ethnic politics and the breakdown of consensus among diverse ethnicities in regard to the persistent Pashtun dilemma.

The Pashtun Dilemma

Constituting around 40 percent of the population, Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are on the front lines of the war on terrorism, both as perpetrators and victims. The Taliban that is behind the bulk of the brutal militancy both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are mainly Pashtuns and derive their support from strongholds in tribal areas across Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borders. The mainstream Pashtun intelligentsia in both countries have been mostly uncertain over whether to sympathize with the Taliban as a nationalist movement seeking to restore traditional Pashtun dominance in Afghan politics and to some extent in Pakistan, or to condemn them as an extremist and externally infiltrated militancy that have dragged Pashtuns into an asymmetric confrontations with the U.S.-led coalition at a massive cost in human life.

Despite the Taliban’s indiscriminate attacks on Pashtun areas, including the last year’s suicide bombing in a market in Paktika province that killed 89 people, some leading Pashtun thinkers support the Taliban as a nationalist movement that could restore Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan, which they believe declined following the fall of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 and the following decades of the Soviet invasion and civil wars. For instance, in his article, the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Anwar Ul-Haq Ahady, a former finance and commerce minister under Karzai and an influential Pashtun thinker, believes that the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, was “more significant than the fall of communism. The rise of the Taliban generated optimism among the Pashtuns about the reversal of their decline.”

The view that the Taliban could serve as a powerful Pashtun nationalist movement with the ability to reverse the post-Taliban inter-ethnic relations and political landscape of Afghanistan remained largely visible in during the administration of President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was frequently criticized by the opposition for his lenience towards the Taliban, yet he continued to compromise and push for negotiation. For its part, the Taliban categorically rejected talks, humiliating Karzai as a “puppet and unauthorized” to negotiate. At the grassroots level, particularly in non-Pashtun circles, there has been a difficult debate over whether Karzai would have been as willing to compromise if the Taliban had been a non-Pashtun movement.

Ghani’s Test of Leadership 

Ghani, a Pashtun himself, already seems incapacitated by the Pashtun factor. If he is to get to grips with the problem, he will need to address several important issues.

First, it should be realized that the war on terror is being fought mainly in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this reality constrains the political status of Pashtun in both countries. To overcome this, Pashtun leaders and intelligentsia, including Ghani himself, need to draw a stark line between the Taliban as a radical movement linked to global terrorist networks, and the legitimate cause of Pashtuns for justice. Fail to do that and Pashtuns will only be more isolated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and forever in conflict with non-Pashtun groups and the international community. Breaking with the Taliban should also not be limited to the official level; the debate should move to the heart of Pashtun tribes and traditions that continue to provide the Taliban with sanctuaries and new recruits.

Second, the dynamics of ethnic relations and politics have fundamentally changed in Afghanistan and Pashtuns must face the reality that the time for a despotic monarchy or factional regime like that of the Taliban has passed. In the worst possible scenario, the collapse of Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy and unity government could lead to chaotic civil war, but it will not permit the emergence of a Pashtun-dominated government, just as it will not allow a government that excludes Pashtuns. Pashtuns will need to renegotiate their relationship with other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and this will inevitably mean giving up some of the privileges they enjoyed in earlier times.

Ghani could play a pivotal role in pushing this message among Pashtuns, but he seems to be replicating the failings of his predecessor. Like Karzai, Ghani is uncertain whether to consider the Taliban enemies or political dissidents. For the moment, he believes they are political opponents, a designation that would baffle many Pashtuns and all non-Pashtuns who have suffered under the Taliban’s violence. Ghani has been clear on his desire to reach a diplomatic settlement with Pakistan, and has also increased his contacts with nationalist Pashtun leaders in Pakistan. In fact, he recently hosted them in Kabul, a risky move that will have infuriated Pakistan’s government and intelligence agency given Pakistan’s long obsession with Pashtun nationalism.

Clearly, there will be no peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the region without the genuine participation of Pashtuns. Yet Pashtuns’ failure to engage constructively with non-Pashtuns in a democratic process that rejects the Taliban will only lead to their isolation. Ghani is the one man who could achieve this engagement, and he will need to do so if he desires to escape the fate of other Afghan rulers.

Ali Reza Sarwar is a Fulbright Graduate Fellow at Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government and Public Service where he is completing a master’s degree in Intelligence and National Security. Reza graduated from the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) where he was also in charge of the university’s enrollment management plan.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/ashraf-ghani-and-the-pashtun-dilemma/


Wednesday, December 31, 2014

The Unsolved Pashtun Question in Af-Pak

Divide and Rule of British Implemented since 1857 continue by Inherited sons of Pakistan in Punjab who Plays with Fire by Trying to Enslave Pashtuns whom they consider not to be their Equal and it  Treats Pashtuns and Afghans as their Fifth Province and subjects . 

ANSWERING THE PASHTUN QUESTION


Answering the Pashtun Question
by Myra MacDonald
December 29, 2014 · in Book Reviews on a Book by  Abubakar Siddique, The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan(C. Hurst & Co. 2014)



The “mujahideen” reached Peshawar in the early 19th century, bringing with them a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and the readiness of zealots to use violence – then against the Sikhs. Their leader, Sayyid Ahmed from Rae Bareilly in northern India, who was inspired by the reformist preacher Shah Waliullah, is still celebrated today in the officially sanctioned ideology of Pakistan as a forefather of modern jihad. But local Pashtuns, who disliked his severe interpretation of Islam, rejected him and the Sikhs killed him in 1831. 

The story is significant in showing how in the history of the region, extremism and religiously sanctioned violence was just as likely to move from east to west, from the heartland of undivided British India to Pashtun lands, as it was to move from west to east. It has all the more resonance following this month’s attack by Taliban militants on a school in Peshawar, in which more than 140 people – most of them children – were killed. It is an attack that Pakistan would desperately prefer to blame on an external enemy hiding among the Pashtuns to the northwest than on influences radiating outwards from its heartland.

The narrative that the dangers of extremism would come from predominantly Pashtun lands to the northwest of British India – including large parts of modern-day Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) adjacent to Peshawar – is of British origin. It was a convenient way for colonial functionaries to explain to London their poor judgment, which led to the massacre of a British army on its retreat from Kabul in 1842. 

That retreat took place more than a decade after Sayyid Ahmed died, and yet it is far more frequently cited as a foundational moment for the development of jihad in the region than his arrival in Peshawar from the east. Later, the British would relegate the Pashtun lands to the periphery of the British Raj, happy to avoid the burden of governance provided that Afghanistan accepted British tutelage on foreign policy. 

The British colonial spotlight on the Indian subcontinent meant that the history of Afghanistan was often consigned to the shadows. If there were a grammar of Raj thinking, the Pashtuns would always be the objects of a sentence, never its subjects.

The Pakistani state, the direct inheritor of British colonial power in the lands bordering Afghanistan, has preserved many elements of the Raj view of Pashtuns. Its military continues to see Afghanistan as a country over which it has rightful influence – as it has proved with its enduring support for the Afghan Taliban and other Pashtun groups opposed to the government in Kabul. 

It still governs the Pashtun tribes living in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) through the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation. Since the United States overthrew the Taliban in Kabul in 2001, Pakistan has also been able to rely on an orientalist description of “untameable” Pashtuns to explain resistance to the American presence in Afghanistan.

 This explanation also allows Pakistan to avoid its own active role in Afghanistan’s instability. Some years back, Pakistan’s military establishment, which runs foreign and security policy, even managed to convince many at home and in the West that the Pakistani Taliban were essentially wild tribals riled up by U.S. drone strikes in FATA

After the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, claimed responsibility for the attack on the school in Peshawar this month, Pakistan’s attention has again been primarily focused on the northwest. 

The day after the attack, Pakistan Army chief General Raheel Sharif travelled to Kabul to demand its help in hunting down Pakistani Taliban leaders that Pakistan says are based in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Air Force stepped up its attacks on militant targets in FATA – the days of worrying about civilian casualties from air strikes seem to be long gone. Just as the British view had relocated violent Islamist extremism to the northwest from the heartland of undivided India where it found its intellectual roots, Pakistan did the same in its response to the Peshawar attack. 

It is not that there are no Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan or FATA. There are. The point is that the roots of Islamist militancy come from deep within Pakistan; the use of religiously sanctioned violence is integral to its history and ideology. 

Its heartland in Punjab province is home to violent militant groups nurtured for decades by the military to impose its will domestically and to fight India. But this problem in the heartland is all the more easily ignored if attention is focused on what the Raj called its “Northwest Frontier” – on the wild tribal Pashtun of the colonial imagination. The enemy becomes external.

In his book, The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan, journalist Abubakar Siddique – who is from Waziristan in FATA – sets out to show that violent extremism is neither rooted in Pashtun history nor finds willing hosts among its tribes. He highlights how Pashtuns comprised not only “ungoverned” tribes but also conquerors and rulers, like the Lodi dynasty, which ruled in northern India from 1451 to 1526. 

Rather than celebrating bearded, religious extremists, the heroes of Pashtun history are poets, proponents of non-violence, and Sufis. The Pashtun leader Ahmad Shah Abdali of the Durrani tribal confederation fought and won what was one of the world’s most important battles in the 18th century when his forces defeated the Marathas in The Third Battle of Panipat north of Delhi in 1761. 

Tellingly, Pakistan has appropriated this victory in its official histories as one of Muslims over Hindus rather than one of Pashtuns over Marathas; it suppresses Pashtun ethnicity and replaces it with Islamic ideology. This effort to stress Islam over ethnic identity is one that has defined Pakistan’s attitude to its own Pashtuns, and to Afghanistan, for decades.

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been troubled. Afghanistan refused initially even to recognise Pakistan at the United Nations. To this day, it refuses to recognise the colonial-era Durand Line as the official border, instead harbouring claims to Pashtun lands on the Pakistani side as far as the Indus River. Pakistan has also fretted about the Pashtuns on its side of the Durand Line hankering after a separate Pashtunistan, an idea floated in the mid-20th century. 

The Soviet invasion in 1979, and the American and Saudi money provided to fund the Afghan resistance, gave Pakistan the perfect opportunity to exert its influence on Afghanistan while undermining Pashtun nationalism. With its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency running the resistance, Pakistan made sure to encourage distinctly Islamist fighters whose commitment to the “jihad” against the Soviets would override any attachment to the ethnic Pashtun cause. Pakistan’s subsequent support for the Afghan Taliban who took power in 1996, Siddique notes, created a form of “Pashtun Islamism” that bitterly divided Pashtuns in Pakistan between those who supported the Pakistani establishment and secular nationalists, while also alienating many Afghan Pashtuns.

Siddique’s history is followed by detailed accounts of the war in key parts of Afghanistan and FATA after 2001, when Pakistan formally promised to work with the United States against the Taliban. Instead, he writes, Islamabad followed “a classic game of doubletalk, in which it sent out different messages to different audiences in hopes of capitalising on the ignorance of both, and gambling that its deception would not be noticed by anyone in a position to do anything about it.” The Pashtuns, who would become the main tools and victims of the conflict, of course, noticed it.

The book is at its best when Siddique brings his own first-hand knowledge to bear, particularly in a region so hard for foreigners to visit. On a trip to Quetta, capital of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, he notes for example that, “it was not difficult to find Afghan Taliban fighters in Quetta. There were hundreds of them, perhaps thousands…” To outsiders they might have seemed indistinguishable from Pakistani Pashtuns, but to Siddique “the way they fastened their turbans, the slight variations of their Pashto dialect, their unkempt long beards and hair, and the way they walked around in packs, distinguished the Afghan Taliban from ordinary residents.”

Given the richness of the material he has collated, the book is, however, surprisingly tame in its conclusions. What Siddique describes as “the unresolved key to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan” essentially echoes the arguments of the Pakistani military establishment: that violence cannot be ended unless Pakistan’s security concerns are assuaged. 

Thus, he writes that Washington should encourage “Afghanistan and India to effectively address, respectively, Pakistani security concerns related to the Pashtun and Baloch border regions and Kashmir.” He also argues that “true stability will not be possible without a comprehensive settlement between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” which would include an agreement on the Durand Line while also keeping the border open for the movement of people and goods. 

These are arguments which have been made by other analysts groping for a solution to the Afghan war. Yet Pakistan’s problems with Islamist militancy run far deeper than the insecurity of its borders. If its nuclear tests in 1998 could not make it feel secure, Afghanistan’s recognition of the Durand Line is unlikely to make much difference. Moreover, having attempted to establish that violent extremism does not have its roots in Pashtun history or culture, Siddique falls into the trap of seeking solutions from within Pashtun lands rather than at the core of the Pakistani state.

It would have been great to see a much bolder conclusion, one which, rather than continuing the British colonial pattern of trying to impose a settlement on the periphery, looks instead at the problems inherent in the Pakistani heartland and its inability to accommodate ethnic diversity. 

He might have found a need to upend a system that depends on preserving many of the repressive structures of the British security state while stressing the unifying role of Islam to suppress the different ethnic identities of its people. After all, Pakistan already lost more than half its population in 1971, when ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan broke away, with Indian help, to form Bangladesh. 

Siddique’s book might have opened the way for a leap of imagination that would have addressed the centre far more clearly from the perspective of the Pashtun periphery. Instead, in what appears to be an effort at balance, he ends up repeating the standard security paradigm that Pakistan has somehow imposed on the vast majority of writers and analysts at home and abroad. His book, however, with its wealth of richly footnoted analysis and history, is an essential volume for anyone studying the region or the U.S. war in Afghanistan.


Myra MacDonald is a former Reuters journalist who has reported on Pakistan and India since 2000. She is the author of “Heights of Madness”, a book on the Siachen war fought in the mountains beyond Kashmir on the world’s highest battlefield. She is now working on a book about the relationship between India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests in 1998. She lives in Scotland and can be found on Twitter @myraemacdonald.

source: http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/answering-the-pashtun-question/

Thursday, December 25, 2014

Eidhi welfare work as explained does not meet Noble Peace Prize Criteria of Working for Peace.


Living in Norway since 1975, Syed Mujahid Ali is a Pakistani-Norwegian journalist. In the past, he has worked with Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation NRK, Urdu Service. He hascontributed regular column for Norwegian daily Arbeiderbladet (now Dagsavisen) besides publishing and editing Urdu-language Monthly Karwan from Oslo (1981-1997). Presently, he is editing the news portal www.karwan.no since 2011. It is updated on daily basis. Apart from updating news, this portal covers world events with a critical perspective.In an interview with Viewpoint, he discusses various aspects of the debate generated by Malala Yusufzai's crowning as Noble laureate. Read on:

Written by Syed Mujahid Ali/Adnan Farooq
Thursday, 16 October 2014 17:02 
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Will you explain to us the procedure followed by the Noble Committee when it grants the Noble Peace Prize?

The Norwegian Nobel Committee is responsible for the selection of eligible candidates and the choice of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates. The Committee is composed of five members appointed by the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded in Oslo, Norway.


The process of selecting the candidates starts almost a year prior to the announcement. Suggestions are received by the 1st of February every year. Committee members can add further names to the list in a meeting held after this date. However, after this date the nomination process is closed. In the period February to March the candidates are shortlisted. Normally 20-25 candidates are selected for further consideration. Then the Nobel Committee’s experts or advisors give their opinion. These experts are normally Norwegian academics with knowledge in different fields. In certain cases, the Committee administration also gets opinion from international experts. This process is completed by September. The Committee then meets in the first week of October to select the winning candidate for that year.
Traditionally, the Committee tries to make a unanimous decision, but if that is not possiblethe winner is selected on the basis of majority opinion. The decision is announced on the 10th of October each year.
Who nominates the possible winners of the Noble Peace Prize?

The following can nominate a candidate for the Peace Prize:

Members of national assemblies and governments of states; Members of international courts; University rectors; Professors of social sciences, history, philosophy, law and theology; Directors of peace research institutes and foreign policy institutes; Persons who have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; Board members of organizations that have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; Active and former members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee (proposals by members of the Committee need to be submitted no later than at the first meeting of the Committee after the 1st of February); Former advisors to the Norwegian Nobel Committee

Is it true that former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was also nominated for the Noble Peace Prize?

There is a fifty-year secrecy rule regarding the nominees of the Nobel Peace Prize. The Committee itself never announces the names of the nominees—neither to the media nor to the candidates themselves. Speculations in this respect are normally either guesswork or the result of disclosure by persons who have nominated the candidate. Therefore, it is not possible for me to confirm if the former Chief Justice was nominated or not. Information in the Nobel Committees’ nomination database is not made public until after fifty years.



Many in Pakistan have been questioning the wisdom of granting the Noble Peace Prize to Malala. Why, for instance, ask these critics, was Malala preferred over noted philanthropist Maulana Abdul SattarEdhi?

The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded according to the will of Alfred Nobel. The will states that award shall be given:

“to the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between the nations and the abolition or reduction of standing armies and the formation and spreading of peace congresses”

The Nobel Committee has redefined this part of will, and has awarded the prize to people or organizations who according to them work towards eliminating causes giving birth to conflicts or wars. There is an intense debate within and outside Norway regarding this interpretation of the Committee. Many believe that the prize must go to a person who has played an active role in reducing armies or in stopping a war or an armed conflict.



Given this background, Maulana Abdul SattarEidhi and his welfare work does not fall under the defined criteria, although he remains a great man and an institution in his own capacity. This year’s prize has been awarded to KailashSatyarthi and Malala Yousafzai for their work for the rights of children. The Committee means that through this work these two have contributed greatly in achieving harmony in the world.

I personally believe that giving this prize to Malala is correct decision even if one follows Alfred Nobel’s will strictly. She is not merely an education activist, but courageouslyshe stood up to one of the greatest dangers to world peace today—extremists such as the Taliban. She has become a symbol of resistance to extremists and their warmongering. There have been reports in Norway that Malala was an extremely strong candidate even in 2013 but was not given the prize due to her young age. She was only sixteen then.

Tell us about media debates in Norway, if any, that routinely mark the occasion of the announcement of the Noble Peace Prize? Any debates over the Malala decision? Is it an attempt to win Pakistani voters who constitute the biggest migrant community in the country?

It is farfetched to state that the Nobel Committee selects a candidate to woo voters for a political party in Norwegian elections. Firstly, the government or political parties have no influence on the decisions of the Nobel Committee. Secondly, there are members of different political affiliations in the committee. It is unthinkable that they sit down to make a decision about the biggest peace prize in the world and have their constituency in mind. Thirdly, apart from greater Oslo,Pakistani immigrants are not concentrated in any other part of the country. Since there is proportional voting system in Norway where parties get seats according to the votes cast in their favour, immigrants cannot have much influence, especially in national elections—even if they function as one group and that is also unimaginable.

Within Norway, there is traditionally a debate about the merits and demerits of a decision of the Nobel Committee. Many a times, the Committee’s decision is bitterly criticized. However, this time the Norwegian media and the politicians have welcomed the decision. Almost all comments have been positive and supportive.

Malala has requested Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi to attend the Noble Prize award ceremony. Has there been any reaction to her suggestion in Norwegian media?

I have not read any big discussion on that topic in Norway. But the suggestion has been mentioned in press reports. Indian President Pranab Mukherjee was also asked about the invitation at the startof his official visit to Norway on October 13. He refused to comment on it and said that it was up to the Prime Ministers of both countries to make the decision. He congratulated the Nobel Committee in its decision to award this year’s prize to Kailash Satyarthi and Malala Yousafzaiand said that Malala was a brave girl who stood up for the cause of education despite threats to her life.

While many in Pakistan have welcomed and celebrated Malala’s peace prize, conservative circles and even the Taliban have criticized the decision. Any anti-Malala voices in Norway?

As I mentioned above, in Norway, support for awarding the prize to Malala is almost unanimous. There is a strong feeling that she has been awarded this prize for her courage and campaign against the methods and the cruelty of the Taliban. She was attacked by the Taliban in 2012 and barely survived the attack. She is under constant threat from extremists even now. Despite that, she stands bravely for the cause of girls’ right to education. She even travelled to Nigeria to reject Boko Haram’s methods and kidnapping of schoolgirls. The Malala Fund is also sponsoring a girl’s school in Nigeria.

One critic says:‘Malala is remarkable, but we must resist the urge to make her exceptional. There is a long legacy to the exceptionalizing narrative when it comes to Muslims, and it works like this: “The majority of folks ‘over there’ are either monsters or victims. Every now and then, there is an isolated solitary hero that stands against that. That hero supports‘our’ values”. That tendency to view the lone solitary hero(ine) of the Muslim masses, the need to have the solitary exceptional Muslim is part of the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” game. And we are done playing these games.’Your comments?

Firstly, the author of this note fails to register that this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to “one Muslim and one Hindu, an Indian and a Pakistani”. Therefore, there is no reason to apply this conspiracy theory to this case. Secondly, the comment also fails to note that the prize is not awarded for making Malala exceptional—she already was. That could be said about Satyarthi though, who was little known for his work in and outside India. Since he is a Hindu, the theory does not fit. Thirdly, this whole statement is based on the traditional conservative mind-set of ours that there is always a big intrigue against Pakistan and Muslims in all Western capitals. I do not buy conspiracy theories. Fourthly, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded every year. Malala is only the seventh Muslim to get this Prize in the 114-year-old history of Nobel Peace Prizes. That is hardly the due share of Muslims if we see it in light of their population ratio in the world.The Nobel Peace Prize has earned its good name over the years because its integrity and neutrality is protected. It is an extreme view that the prize is political and awarded to safeguard the West’s political interests.

SOURCE: http://www.viewpointonline.net/2014/10/vp223/eidhi-s-welfare-work-does-not-meet-noble-s-criteria


Wednesday, December 24, 2014

Pashtuns and Baluchi this Will not be the Last Massacre





It wasn’t the final atrocity
Pervez Hoodbhoy
Updated Dec 20, 2014 09:23am

THE gut-wrenching massacre in Peshawar’s Army Public School has left Pakistan aghast and sickened. All political leaders have called for unity against terrorism. But this is no watershed event that can bridge the deep divides within. In another few days this episode of 134 dead children will become one like any other.

All tragedies provoke emotional exhortations. But nothing changed after Lakki Marwat when 105 spectators of a volleyball match were killed by a suicide bomber in a pickup truck. Or, when 96 Hazaras in a snooker club died in a double suicide attack. The 127 dead in the All Saints Church bombing in Peshawar, or the 90 Ahmadis killed while in prayer, are now dry statistics. In 2012, men in military uniforms stopped four buses bound from Rawalpindi to Gilgit, demanding that all 117 persons alight and show their national identification cards. Those with typical Shia names, like Abbas and Jafri, were separated. Minutes later corpses lay on the ground.

If Pakistan had a collective conscience, just one single fact could have woken it up: the murder of nearly 60 polio workers — women and men who work to save children from a crippling disease — at the hands of the fanatics.

Hence the horrible inevitability: from time to time, Pakistan shall continue to witness more such catastrophes. No security measures can ever prevent attacks on soft targets. The only possible solution is to change mindsets. For this we must grapple with three hard facts.

First, let’s openly admit that the killers are not outsiders or infidels. Instead, they are fighting a war for the reason Boko Haram fights in Nigeria, IS in Iraq and Syria, Al Shabab in Kenya, etc. The men who slaughtered our children are fighting for a dream — to destroy Pakistan as a Muslim state and recreate it as an Islamic state. This is why they also attack airports and shoot at PIA planes. They see these as necessary steps towards their utopia.
Let’s openly admit that the killers are not outsiders or infidels.

No one should speculate about the identity of the killers. Taliban spokesman Muhammad Umar Khorasani released pictures of the eight ‘martyrs’, justifying the killing of minors with reference to Hadith (a horrific perversion, of course). Dizzied by religious passions, the men roamed the school searching for children hiding under desks and shouted “Allah-o-Akbar” before opening fire. Shot in both legs, Shahrukh Khan, 16, says he survived by playing dead. Another surviving student, Aamir Ali, says that two clean-shaven gunmen told students to recite the kalima before shooting them multiple times.

Second, Pakistan must scorn and punish those who either support terrorism publicly or lie to us about the identity of terrorists. Television anchors and political personalities have made their fortunes and careers by fabricating wild theories. For example, retired Gen Hamid Gul and his son Abdullah Gul have adamantly insisted multiple times on TV that suicide attackers were not circumcised and hence not Muslim. Though body parts are plentifully available for inspection these days, they have not retracted earlier claims.

Those on the state’s payroll that encourage violence against the state must be dismissed. Maulana Abdul Aziz of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid — a government mosque — led an insurrection in 2007 against the Pakistani state. He flatly refuses to condemn the Peshawar massacre. Other state employees have called upon all to not pray for army soldiers killed in action. At another level is Jamaatud Dawa’s supremo, Hafiz Saeed. He blames India for the Peshawar massacre and, ignoring ironclad evidence, misguides Pakistanis about the identity of the enemy.

Among political leaders, none is more blameworthy than Imran Khan, the icon of millions of immature minds. He has never named the Taliban as terrorists even when they claimed responsibility for various atrocities. That the TTP may be involved in the Peshawar massacre is the first exception, but this is contained only in a tweet. For a man who uses the strongest language against political opponents and has hogged TV channels for months, he has yet to condemn TTP before a national audience. Why the reticence?

It was even worse earlier. In 2009, as the Taliban took over Swat, on Hamid Mir’s Capital Talk he claimed that the Swat Taliban were fighting a war of liberation against the Americans. When I asked why they were fighting in Pakistan and killing our policemen and soldiers, he accused me of being an American agent and then, later, attempted to physically attack me. Readers can google this video.

Third, if Pakistan is to be at peace with itself then it must seek peace with its neighbours and begin disassembling the apparatus of jihad. The bitter truth is that you reap what you sow. Today, massive militant establishments hold the Pakistani state hostage. They run their own training centres, hospitals, and disaster relief programmes. When Sartaj Aziz, adviser to the prime minister on foreign affairs, said that Pakistan was not going to target militant groups which “did not pose a threat to the state”, he accidentally spilled the beans. In fact he was merely restating Pakistan’s well-known zero-sum paradigm — we live to hurt others, not to better ourselves.

While bewailing the murder of our children, let us acknowledge that Pakistan’s soil has been used time and again for inflicting grief and sorrow across the world. Today it is not just India and Afghanistan who accuse us, but also China and Iran.

By launching Zarb-i-Azb, Gen Raheel Sharif has broken with his timid predecessor, Gen Kayani. North Waziristan should never have become the epicentre of terrorism. He has done well to meet President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul and demand the extradition of TTP’s Mullah Fazlullah, now ensconced on the Afghan side. But what of Mullah Omar? The Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban are two sides of the same coin. I wonder if President Ghani asked General Sharif to help extradite Mullah Omar for facing justice before the Afghan people.

The author teaches physics in Lahore and Islamabad.

Published in Dawn December 20th , 2014: http://www.dawn.com/news/1151930/it-wasnt-the-final-atrocity

Wednesday, December 3, 2014

No Accommodation for FATA Students on Federal Seat in Punjab Universities

From the NewspaperPublished Nov 30, 2014 07:28am
Letter of Poor FATA Student 



I RECENTLY completed my graduation from Government College University Lahore in philosophy and applied to the Punjab University Lahore for M.Phil.

I was selected after a tough competition in the department of philosophy. Hailing from South Waziristan Agency (Federally Administrated Tribal Area) the Mahsud tribe, I had no accommodation in Lahore and applied for a room in the university hostel.

After a fortnight I was allotted a room in Sir Syed International Boys Hostel No 2.
When I visited the hostel, I was told that my documents were being processed and another two weeks passed. During this time I lived in a private hostel and found it difficult to concentrate on my academics as this place was far from the university and expensive as well.

After another two weeks when I asked the hostel superintendent about my room, I was told that I would not get a room because I belonged to South Waziristan Agency, Fata and the international students residing there may feel insecure because of my presence in the hostel. As an M.Phil student I am at a loss to understand the administration’s logic.

Campuses are supposed to be places where people from diverse backgrounds come and understand each other. In this way they develop a room for imbibing diversity in themselves and are in a better position to later serve in society.

Disallowing people from different backgrounds to come close to each other is promoting and reinforcing stereotypes about each other. This should not be the essence of any educational institution.

Unfortunately in our universities, the participatory culture is not applied so that students from diverse backgrounds can understand each other. This practise becomes all the more alarming when it becomes the policy of an institution of higher learning to segregate students which happened in my case. These practices reflect adversely on our society.
Rafi ud din Mahsud
South Waziristan Agency, Fata
Published in Dawn, November 30th , 2014
source; http://www.dawn.com/news/1147773

Sunday, November 16, 2014

200 Year old Icon Khan Klub of Peshawar Heritage falls to Mullahcarcy and Punjabi Establishment Proxy Wars.






A view of Peshawar city’s iconic 200-year-old building Khan Klub. PHOTO: EXPRESS

PESHAWAR: Once upon a time, Khan Klub resembled a part of some fabled land right out of an ancient tale. Today the boutique hotel — that was actually a Hindu haveli — is enveloped in particles of flour, and looks nothing like it used to.

Once a favourite haunt of visiting foreigners, it is now employed for commercial purposes. The hotel building is now in a shambles and its halls have been turned into a flour godown.

Built over 200 years ago, the place was renovated and converted into a hotel in 1995 by Martin Jay Davis, an Irish-American, in partnership with a local by the name of Inayatullah. It soon emerged as one of the city’s most attractive hotels. Its rooms were named and designed according to certain themes, says Adil Zareef, head of the Sarhad Conservation Network.

Abdul Qayyum, who was once associated with the Khan Klub, told The Express Tribune that people from around the world have stayed here during their sojourn in Peshawar. “We have seen foreigners here from every part of the world who used to stay in the city without any fear,” said Qayyum.

After 2001 Khan Klub fell into a state of rapid decline. That was when militancy erupted and visitors started avoiding Peshawar.

“Ultimately the Klub had to be closed down. Before militancy, however, its boisterous New Year celebrations invoked the wrath of the Jamaat-e-Islami which accused it of spreading vulgarity in the city.”



“The federal government does not facilitate foreign tourists in K-P. Also, there is a lack of political will in K-P government officials to make efforts for the preservation of the 3,000-year old city,” said Zareef.

In Peshawar alone, there are 300 sites which can earn huge revenue through tourism. Before Khan Klub, Peshawar also lost Deans hotel — the only European-style hotel constructed by the British government — which has since been replaced by a shopping plaza.

The club in situated at the junction of the historical markets of the city, on a side of the old walled city of Peshawar. It has strong influences of old Peshawari architecture. The ceilings of some of its rooms are as high as 22 feet.



The spacious basement where once some of the most famous musicians performed the cultural music of the Pakhtuns is now a flour godown. Reminiscing about the good old days, Qayyum said that the Rabab along with tabla was a regular feature every day.

The Klub used to serve traditional as well as western foods and drinks, but Pakhtun culture was always prominent. In a dining hall done up to remind one of the Mughal era, tourists used to rest on traditional cushions and devour delicacies like Kabuli Pulao before washing down the same with Qahwa. Here was once the most expensive restaurant in the city. A small library of books on the history and culture of the province was also established there to provide maximum information to the visitors.

In Qayyum’s opinion, the club was opened mainly to entertain tourists, and it closed down due to an absence of foreigners. He added that when the owners of the building tried to sell it, no one was ready to invest such a huge amount of money, and potential buyers did not see it as economically feasible option.

“As a part of the fabric of society, buildings have a relation with the social, economic and political system. Without them, nothing will be left of our culture,” adds Zareef.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 16th, 2014.

source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/791922/khan-klub-another-icon-of-peshawar-heritage-falls/

The Art of peace ANP stalwart launches anti-war book





The book is based on the proceedings of a two-day event held in April 2012. The talks held during the event were then compiled in written form by Lala. PHOTO: NNI

PESHAWAR: Veteran politician of the Awami National Party, Afzal Khan Lala, launched his book ‘Da Pukhtano Pa Khawra Praday Jhagarha’ (Ghost war on Pakhtun soil) at a ceremony held at Peshawar Press Club on Saturday.

“Pukhtuns have not stood united as a nation since 1893,” said Lala while speaking on the occasion, referring to the year the Durand Line was drawn. “People cannot win without unity and Pukhtuns can never become a great nation unless they exhibit unity among them.”

Lala said Pakistan, Afghanistan and India should work towards bringing peace to their respective countries.



Pashto scholars and intellectuals can play an active role in bringing peace by using the power of their pens, but unfortunately, they are not writing anything positive in this regard, he lamented.

The book is based on the proceedings of a two-day event held in April 2012. The talks held during the event were then compiled in written form by Lala.

The event was an international one with participants from Afghanistan also in attendance. Speakers stressed on how peace could be restored in Pakistan and its western neighbour.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 16th, 2014.
source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/791760/the-art-of-peace-anp-stalwart-launches-anti-war-book/

Sunday, September 28, 2014

How Afghans gave Indian Subcontinent Various Religions and Culture over Thousands of Years

History



Excavation of prehistoric sites suggests that early humans lived in northern Afghanistan at least 50,000 years ago and that farming communities in Afghanistan were among the earliest in the world. After 2000 bc successive waves of people from Central Asia moved into the area. Since many of these settlers were Aryans (speakers of the parent language of the Indo-European languages), a people who also migrated to Persia (now Iran) and India in prehistoric times, the area was called Aryana, or Land of the Aryans.
By the middle of the 6th century bc the Persian Empire of the Achaemenid dynasty controlled the region of Aryana. About 330 bc, Alexander the Great defeated the last Achaemenid ruler and made his way to the eastern limits of Aryana and beyond. After his death in 323 bc several kingdoms fought for control of his Asian empire. These kingdoms included Seleucids, Bactria, and the Indian Mauryan Empire.
A. Buddhist Period:
About the 1st century ad the Kushans, a central Asian people, won control of Aryana. Buddhism was the dominant religion from the 3rd century to the 8th century ad. Ruins of many monasteries and stupas, or reliquary mounds (structures where sacred relics are kept or displayed), from that period still remain. They line what was once a great Buddhist pilgrimage road from India to Balkh, in northern Afghanistan, and on into Central Asia.
Kushan power was destroyed at the end of the 4th century ad by a Turkic people of central Asian origin called the White Huns or Ephthalites. After the Ephthalites, the area was divided among several kingdoms, some Buddhist, some Hindu.
B. Islamic Period
In the 7th century ad Arab armies carried the new religion of Islam to Afghanistan. The western provinces of Herāt and Sistan came under Arab rule, but the people of these provinces revolted and returned to their old beliefs as soon as the Arab armies passed. In the 10th century Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara in what is now Uzbekistan, extended their influence into the Afghan area. A Samanid established a dynasty in Ghaznī called the Ghaznavids. The greatest Ghaznavid king, Mahmud, who ruled from 998 to 1030, established Islam throughout the area of Afghanistan. He led many military expeditions into India. Ghaznī became a center of literature and the arts.
The Ghaznavid state grew weaker under Mahmud’s descendants and gave way in the middle of the 12th century to the Ghurid kingdom, which arose in Ghur, in the west central region of present-day Afghanistan. The Ghurids in turn were routed early in the 13th century by the Khwarizm Shahs, another central Asian dynasty. They were swept away in about 1220 by the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan, who devastated the land.
Near the end of the 14th century the central Asian military leader Tamerlane (Timur Lang) conquered the region of Afghanistan and moved on into India. His sons and grandsons, the Timurids, could not hold Tamerlane’s empire together. However, they ruled most of present-day Afghanistan from Herāt.
The period from the Ghurid through the Timurid dynasty produced fine Islamic architectural monuments. Many of these mosques, shrines, and minarets still stand in Herāt, Qal‘eh-ye Bost, Ghaznī, and Mazār-e Sharīf. An important school of miniature painting flourished at Herāt in the 15th century.
A descendant of Tamerlane on his father’s side and Genghis Khan on his mother’s side, Babur (Zahiruddin Muhammad) took Kābul in October 1504 and then moved on to India, where he established the Mughal Empire.
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the rulers of the Mughal Empire, centered in India, and those of the Safavid dynasty, in Persia. Usually the Mughals held Kābul and the Persians held Herāt, with Kandahār frequently changing hands. The Pashtun tribes increased their power, but they failed to win independence.
C. An Afghan Empire:
In the 18th century, Nadir Shah, the king of Persia, employed the Abdali tribe of Pashtuns in his wars in India. Ahmad Shah, an Abdali chief who had gained a high post in Nadir Shah’s army, established himself in Kandahār after Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747. An assembly of tribal chiefs proclaimed him shah, and the Afghans extended their rule as far east as Kashmīr and Delhi, north to the Amu Darya, and west into northern Persia.
Ahmad retired from the throne in 1772 and died in Kandahār, whereupon his son Timur Shah assumed control. The Afghan empire survived largely intact through the next 20 years. He established his capital in Kābul to draw power away from his rivals in Kandahār, as well as to be closer to his richest province, the Punjab of India. Following Timur’s death in 1793, palace rivalries and internal conflicts led to the disintegration of the empire. Two sons of Timur, Shah Shuja and Shah Mahmud, fought over the remnants of the Afghan empire, with Shuja finally going into exile in India and Mahmud withdrawing to Herāt, as a number of other small principalities emerged throughout Afghanistan.
Dost Muhammad Khan emerged as the new ruler, or emir, in Kābul by 1826. Among the most pressing problems he faced was repelling the westward encroachment of the Sikhs, who gained control of the Punjab and the region up to the Khyber Pass, including the important trading post of Peshāwar. In 1837 Dost Muhammad’s forces defeated the Sikhs at Jamrūd, but failed to recover Peshāwar. This conflict and the arrival of a new Russian envoy in Kābul made the British, who were allies of the Sikhs, extremely nervous about the security of the western frontier of their growing empire in India. These events played out during the so-called Great Game between the Russian “bear” and the British “lion,” with both empires vying for regional dominance and Afghanistan becoming caught between them. In 1838 Lord Auckland, the British governor-general of India, ordered military intervention in Afghanistan to protect British interests, thereby setting off the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). With British and Sikh manipulation and support, Shah Shuja returned to Afghanistan to overthrow Dost Muhammad, as a British garrison was established in Kābul and elsewhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.
A revolt by Dost Muhammad’s son Muhammad Akbar Khan led to the forced withdrawal of the British garrison from Kābul in the winter of 1842. Ambushed during the retreat, nearly all of the some 4,500 British troops and their 12,000 camp followers were killed. Dost Muhammad was able to return to Kābul, from where he spent the next 20 years reunifying parts of Afghanistan until his death in 1863.
Dost Muhammad designated his third son, Sher Ali, as his successor, but civil war erupted as rivals to Sher Ali vied for control. Sher Ali defeated his rivals, notably his brother Afzul Khan, by 1868. At the same time he tried to maintain good relations with the British Raj (British-ruled India). However, the Russian conquests in Central Asia had brought that empire to the Amu Darya river on the northern border of Afghanistan by 1847. The negotiations of a Russian envoy in Kābul renewed the unease of the British, who consequently invaded Afghanistan, instigating the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880). Sher Ali was deposed in 1879, but the British, realizing the difficulties of ruling from within Afghanistan, in 1880 invited a nephew of Sher Ali, Abdur Rahman Khan (Afzul Khan’s son), to rule at their behest. However, the British limited his power beyond the borders of Afghanistan by securing control of Afghan foreign relations.
Known as the Iron Emir, Abdur Rahman recognized the threat from the expansionistic Russians and the defensive British. As a result he allowed the foreign delineation of his borders to encompass a smaller territory than he actually considered to be Afghanistan. The emergence of the present-day configuration of the country, with its narrow panhandle of the Wakhan Corridor projecting to China on the northeast, is an example of the establishment of a classic buffer state, in which, to avoid inadvertent conflict, the borders of the Russian and British empires were to have no contact points in common. Similarly, the establishment of the Durand Line, the southeastern border of Afghanistan, divided the territory of the militant Pashtun tribe into two halves, with one half under the control of the British Raj, and the other inside Afghanistan. This divide-and-rule policy allowed some nominal control of a difficult region, but problems related to the tribally unpopular (and for them, unrecognized) border have continued to the present day.
D. Modern Afghanistan:
Abdur Rahman Khan extended his control throughout the territory within the new boundaries of Afghanistan. His son, Habibullah, who reigned from 1901 until 1919, took the first steps toward the introduction of modern education and industry. Habibullah’s son and successor, Amanullah, initiated a brief war, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, in 1919 to end British control over Afghan foreign affairs. The resulting peace treaty recognized the independence of Afghanistan.
Amanullah was determined to modernize his country. In 1926 he took the title of king. His reforms, including efforts to induce women to give up the burka, or full-length veil, and to make men wear Western clothing in certain public areas, offended religious and ethnic group leaders. Revolts broke out, and in 1929 Amanullah fled the country.
Order was restored in 1930 by four brothers who were relatives of Amanullah. One of them, Muhammad Nadir Shah, became king, but he was assassinated in 1933. His son, Muhammad Zahir Shah, succeeded him. Power remained concentrated in the hands of Zahir and the royal family for the next four decades. In 1946 Afghanistan joined the United Nations (UN).
In 1953 Muhammad Daud, a nephew of Nadir Shah, became prime minister. Daud began to modernize Afghanistan rapidly with the help of economic and especially military aid from the USSR; the modern Afghan army was largely created with Soviet equipment and technical training. The United States declined to assist in this process. Social reform proceeded slowly because the government was afraid to antagonize conservative ethnic group leaders and devout Muslims. Relations with Pakistan deteriorated after Daud called for self-determination for the Pashtun tribes of northwestern Pakistan.
In 1963, hoping to halt the growth of Soviet influence and to improve relations with Pakistan, Zahir Shah removed Daud as prime minister. In 1964 Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, changing the country from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The armed forces still depended on the Soviet Union for equipment and training. A severe drought in the early 1970s caused economic hardship, and the popularity of the regime declined.
E. End of Monarchy
In 1973 Muhammad Daud overthrew the king in a coup. He declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as president. Daud announced ambitious plans for economic development and tried to play the USSR against Western donors, but his dictatorial government was opposed both by radical left-wing intellectuals and soldiers and by traditionalist ethnic leaders. The leading leftist organization was the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had been founded in 1965 and in 1967 split into a pro-Soviet Parcham faction and a much more radical Khalq faction. The two groups joined forces in 1976 to oppose Daud.
F. Leftist Coup and Soviet Invasion
In April 1978, after Daud launched a crackdown against the PDPA, leftist military officers overthrew him. PDPA leader Noor Muhammad Taraki became prime minister, subsequently assuming the title of president as well. Taraki and his deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, both members of the Khalq faction, purged many Parcham leaders. Taraki announced a sweeping revolutionary program, including land reform, the emancipation of women, and a campaign against illiteracy. In late 1978 Islamic traditionalists and ethnic leaders who objected to rapid social change began an armed revolt against the government. By the summer of 1979 the rebels controlled much of the Afghan countryside. In September Taraki was deposed and later killed. Amin, his successor, tried vigorously to suppress the rebellion and resisted Soviet efforts to make him moderate his policies. The government’s position deteriorated, however, and on December 25, 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. They quickly won control of Kābul and other important centers. The Soviets executed Amin on December 27 and installed Babrak Karmal, leader of PDPA’s Parcham faction, as president. Karmal, whom the Soviets considered to be more susceptible to their control, denounced Amin’s repressive policies, which reportedly included mass arrests and torture of prisoners, and promised to combine social and economic reform with respect for Islam and for Afghan traditions. But the government, dependent on Soviet military forces to bolster it, was widely unpopular.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan played out in the waning days of the Cold War, as the leaden economy and political repressions of the Soviet Union were just beginning to show signs of strain. Despite the Soviet Union’s own domestic difficulties and high-level internal advice against such a move, the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan’s government and eventual full military invasion was a long-considered and reasonably well-thought-out plan. From its earliest foreign aid in construction of military-quality bridges and highways, to its progressive planting of special agents within the Afghanistan bureaucracy and military, the Soviet Union displayed an unremitting interest in expanding its influence in the country and moving farther south toward the warm-water ports and hydrocarbon riches of the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan’s location along part of the Soviet Union’s southern border made the installation of a Soviet-friendly government there all the more desirable. The leftist coup of 1978 in Kābul seemingly assured that the Soviets would not lose the strategic position that they had patiently established through expensive and pervasive efforts over the prior quarter-century. Elsewhere in the country, however, there was only minimal support for the emerging Communist government in Kābul; opposition to it mounted nationwide, eventually even including significant portions of the Afghan military. The Soviet Union’s large-scale military intervention aimed to protect its interests in the region by helping the Soviet-installed government to put down this widespread opposition.
Nevertheless, resistance to the Communist government and the Soviet invaders grew spontaneously throughout Afghanistan so that by the mid-1980s there were about 90 areas in the country commanded by guerrilla leaders. The guerrillas called themselves mujahideen (Muslim holy warriors). They had gained prominence by their fighting prowess rather than through the customary routes within traditional social structures. The resistance was roughly organized into seven major mujahideen parties, largely of Sunni background, based in Peshāwar, Pakistan, in the 1980s. Other mujahideen parties were based in Iran. The mujahideen were sustained by weapons and money from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China. By the mid-1980s the United States was spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year to aid Afghan rebels based in Pakistan.
During the 1980s Soviet forces increasingly bore the brunt of the fighting. By 1986 about 118,000 Soviet troops and 50,000 Afghan government troops were facing perhaps 130,000 mujahideen guerrillas. Although the Soviet troops used modern equipment, including tanks and bombers, the mujahideen were also well armed, and they had local support and operated more effectively in familiar mountainous terrain. In 1986 the United States began supplying the mujahideen with Stinger missiles able to shoot down Soviet armored helicopters.
The effects of the war on Afghanistan were devastating. Half of the population was displaced inside the country, forced to migrate outside the country, wounded, or killed. About 3 million war refugees fled to Pakistan and about 1.5 million fled to Iran. Estimates of combat fatalities range between 700,000 and 1.3 million people. With the school system largely destroyed, industrialization severely restricted, and large irrigation projects badly damaged, the economy of the country was crippled. Despite some negative reaction, the presence of so many refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran actually improved Afghan relations with those countries. In addition, many of the refugees improved their lives considerably by leaving Afghanistan and the dangers of war therein. Because the majority of the refugees were religious, their fellow Muslims in Iran and Pakistan accepted them, even while the Iranian and Pakistani governments were striving to bring about the fall of the Communist regime in Kābul.
In May 1986 Karmal was replaced as PDPA leader by Mohammad Najibullah, a member of the Parcham faction who had headed the Afghan secret police. In November 1987 Najibullah was elected president.
G. Soviet Withdrawal
When Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985, he gave high priority to getting Soviet troops out of the costly, unpopular, and apparently unwinnable war in Afghanistan. In May 1988 Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the United States signed agreements providing for an end to foreign intervention in Afghanistan, and the USSR began withdrawing its forces. The Soviet withdrawal was completed in February 1989. See also Soviet-Afghan War. H. Civil War
The mujahideen, who did not sign the agreement concerning the Soviet withdrawal, maintained their fight against the Afghanistan central government with weapons that they continued to get from the United States via Pakistan. They rejected offers from Najibullah to make peace and share power, and refused to consider participating in any national government that included Communists. Thus the civil war continued. The United States and Pakistani sponsors prompted the Peshāwar-based rebels to besiege Jalālābād, a strong point for Najibullah in southern Afghanistan. After months of fighting, however, the Afghan government scored a clear victory. A March 1990 coup attempt also failed to bring down Najibullah. He continued to receive Soviet food, fuel, and weapons to help maintain his control. However, rebels persisted in terrorizing the civilian population by rocket bombardment of Kābul and other cities. Finally in late 1991 the USSR and the United States signed an agreement to end military aid to the Kābul government and to the mujahideen rebels.
In 1992 as the resistance closed in on Kābul, the Najibullah government fell, in part because of the defection of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek from northern Afghanistan whose militia had served the PDPA government. Two mujahideen parties from Peshāwar, both considered fundamentalist, joined forces with Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik military commander, in the north and central mountains of Afghanistan. They won control of Kābul, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, became interim president from July through December 1992, taking office as full president in January 1993. A strong attempt was made to keep the Pashtun leaders, who traditionally held the power in Afghanistan, out of the most important government positions. Kābul was besieged beginning in 1992, first by various mujahideen groups and then by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, which sought to reestablish Pashtun dominance in the capital.
The Taliban emerged in the fall of 1994 as a faction of mujahideen soldiers who identified themselves as religious students. The movement started in the south and worked its way toward Herāt in the northwest and Kābul in the east. It made outstanding military gains using armor, heavy rocket artillery, and helicopters against government forces. The Taliban’s stated mission was to disarm the country’s warring factions and to impose their strictly orthodox version of Islamic law. Some experts suspected the Pakistani government of supporting the Taliban, in order to keep the combat within Afghanistan and out of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which is a major part of the Pashtun homeland. During the many vagaries of shifting alliances, as Afghans sought a new political equilibrium, one fundamentalist and one moderate party from the Peshāwar-based mujahideen groups contributed considerable personnel to the Taliban.
The term of Rabbani’s government expired in December 1994, but he continued to hold office amid the chaos of the civil war. Factional fighting since the beginning of January 1994 kept government officers from actually occupying ministries and discharging government responsibilities. Most cities outside of Kābul were administered by former resistance commanders and their shuras (councils). In June 1996 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had resigned as prime minister in 1994 to launch a military offensive against forces loyal to Rabbani, again assumed the post, this time to help Rabbani’s government fight the Taliban threat. Despite their efforts, the Taliban took Kābul in September 1996. By that time, the capital had been devastated by the civil war.
Rabbani and Hekmatyar fled north to join the northern-based anti-Taliban alliance led by the military commanders Massoud and Dostum. The alliance was a coalition of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras who were opposed to the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. The alliance took the name United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, commonly known as the United Front or the Northern Alliance. Massoud was the military commander of its chief political wing, Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society). The Taliban advanced north toward the mountain strongholds of the Northern Alliance and by the late 1990s had taken control of almost all of Afghanistan. Northern Alliance forces held a small portion of the country’s territory in the north. I. Taliban Regime
After taking over Kābul, the Taliban created the Ministry for Ordering What Is Right and Forbidding What Is Wrong to impose and enforce its fundamentalist rules of behavior. The Taliban’s laws particularly affected women, who were ordered to cover themselves from head to toe in burkas (long, tentlike veils), forbidden from attending school or working outside their homes, and publicly beaten if they were improperly dressed or escorted by men not related to them. The Taliban also made murder, adultery, and drug dealing punishable by death and made theft punishable by amputation of the hand. Many of the laws alarmed human-rights groups and provoked worldwide condemnation. Most countries did not recognize the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
In 1998, after terrorist bombings struck U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launched cruise missiles at alleged terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan. The camps were reportedly connected to an international terrorist ring allegedly run by Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian expatriate named by U.S. officials as the mastermind behind the embassy bombings. Bin Laden was active in the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation forces during the 1980s, and toward the end of that war he established al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the Base”), an organization based in Afghanistan that, according to U.S. officials, connects and coordinates fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups around the world. Al-Qaeda also supported the Taliban regime, with its special forces, called the Arab Brigade, fighting alongside Taliban troops in the civil war against the Northern Alliance.
On September 9, 2001, pro-Taliban suicide bombers assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Two days later in the United States, terrorists hijacked passenger airplanes and deliberately crashed them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, killing thousands of people (see September 11 Attacks). The U.S. government identified bin Laden as the prime suspect behind the attacks. Mullah Muhammad Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban, refused U.S. demands that the Taliban surrender bin Laden. The U.S. government built an international antiterrorism coalition, securing the approval of many nations for a war on terrorism. American and British forces began aerial bombings of al-Qaeda camps and Taliban military positions on October 7. The Northern Alliance, meanwhile, continued its front-line offensive north of Kābul and other strategic areas. Many Afghans fled to refugee camps in border areas of Pakistan and Iran to escape the bombings, adding to the millions of Afghans already displaced from more than two decades of war.
While the United States and Britain continued the aerial bombardment in November, Northern Alliance forces captured several strategic cities, including Kābul. In late November hundreds of U.S. marines landed near Kandahār in the first major infusion of American ground troops into Afghanistan. The Taliban surrendered Kandahār, their last remaining stronghold, by December 10. The U.S.-led offensive then focused on routing out al-Qaeda forces holed up in the rugged Tora Bora cave region of eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan. In March 2002 U.S. troops undertook a mission, known as Operation Anaconda, to clear Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from the Shah-i-Kot Valley, in the vicinity of Gardēz in eastern Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the whereabouts of bin Laden remained unknown.
J. Afghanistan After the Taliban
United Nations-sponsored negotiations in Bonn, Germany, resulted in agreement on December 5, 2001, among four major Afghan factions to create an interim post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, a widely respected Pashtun leader, was chosen to head the interim administration, which took power in Kābul on December 22. An international peacekeeping force maintained a measure of law and order in the capital.
J.1. Transitional Government
Karzai’s administration was given up to six months to prepare the country for the introduction of a broad-based, multiethnic transitional government. In January 2002 international donors—including more than 60 countries, major development institutions, and nongovernmental organizations—pledged more than $4.5 billion in aid to Afghanistan over a period of five years. In April deposed Afghan king Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan, ending nearly three decades of exile, in order to serve a symbolic role in the country. In June he formally convened the loya jirga, or grand council, which was responsible for electing a transitional government to rule the country for 18 months, until general elections scheduled for 2004. The loya jirga elected Karzai interim president of Afghanistan.
J.2. New Constitution
In January 2004 the loya jirga ratified a new constitution and Karzai signed it into law. The new constitution created a strong presidency, a two-chamber legislature, and an independent judiciary. It recognized Islam as the country’s sacred religion but guaranteed protections for other religions. It also recognized equal rights for women and language rights for minorities.
The adoption of the new constitution paved the way for elections, originally scheduled for June 2004 but then postponed due to the continued lack of security in many parts of the country. The Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, who had regrouped as a military force despite new U.S.-led offensives to combat them, were waging a sporadic guerrilla campaign against the Karzai government and the international forces stationed in the country. In March 2004 Pakistan conducted a military operation along its border with Afghanistan in an attempt to flush out the insurgents.
About 18,000 non-Afghan troops were stationed in Afghanistan in 2004 to fight Taliban forces and offer protection for the Karzai government. Of these, about 8,500 were U.S. troops, and about 3,000 soldiers came from other coalition partners. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stationed about 6,000 troops in Afghanistan. NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003 and for the first time played a military role outside of Europe. The ISAF was authorized by the United Nations Security Council to act as peacekeepers in the Afghan capital, Kābul, and surrounding areas. By the end of 2005, about 19,000 U.S. troops and about 9,200 ISAF troops remained in Afghanistan.
In October 2006 about 12,000 of the 20,000 U.S. troops then serving in Afghanistan became part of the ISAF forces as NATO reportedly assumed primary responsibility for international military operations in Afghanistan. The remaining 8,000 U.S. troops were assigned to counterterrorism efforts and to training Afghan security forces as part of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. The ISAF consisted of about 31,000 troops and faced an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Taliban fighters in October 2006.
J.3. Presidential Election
Afghanistan held its first-ever presidential election on October 9, 2004. Large numbers of Afghans turned out to vote in the election, which was largely free of the violence threatened by the country’s former Taliban leaders. Karzai won 55.4 percent of the vote, easily beating 15 other candidates in the first round of voting. His victory was officially announced on November 3, following an investigation into charges of electoral fraud. According to a three-member United Nations panel set up to examine the complaints—made mostly by the losing candidates—the election’s “shortcomings…could not have materially affected the overall result.”
Karzai’s top goals after forming a new government included curbing the power of regional warlords, building an effective national security force, and pursuing national redevelopment plans. Uniting the country despite its longstanding ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries remained one of Karzai’s highest priorities.
J.4. Parliamentary Elections
Elections to the lower house of the National Assembly took place in September 2005, and in December 2005 President Karzai used his constitutional powers to appoint the members of the upper house. On December 19 Afghanistan’s first democratically elected legislature in more than 30 years officially convened. The new legislature represented a wide spectrum of the country’s political groupings and factions, including former warlords and former Taliban officials.
J.5. Continued War Against a Taliban Insurgency
Despite its initial defeat following the U.S. invasion of 2001, the Taliban regrouped, using remote areas of Pakistan for refuge and staging sporadic guerrilla attacks in areas of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border. By 2007 the Taliban adopted tactics that included suicide bombings and roadside bombs, while also besieging remote U.S. and NATO outposts in the countryside. In June 2007 U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates expressed cautious optimism that the military campaign was having success against the resurgent Taliban. Defense Department officials said they believed NATO operations had helped thwart a planned spring offensive by the Taliban.
However, Afghan civilian support for the U.S. and NATO military operations waned in the spring of 2007, particularly after a series of attacks that resulted in civilian casualties. In early May, following an April ground attack and air strike on a small village in western Herāt province in which about 50 civilians were reportedly killed, Afghan president Karzai told U.S. and NATO officials that civilian deaths had reached an “unacceptable level.” About a week later lawmakers in the upper house of parliament, the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire with the Taliban and for setting a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Many of the legislators cited an incident in March in which a U.S. Marine Special Operations force opened fire on civilians lining a highway as the marines fled the scene of a suicide bombing attack. The incident in the eastern Afghanistan province of Nangarhār resulted in the deaths of 19 Afghan civilians and the wounding of about 50 others. A U.S. military commander later determined that the marines had used excessive force and he referred the incident for a possible criminal inquiry.
By June 2007 the Associated Press reported a death toll of 2,300 in insurgency-related violence in 2007 alone. The International Red Cross said that violence was occurring throughout Afghanistan. The Department of Defense reported nearly 400 U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion, and the United Kingdom reported the deaths of 60 British soldiers during that same period.
United Nations (UN) figures showed that the death toll in Afghanistan totaled more than 8,000 people in 2007, including about 1,500 civilians. The average monthly death toll soared to 566 from an average of 465 in 2006. About 230 troops from the U.S.-NATO coalition were killed in 2007, the highest yearly number since the war began.
As 2008 began the director of national intelligence for the United States, Michael McConnell, reported that the security situation for the Afghan government had deteriorated. McConnell told the U.S. Congress that the Taliban had made inroads in the western part of Afghanistan and around the capital, Kābul, as well as in southern Afghanistan. In July 2008 the number of U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the second straight month, with 46 U.S. personnel killed in Afghanistan compared to 31 in Iraq. By August the total U.S. death toll for 2008 was around 100. A U.S. Defense Department report found that Taliban attacks on U.S. and NATO forces increased by 40 percent in 2008 compared with the previous year. The same report noted two distinct Taliban insurgencies, one based in Kandahār in southern Afghanistan and another in eastern Afghanistan, where the insurgents often obtained refuge in neighboring Pakistan’s rugged North-West Frontier Province.
The insurgency was described as a loosely organized alliance of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and Afghan warlords. The forces operating in northeast Afghanistan and around the capital were led by former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar was believed to be allied with the Taliban but not formally part of the movement. The insurgency in the east, southeast, and southern parts of Afghanistan was thought to be led by remnants of the original Taliban, foreign fighters, and al-Qaeda.
The Taliban was also establishing shadow, or parallel, governments in regions where they exerted control or where the central government in Kābul had only a loose hold on security. In some cases the shadow governments consisted of judges and other officials, along with finance and defense councils. Some experts estimated that the insurgency controlled as much as 40 percent of Afghanistan. Many Afghans reportedly welcomed the security that the Taliban provided from criminal elements or saw the Taliban as an alternative to corruption in the central government. In some cases the Taliban provided services that the government could not. Still others gravitated toward the insurgents in response to U.S. air strikes that often mistakenly killed civilians.
In August 2008 a U.S. air strike on a suspected Taliban compound in the village of Azizabad near Herāt killed a large number of civilians. The Afghan government, backed by a United Nations investigation and accounts from independent observers, alleged that more than 90 civilians were killed in the attack. The U.S. military initially dismissed the charges, saying that at most only 6 or 7 civilians were killed, but a subsequent military investigation concluded that 30 civilians, including women and children, had died. U.S. air strikes increased 31 percent from January 2008 to September 2008 compared with the same period in 2007. During the first nine months of 2008 U.S. and NATO aircraft flew about 14,000 missions and dropped about 3,000 bombs. U.S. military officials said the air strikes were necessary because ground troops were thinly dispersed throughout the country. As of mid-November 2008, there were about 65,000 allied troops in Afghanistan, of which about 36,000 were U.S. troops.
The U.S. role in Afghanistan became an issue during the U.S. presidential election with Democratic candidate Barack Obama promising to redeploy U.S. troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, in part to strengthen the ground presence and make the U.S.-NATO coalition less reliant on air strikes. Following a November air mission that mistakenly strafed a wedding party in the village of Shah Wali Kot in southern Afghanistan, killing 40 civilians, Afghan president Hamid Karzai called on President-elect Obama to cease all air strikes that might risk civilian casualties. The same month Karzai extended an invitation to Taliban leader Mohammed Omar, promising him safe passage if he agreed to negotiate a peace settlement. Omar was believed to be based in Quetta, Pakistan. However, the Taliban rejected the overture.
Once in office, Obama followed through on his promise and committed an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 53,000. Obama said the increase was necessary due to the deteriorating security situation. He also promised a review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan while saying that he believed the conflict could not be resolved “solely” through military means. In the meantime the United Nations released figures for the civilian death toll in Afghanistan in 2008, reporting that it rose 40 percent to 2,118 from 1,523 in 2007. More than 50 percent of the deaths were caused by the insurgents, while 39 percent were caused by pro-government forces.
J.6. 2009 Presidential Elections
Afghanistan held its second presidential election in August 2009. The weeks preceding the election saw a rise in insurgent violence. The day of the election, August 20th, was one of the most violent days since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. The wave of violence contributed to a voter turnout estimated to be only 35 percent.
The preliminary results showed Karzai winning approximately 47 percent of the vote and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah winning approximately 33 percent of the vote. With no candidate winning more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off election seemed likely. There were also numerous accusations of voter fraud leveled against Karzai and his followers. As a result, Abdullah threatened to not accept the outcome of the vote, raising the possibility of additional violence.
Contributed By:
John Ford Shroder, B.S., M.S., Ph.D.
Regents Professor of Geography and Geology, University of Nebraska. Editor, Himalaya to the Sea: Geology, Geomorphology, and the Quaternary and other books.