Saudi Customs not Related to Islam being Shoved down Throats of Muslims as Islam .

Mrs Obama without Hijab in Saudia Arabia 

COMMENTATORS, mainly non-Saudis, made a hullabaloo when Michelle Obama, America’s first lady, turned up in Saudi Arabia on January 27th in colourful, loose-fitting clothing and no headscarf. The oil-rich kingdom is known for its women being swathed in long, black cloaks known as abayas, usually paired with the hijab (headscarf) or niqab(which leaves a slit for the eyes), or a burqa (which covers the body from head to toe, with a mesh for the eyes). So what do women, Saudi and foreign, actually have to wear in Saudi Arabia?

The key to understanding Saudi customs is the country's history. When the modern nation was founded in 1932, it was based on an 18th-century pact between the ruling Al Saud monarchy and a devout bunch of clerics who followed a fiery version of Islam, dubbed Wahhabism (after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab). Ever since, Saudi Arabia’s laws have been based on this creed’s strict version of sharia, or Islamic law, which in reality incorporates many desert traditions that have been cloaked in Islam. The full covering for women is considered to be one of these customs. But today it is enforced by the religious police and zealous volunteers.

While all versions of Islam suggest a woman should dress modestly, often covering her hair and body, Saudi Arabia is one of the only Muslim-majority countries that legally imposes a dress code (Iran is another). Women, foreign and local, must wear an abaya (a few get away with long coats) in public places. Muslim—often equated with Saudi—women are said to have to wear a headscarf; foreigners needn’t. The face need not be covered, much to the chagrin of some hardliners. There are margins and uncertainties, too. The western coastal of Jeddah is far more relaxed than Riyadh, with abayas often brightly coloured or worn open to expose the clothing beneath. At home with relatives, in compounds and all-female settings, women can shed their outer layers. At some posh private Red Sea resorts, they go in bikinis. While many women head to aeroplane lavatories just before landing, not being fully covered is tolerated in the airport.

The strict dress code doesn’t mean there is no room for personal expression or fashion.Abayas come in different cuts, colours, styles and fabrics, from plain black to ones with cartoon characters on the back, and from cotton daywear to lacy or frilly ones fit for an evening out. Most women have a wardrobe of options; abaya shops abound. Moreover, women can wear whatever shoes they like, from trainers to Jimmy Choos. The accessory business is booming in Saudi Arabia as bags, sunglasses and jewellery become the markers of taste. A number of women are heavily made up. Some suggest that defeats the point. As with other rules in the kingdom, many young people find ways around them. But asurvey in January 2014 found that conservative attitudes remain pervasive among the population: despite half the sample saying women should be free to choose what to wear, two-thirds reckoned women should wear the niqab and another 11% the burqa—stricter forms of dress than the one currently enforced.

source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains-20?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ee/tr/saudiarabiasdresscodeforwomen

ISIS Is Now Operating in Afghanistan formed from Pakistani Taliban Factions

Could a new front line emerge in South and Central Asia?

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Afghan officials confirmed for the first time this week that the terror organization ISIS, which controls large stretches of territory in Iraq and Syria, is operating in Southern Afghanistan. According to BBC sources, Islamic State fighters have been battling Taliban forces in the southwestern province of Helmand with about 20 people from both sides killed and injured.

The Associated Press reports that Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former corps commander under the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, had a falling out with the Taliban leadership in the Pakistani city of Quetta, after which he replaced White Taliban flags with the black flags of the Islamic State, donned black battle fatigues, and pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Saudi Style Beheadings by ISIS and Taliban are thier Trade Mark 

The Wall Street Journal reports of a 16 minute propaganda video published last Saturday, which purportedly shows a former Pakistani Taliban spokesman pledging his allegiance to the terror group Islamic State and claiming that a number of Taliban field commanders have defected with him. “We are gathered here with commanders from 10 units. They all want to pledge their allegiance to the caliph of all believers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” proclaims the former spokesperson, Shahidullah Shahid, according to Wall Street Journal reporters who have seen the video.

from White Taliban Flag to a Black Flag a Copy of Saudia Flag 

Afghan officials do not seem to be excessively worried that the group will gain traction with Afghans. The BBCquotes the Governor of Nimruz province: “Once they fought under al-Qaeda name, then as Taliban, and now IS, they are the same people with the same programmes.” A key difference, however, is that the Taliban does not endorse the pan-Islamic model of global jihad that ISIS does, and usually confines its operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A December UN report noted that there had been an increase in the activities of al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan over the past year. The report singles out ISIS as constituting a challenge to the fragmented Taliban movement, whose spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, has not been seen in public since 2001. The report notes that Afghan security forces have retrieved ISIS propaganda material from insurgents.

The report also emphasized that, “Taliban leadership was concerned that the success of ISIL in parts of northern Iraq would draw young people who were potential Taliban recruits to join ISIL in Iraq.” It said that two prominent supporters of the Taliban have publicly endorsed the leader of the terror group Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Most interestingly, the UN report noted that several Afghan media articles have reported that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had lived in Kabul under the Taliban regime under the alias Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and that he worked closely with al-Qaeda groups in the country at that time.

While could just be motivated by opportunism inspired by the recent successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the emergence of this new militant force in Afghanistan could pose a challenge to efforts by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to re-launch peace talks with the insurgents. As The Diplomat reported last week, the Taliban has rejected Ghani’s recent peace overtures and turned down cabinet positions in the new Afghan government.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-is-now-operating-in-afghanistan/

Making the Sacrifices in Afghanistan Worthwhile will the Natural Resources of Afghanistan be Used for Afghans ?

Ahead of a major conference, what needs to be done to justify the sacrifices made in Afghanistan?

By Ikram Afzali

As David Cameron prepares to welcome the nations of the world to the first major conference on Afghanistan since its tumultuous election earlier this year, many of his fellow-citizens will be asking themselves if the 13 years of U.K. military engagement in Afghanistan have been worth it.

As an Afghan, I would give the prime minister a simple answer: “It depends.” It depends on what happens in the next few years and whether we are able together to finally make progress on building the foundation that is needed for a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. And one of the most important parts of this foundation, will be tackling the cancer of corruption and the systemic abuse of my country’s natural resources.

Afghanistan is rich. Experts estimate we have around $1 trillion of minerals, as well as plentiful reserves of oil and gas. Our mountains produce a rainbow of precious stones, from rubies and lapis to emeralds. We have oil and gas, lithium, copper, gold and iron. This is a treasure that belongs to all Afghans.

Enormous hope has been invested in these resources to fund the Afghan government and fuel the Afghan economy. The international community is relying on them to free them from the burden of funding the Afghan government and especially the Afghan military. Afghans are relying on them to provide desperately needed jobs, development and growth. But there is a great danger that these riches will instead be a poison for Afghanistan.

Across the country, widespread illegal mining continues to fund the Taliban and armed militias involved in terrible abuses. The income minerals should be producing for the national budget instead lines the pockets of corrupt officials, politicians, commanders and mining companies. Scratch under the surface in some parts of the country and the fighting is much more a result of competition to control the mines than it is of competing ideologies. There is a great danger that these resources will lead to a chronic cycle of conflict and humanitarian crisis.

If we want our natural resources to fulfil their promise, we should surely be taking every available measure to mitigate this clear and present danger. And that is exactly what a coalition of more than 40 Afghan and international civil society organisations, are asking Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani and Afghanistan’s donors to do.

Cameron, as the co-host of the London conference, must step up and take the lead for the international community. In a letter to the Prime Minister ahead of the conference, we’ve made the case that “stronger natural resource governance is not a side issue: it is a critical precondition for the stability and prosperity we are all working for.”

We’ve asked both him and Ghani to re-enforce their promises to create strong laws and strong policies to regulate our natural resources. We’ve asked them to put some flesh on the bones of that promise, by agreeing some of the basic measures that will go into fulfilling it. We’ve asked for transparency, we’ve asked for accountability, we’ve asked for the rights of communities living in mining areas to be respected.

These are basic protections: publication of contracts, of payments between companies and the government, and of the true, beneficial owners of mining companies. This is about introducing rules to allocate mining concessions fairly and transparently; ensuring communities are involved in the benefits of mining and can have their concerns addressed; preventing environmental and social damage, and making sure abusive armed groups are kept out of any involvement in the sector.

We believe our new government is serious about making sure Afghans are not robbed of the resources that are their birth right, but they now need to deliver on their commitments. We want to be open to businesses and investment, but not to exploitation and abuse. We want to develop our natural resources – but from a position of pride and strength, not by lowering our standards and ignoring abuses.

And Cameron also needs to deliver on his commitments. He has already said he will push the agenda of greater transparency and honesty in Afghanistan’s extractive industries “as far and as fast as we can.” Now there is a chance to get agreement on practical, concrete measures to do exactly that.

Just last month, Cameron said that Britain has ”paid a very high price” for the war in Afghanistan. Afghans themselves have paid an even higher price. The only justification for all this sacrifice is if it can provide the space for Afghans to build a lasting peace. Afghanistan can still pull itself out of decades of conflict, but we need the international community to help us seize that chance. We need them to help us to build up our abilities and back us in the fight against corruption and conflict.

Tackling this challenge is not easy. But Cameron should know that, in the end, it is the only thing that will make the great sacrifices we have all made truly worthwhile.

Ikram Afzali is the Director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan civil society organisation campaigning against conflict and corruption.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/making-the-sacrifices-in-afghanistan-worthwhile/

China Hosted Afghan Taliban for Talks in China.

Has China quietly begun brokering talks between Afghanistan’s government and the Taliban? Is china Gaining Access via Pakistan Links with Afghan Taliban for Interests of China in Afghanistan. 

By Shannon Tiezzi

Pakistani and Afghan media are reporting that Afghan Taliban leaders visited China for talks with Chinese officials late last year. Pakistan’s The News International, citing a report from the Afghan Islamic Press,reported that two Taliban representatives traveled to China in November. The purpose of the trip was to “share the Islamic Emirate’s stance with China,” according to a Taliban official. The delegation was reportedly led by Qari Din Muhammad, who is based at the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar (and has been involved in Afghan peace talks before).

The visit by Taliban members came on the heels of the 2014 Istanbul Process ministerial conference, held in China on October 31. That meeting coincided with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s inaugural visit to China, with Beijing pledging to provide Afghanistan 2 billion RMB ($327 million) in aid through 2017. Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to open “a new era of cooperation in China-Afghanistan relations” while Ghani indicated Kabul’s interest in working with China during the Afghan rebuilding process.

China-Afghanistan cooperation is determined largely by the stability of the security situation – and here the Afghan Taliban remains a major threat. Accordingly, in November 2014 China offered to mediate talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, a plan that would greatly increase Beijing’s involvement in the political side of the Afghan rebuilding process (to date, China’s interest has been mostly economic). According toReuters’ report, based on Chinese government documents, the proposed forum would bring together officials from the Afghan, Pakistani, and Chinese governments as well as Taliban leaders. Under the plan, China “would invite the Taliban to China if Afghanistan agreed to it,” one Afghan official told Reuters.

Around the same time, Ambassador Sun Yuxi, China’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the BBCthat China “would welcome the Taliban in any neutral venue such as in China. We will make negotiations happen but … the agenda must be proposed by President Ashraf Ghani.”

The reports emerging now from Afghan and Pakistani media suggest that China in fact hosted Taliban representatives last November, shortly after China’s proposal was first discussed at the Istanbul Process. It’s unclear to what extent Kabul was involved in these talks. Neither China nor the Afghan government has commented directly on the reports, but both sides have sent positive signals. According to Afghan Channel One TV, a spokesman for Afghanistan’s High Peace Council said, “We welcome such visits and praise them. We want to launch inter-Afghan talks.”

When asked about the reported Taliban delegation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “supports the ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ process toward peace and reconciliation and wishes to play a constructive role to that end.” Hong declined, however, to confirm that Taliban leaders had visited China.

Insecurity in Afghanistan is a major concern for China, which fears terrorists and militants gaining a stronghold on its western border. China’s Xinjiang province faces its own security vulnerabilities, which would be exacerbated by a prolonged conflict between the Taliban and Kabul. That immediate security concern may be why China is taking the on the unaccustomed role of mediator in internal Afghan peace talks.

Similar U.S. efforts to broker peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government achieved little, and it’s entirely possible China’s own initiative will lead to nothing. That’s what makes the talks so surprising – Beijing is not given to taking high-profile foreign policy risks. The behind-the-scenes nature of the process so far, with no formal recognition of a two-month-old meeting, speaks to intentionally lowered expectations for the Afghan peace talks, at least so far. Beijing, Kabul, and even the Taliban themselves have little to gain from trumpeting negotiations before there’s any sign talks are making progress. But keep an eye on China and Afghanistan in 2015 – this could be the relationship (and the year) that determines Afghanistan’s future.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-hosted-afghan-taliban-for-talks-report/

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma

Ashraf Ghani and the Pashtun Dilemma, If he is to succeed, Afghanistan’s president will need to come to grips with the country’s ethnic tensions. 

By Ali Reza Sarwar

With his impressive background, which includes a stint as a senior official at the World Bank and a ministerial post, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani would not appear to be short of qualifications for leadership. Yet, the president appears on course to be just another Afghan leader who is unable to rule the troubled country. When Ghani delivered his lofty inaugural speech on September 29, 2014, following a disputed election and power-sharing deal, expectations were high. The president made a strong argument in support of what he called the “triangle of stability” – economy, security and human resources – promising to restore Afghanistan’s valuable ancient geopolitical and economic position as the “crossroads of Asia.”

More than 100 days after taking the office, however, and Ghani is bogged down in a serious political crisis, one that draws a gloomy picture of the fragile unity government. He has only in the last few days been able to form a cabinet, leaving Afghanistan’s major public institutions, including ministries, independent departments, and commissions without leaders for months. A recent survey conducted by Afghanistan’s popular private TOLO TV and an independent civil society, shows that Ghani’s popularity has fallen dramatically, with only 27.5 percent of respondents satisfied with his leadership. With insecurity and political uncertainty looming, a number of parliamentarians have asked for Ghani’s impeachment for “treason,” blaming him for Afghanistan’s current state of disarray.

What has gone wrong? Why is this impressively credentialed leader unable to fix Afghanistan? Traditionally, Afghanistan’s woes have been blamed on crippling corruption, weak governance, dismal economic conditions, and worsening security coupled with foreign intervention. While these are certainly painful realities, the root cause of political crisis lies in ethnic politics and the breakdown of consensus among diverse ethnicities in regard to the persistent Pashtun dilemma.

The Pashtun Dilemma

Constituting around 40 percent of the population, Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are on the front lines of the war on terrorism, both as perpetrators and victims. The Taliban that is behind the bulk of the brutal militancy both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are mainly Pashtuns and derive their support from strongholds in tribal areas across Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borders. The mainstream Pashtun intelligentsia in both countries have been mostly uncertain over whether to sympathize with the Taliban as a nationalist movement seeking to restore traditional Pashtun dominance in Afghan politics and to some extent in Pakistan, or to condemn them as an extremist and externally infiltrated militancy that have dragged Pashtuns into an asymmetric confrontations with the U.S.-led coalition at a massive cost in human life.

Despite the Taliban’s indiscriminate attacks on Pashtun areas, including the last year’s suicide bombing in a market in Paktika province that killed 89 people, some leading Pashtun thinkers support the Taliban as a nationalist movement that could restore Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan, which they believe declined following the fall of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 and the following decades of the Soviet invasion and civil wars. For instance, in his article, the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Anwar Ul-Haq Ahady, a former finance and commerce minister under Karzai and an influential Pashtun thinker, believes that the decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, was “more significant than the fall of communism. The rise of the Taliban generated optimism among the Pashtuns about the reversal of their decline.”

The view that the Taliban could serve as a powerful Pashtun nationalist movement with the ability to reverse the post-Taliban inter-ethnic relations and political landscape of Afghanistan remained largely visible in during the administration of President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was frequently criticized by the opposition for his lenience towards the Taliban, yet he continued to compromise and push for negotiation. For its part, the Taliban categorically rejected talks, humiliating Karzai as a “puppet and unauthorized” to negotiate. At the grassroots level, particularly in non-Pashtun circles, there has been a difficult debate over whether Karzai would have been as willing to compromise if the Taliban had been a non-Pashtun movement.

Ghani’s Test of Leadership 

Ghani, a Pashtun himself, already seems incapacitated by the Pashtun factor. If he is to get to grips with the problem, he will need to address several important issues.

First, it should be realized that the war on terror is being fought mainly in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this reality constrains the political status of Pashtun in both countries. To overcome this, Pashtun leaders and intelligentsia, including Ghani himself, need to draw a stark line between the Taliban as a radical movement linked to global terrorist networks, and the legitimate cause of Pashtuns for justice. Fail to do that and Pashtuns will only be more isolated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and forever in conflict with non-Pashtun groups and the international community. Breaking with the Taliban should also not be limited to the official level; the debate should move to the heart of Pashtun tribes and traditions that continue to provide the Taliban with sanctuaries and new recruits.

Second, the dynamics of ethnic relations and politics have fundamentally changed in Afghanistan and Pashtuns must face the reality that the time for a despotic monarchy or factional regime like that of the Taliban has passed. In the worst possible scenario, the collapse of Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy and unity government could lead to chaotic civil war, but it will not permit the emergence of a Pashtun-dominated government, just as it will not allow a government that excludes Pashtuns. Pashtuns will need to renegotiate their relationship with other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and this will inevitably mean giving up some of the privileges they enjoyed in earlier times.

Ghani could play a pivotal role in pushing this message among Pashtuns, but he seems to be replicating the failings of his predecessor. Like Karzai, Ghani is uncertain whether to consider the Taliban enemies or political dissidents. For the moment, he believes they are political opponents, a designation that would baffle many Pashtuns and all non-Pashtuns who have suffered under the Taliban’s violence. Ghani has been clear on his desire to reach a diplomatic settlement with Pakistan, and has also increased his contacts with nationalist Pashtun leaders in Pakistan. In fact, he recently hosted them in Kabul, a risky move that will have infuriated Pakistan’s government and intelligence agency given Pakistan’s long obsession with Pashtun nationalism.

Clearly, there will be no peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the region without the genuine participation of Pashtuns. Yet Pashtuns’ failure to engage constructively with non-Pashtuns in a democratic process that rejects the Taliban will only lead to their isolation. Ghani is the one man who could achieve this engagement, and he will need to do so if he desires to escape the fate of other Afghan rulers.

Ali Reza Sarwar is a Fulbright Graduate Fellow at Texas A&M University, Bush School of Government and Public Service where he is completing a master’s degree in Intelligence and National Security. Reza graduated from the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) where he was also in charge of the university’s enrollment management plan.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/ashraf-ghani-and-the-pashtun-dilemma/

Taliban Khan Biggest Supporter of Monsters Taliban made by Punjabi Establishment

Liberal Pakistanis have criticized cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan's opposition to a military operation against the Taliban. His alleged support to the Islamists has earned him the title, 'Taliban Khan.'

Imran Khan:Aka Taliban Khan  Flirting with the Taliban

Recently, when the Pakistani Taliban nominated Imran Khan to engage in peace talks with Islamabad, liberal sections of society exclaimed, "See, we always said that Khan was one of the Islamists!"

Although Khan immediately refused to take part in the talks, the controversial "Taliban Khan" tag that he has earned over the years, got another endorsement.

Imran Khan is now one of the key players in Pakistani politics. His party came third in the May 2013 parliamentary elections and now rules the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan. He wants Islamabad to make peace with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and sever its alliance with the US in the "war against terror."

Power and Money Hungry : Imran Khan married Jewish Jemima Goldsmith in 1995

"We will win this war if we disengage from the US," Khan recently told the media. "As long as the Taliban believe we are fighting the US war, they would declare jihad on us. This would be a never ending war," he added.

This is certainly a very different image of a liberal person who studied at the University of Oxford and played in the English cricket league in the 1980s. Back then, Khan was discussed in the British press as much for his sporting talent as for his alleged love affairs.

Khan went on to become one of the most successful cricketers Pakistan has ever produced, under whose leadership the nation won its first Cricket World Cup in 1992. He later engaged in philanthropic work in Pakistan and married British writer and campaigner Jemima Goldsmith. The wedlock, however, didn't last long.

Khan entered politics in the late 1990s, forming a party called Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI). Although he was worshipped by millions in the country as a great cricketer, Khan was never considered a serious politician, even by his ardent fans, until 2011.

Cant be Away from Cameras ?? Cricketer Play boy and now Taliban Khan 

But now, for many of his fellow contrymen, the 60-year-old is the "last hope" in a country which is facing innumerable problems ranging from a non-functional economy to a protracted Islamist insurgency. For others, he is a right-wing politician who wants to appease the Taliban.

Who really is Imran Khan?

Play Boy and Play Girl Perfect Couple now Deceiving Pashtuns 

So how did a person, who was doubted even by members of his own political party as a political alternative to the two main political families, the Bhuttos and the Sharifs, become a force to reckon with in the Islamic Republic? Was it because of the support of the ubiquitous Pakistani army and its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), as his critics claim, or was it the relentless political campaigning that Khan has been doing for more than 16 years? Khan's supporters believe it is the latter.

"Khan's stance on corruption, terrorism and nepotism in Pakistani politics has struck a chord with the masses, which are fed up with the traditional ruling elite. He has no corruption charges on him, no foreign assets," claims PTI activist in Islamabad, Khawar Sohail.

Imran Khan Rise to Power by Punjabi Establishment / GHQ and its Made Taliban

But some observers argue that Khan is backed by Pakistan's right-wing groups, in particular the military establishment, because of his "soft" stance on the Taliban and other Islamist militants. His rise in Pakistani politics, they claim, is due to his "good relations" with the ISI. Khan agrees with the organization's position on matters such as Afghanistan and Pakistan's national security, they say.

Amima Sayeed, a development researcher from Karachi, believes that Khan, most definitely, supports right-wing extremists. He has not made it secret.

Need any ID Card ??

"When the Swat peace deal between the government and the Taliban was introduced in 2009, Imran Khan was the first politician to support it. His collaboration with the Islamic Jamaat-e-Islami party is also a proof of his right-wing agenda," she told DW.

"He might not sound like a religious political leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami or the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, but his views about the region, the world, and in particular about the militant groups in Pakistan, are sympathetic if not supportive of the religious right," Owais Tohid, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal in Karachi, agrees. "He opposes a military crackdown on the militants and dismisses the idea that there has been an increase in the homegrown jihadist culture in Pakistan over the years."

Eight months of Failed Government  in power

But some analysts say that the debate about Khan's Islamist or liberal credentials is actually taking the spotlight away from his performance as a politician and the leader of a party which governs an important province of the country.

Khan promised speedy justice and an end to corruption in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after taking its reins. During the election campaign, he also said his party would curb violence and bring peace.

Chief Trainer of Taliban Mullah Sami and Iran Siddique a Taliban Sympathizer in Paki Media 

Representatives of the Pakistani government and the Taliban met in Islamabad for peace talks

Khan's PTI has been in power for almost , 1 year and eight months, yet critics state that most of his election promises have not been fulfilled.

"The government in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has not delivered anything to people. Corruption and nepotism are rampant and there hasn't been any significant development work in the past eight months," said Qasim Jan, a student in the northwestern city of Peshawar.

"Khan has only focused on protesting US drone strikes in the northwestern tribal areas, blocking the NATO supply route to Afghanistan, and coming up with all sorts of excuses in support of the militants," he added.

Pakhtunkhwa Governance 

Islamabad-based writer, Arshad Mahmood, agrees: "Things are pretty much the same as they were in the past. Khan's party workers consider themselves to be above the law and won't cooperate with the administration. If the PTI officials don't obey the law, how will the governance be improved?," asked Mahmood.

But Khan's supporters, which comprise mainly the Pakistani youth, feel his administration is being unfairly criticized.

"The government has made great strides into a faster and more effective judicial system. The education budget of the province is much bigger than in other provinces. Yes, there are problems, but things are improving," Zakria Zubair, a young entrepreneur in Islamabad, told DW. The 29-year-old PTI supporter also says that Imran Khan is playing the role of a competent opposition leader in the country's lower house of parliament.

source ; http://www.dw.de/pakistan-school-massacre-to-further-strengthen-armys-resolve-to-fight-ttp/a-18134203