PushKalavati Museum Peshawar made in the House of Ghani Khan Son of Bach Khan

Pushkalavati Museum Peshawar Made in Donated House of Ghani Khan son of Bacha Khan  

Sher Alam Shinwari Published Mar 15, 2014 07:00am


BUILT in 2011 at a huge cost, Pushkalavati Museum and Ghani Khan Art Gallery in district Charsadda is yet to be handed over to the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, Peshawar.

Earlier, Ghani Derai Complex comprising a public library and hall was built in 2002 at a cost of Rs7.5 milliaon over a hollow sandy mound, however, it collapsed due to loose-filling and excessive seepage.

The Ghani Derai Complex was handed over by the Directorate of Archives and Libraries to the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums in 2006 in the shape of a liability.

A huge amount was allocated for repair and renovation of Ghani Derai Complex but soon it crumbled down. An inquiry was initiated against the contractor but it was also shelved. The public library had to be shifted to Pushkalavati Museum’s basement two years ago.

“The Ghani Derai Complex is still in ruins and the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums has taken no step in this regard,” said Muflis Durrani, the vice president of Ghani Khan Adabi Au Saqafati Jirga.

About 60 members of the Jirga, he said, held various literary and cultural events on different occasions every year at the site. He said that the officials concerned should take interest in rebuilding and restoration of both the sites.

According to local people, two watchmen, one gardener, one peon and one sweeper, appointed on permanent basis for Pushkalavati Museum and Ghani Khan Art Gallery, are getting salaries at their homes because the structure has not been commissioned by the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums.

The newly built museum has not been commissioned by the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums from the communication and works department owing to its reservations regarding the faulty construction and seepage problem.

Local people say that seepage is damaging the walls of the complex and its three display halls comprising 96 shelves are also lying empty as no artifacts are exhibited in them.

The Ghani Derai Complex, which has no permanent staff, is being run through a grant in-aid of Rs5 million approved by the provincial finance department.

Currently, an 11 grade assistant librarian is running the public library with a total membership of 300 while the grant in-aid has been increased to Rs8 million.

A senior official at the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums on the condition of anonymity told this scribe that the fate of Pushkalavati Museum and Ghani Art Gallery seemed to be no different from that of Ghani Derai Complex for want of interest of the authorities concerned.

“We have written a detailed letter to the communication and works department to remove our reservations and hand over the structure so that it could be made operational otherwise it would be crumbled down. Also, we have asked them to restore Ghani Derai Complex but unfortunately nobody is taking interest,” he said.

The official said that the inquiry was also dumped because the contractor belonged to the then ruling political party.

Director Archaeology and Museums Prof Mohammad Nasim Khan, when contacted, said that being an archeologist he would not recommend reconstruction of Ghani Derai public library and hall on hollow deposit, however, it could be shifted to another site.

“The permanent employees have been deputed to perform duty at other sites scattered in the district till the Pushkalavati Museum comes under our control,” he said.

He said that the directorate would arrange a visit to the site in near future.

“Filling empty shelves with display items is no issues. We have lots of items being kept in our stores of directorate. We have also sufficient funds for purchasing more display items for Pushkalavati Museum from amateur local collectors. Once it gets properly commissioned and our reservations regarding seepage are removed, the directorate can make it operational,” Prof Khan said.

The post of assistant curator for the said museum was still lying vacant while two watchmen, one peon, one gardener, and one sweeper were appointed on permanent basis, he said. However, the services of two watchmen, a peon, one sweeper and one gardener already serving since 2002 at Ghani Derai Complex were yet to be regularised, he added.

The director said that a post for a 16 grade assistant librarian for the public library would be advertised soon.

An office-bearer of Ghani Khan Adabi Au Saqafati Jirga said that they had formed a committee comprising senior writers, intellectuals and poets to meet Chief Minister Pervez Khattak to resolve the issues regarding both the structures.

“We want Ghani Derai to be rebuilt on firm foundations so that literary and cultural activities can be restarted here,” he said. He said that senior members of the Jirga should also be included in the staff to ensure its faultless reconstruction and smooth running of its affairs.

Different literary and cultural organisations plan to commemorate the 18th death anniversary of noted Pashto poet, painter and sculptor Ghani Khan today (Saturday).
source : http://www.dawn.com/news/1093190

Living Hell of Chitral Residents-Story of Lowari Tunnel

Why Punjabi Establishment run by Racist Punjabi's who always thinks of Plans to Belittle and Make Pakhtunkhwa Backward and slave to Punjabi's ,  have delayed the Lowari Tunnel Project that was Approved in 1970,s but is still not completed and is Made to Stall Deliberatively , as its in Situated in Pakhtunkhwa and Connects the Mardan and Dir to Chitral and it cuts down Journey Time to Chitral from 14 Hours to 5 Hours only . 


Victims of Punjabi Racism who Wants to Punish Chitralis and Also Change the Route of Pakistan China Economic Route has Stalled the Lowari tunnel More Shorter then Gilgit , Abbottabad Route which is not in straight line with Kashghar and longer then the Gilgit , Chitral and Dir Mardan Route , which Amritsar Indian Born Ex- Sikhs Punjabi Nawaz Government had selected to Serve Lahore .
They Plan to delay this Tunnel to 2020 , from its Planned Completion in 2010 already Passed and Chitralis and Dir Residents are cut off and live in Hell , Read this Incredible Story of People of Pakhtunkhwa Pushed to Living hell by Prejudiced Punjabi's . 

Pakistan Lowari: Frozen travelers trapped by an unfinished tunnel

By M Ilyas Khan

Water dripping from the top of the crumbling, cave-like opening of an unfinished tunnel in northern Pakistan forms into icicles, accentuating the bite of a freezing January morning.

About a kilometre down the valley behind, a large huddle of passenger vans, trucks and cars waits for the tunnel to open. They have been here for many endless hours.

Bi Weekly Lowari Tunnel Traffic 

In one rented vehicle is the coffin and body of an old woman on way to her own funeral, but she is running late.

On the other side of the mountain, in her home village, people have already gathered for the burial.

Anxiety is writ large on the face of her son, Wali Ahmad, a soldier in the Pakistani army and a resident of Chitral district, located on the far side of the 8.6km (5.2-mile) Lowari tunnel.

Faces of  Ordeal 

Wali Ahmed worries that he might not get his mother's body to her own funeral on time

"My mother died in Peshawar. Now we have to take her home for burial. We don't know if they will open the tunnel in time for us to make it there in daylight," he says.

It's at least three hours' drive to his village of Golen from where he's standing. It's already approaching midday, and the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush range shut off the winter sunlight from most of Chitral's 34 branch valleys after 4pm.

At a little over 7,000 feet (2,500m) above sea level, the tunnel is the only exit route in winter for the 500,000 population of Chitral.

Dozens of loaded trucks are parked every few kilometres along the rocky, broken mountain road that winds up from the town of Dir to the tunnel.

Some drivers have lit gas cylinders beneath the engines to keep them warm and prevent the pipes from bursting due to freezing temperatures.

Mohammad Qasim Khan, a resident of Drosh area in Chitral, is the head of another party waiting for the tunnel to open.

"My daughter's just been operated for appendicitis, and my cousin got a rod fixed in his left leg which suffered a fracture," he says.

Faces of Misery 

In need of rest - but they are stuck in a car waiting for the chance to get through

"They can't stand the cold and the wait, but we are told the tunnel is closed. We drove some eight hours from a hospital in Peshawar, and now we've been stuck in this wilderness for more than six hours. There's no food or heating here, and there are no toilets."

It is the same story on the Chitral side of the tunnel - residents taking sick relatives to hospitals in Peshawar, students and job seekers trying to make it to their appointed interviews, and workers with jobs in the Gulf fretting over whether they'll be able to catch their flights from Peshawar and Islamabad.

All these people are caught in a gridlock that started when the government suddenly decided to reschedule work on the tunnel ahead of this winter.

The fortunes of the people of Chitral have fluctuated with the fortunes of the Lowari tunnel project.

Lowari Tunnel has been delayed for last 40 Years 

In summers, a road built by the British over the 10,230ft (3,140m) Lowari Pass links them to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, of which Chitral is a part. But the pass closes in mid-December due to snow.

Two other passes - one connecting Chitral to the Afghan province of Badakhshan, and the other linking it to Pakistan's north-eastern Gilgit-Baltistan region - are more than 12,000 feet high and also remain snowbound in winters.

The region's only natural all-weather route passes through its south-western town of Arandu into Afghanistan, and follows a southward route via the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Ningarhar into Pakistan's Peshawar valley.

But that is no longer an option.

"The Arandu route closed when a Pakistani military operation in the Swat region in 2009 pushed Islamist militants into the Kunar region," says Shahzada Iftikharuddin, Chitral's representative in Pakistan's national parliament.

"This happened when the Americans wound up their bases in the Kunar region, making it possible for these militants to set up sanctuaries there. A number of Chitrali travellers were held and beheaded by them in 2010."

Chitral Scouts have helped maintain security along this perilous route

The tunnel was commissioned in late 2005, and by 2008 the construction contractor, Sambu JV of South Korea, had dug the 8.6km tunnel all the way through. But funding for the project stopped when a new government took over.

Over the next few years, this unfinished tunnel remained open for winter traffic.

In 2011, when some funds became available and work commenced, public use of the tunnel was restricted to three alternate days in a week. This catered to the needs of the locals and there was no crisis.

But after the first snow in late November this year, the commuters were shocked to discover that a new standard operating procedure (SOP) permitted three days of transit through the tunnel only every two weeks instead of one.

Hundreds of people were stranded in the snow. Those with money had to spend weeks in Dir town's hotel rooms. Others slept in their vehicles or turned back.

Commuters walk along the ridge to try and find out what the delay with the tunnel is

In Chitral, food supplies became scarce, sparking protests that finally forced the authorities to revise the SOP and open the tunnel twice a week - on Saturdays and Sundays - for six hours a day.

The authorities defend the new arrangement as the only viable balance between human suffering and project completion.

"The project cost has escalated from 5bn rupees to 18bn, and we have to pay penalties to the contractor for idle hours," says Hameed Hussain, the project director of Lowari tunnel.

Besides, six hours of public traffic pushes carbon levels inside the tunnel beyond human tolerance.

"We need an extra four to five hours to ventilate the tunnel before the workers can get to work safely," he says.

Inside of Unfinished Tunnels since 1978 

And there is still a lot of work to do.

At the moment, there is no proper lighting in the tunnel, no exhaust system and no emergency services.

Most of the tunnel is still without the shotcrete lining, retaining walls or a metalled road. Water seepage from the ceiling and walls forms into puddles on the floor.

In addition, the widening process leaves the tunnel floor strewn with debris, causing traffic jams inside the tunnel and endangering those travelling in open vehicles.

Mr Hussain says he recovered four persons from a truck that had broken down inside the tunnel last week. All of them had fainted.

But bound by towering mountains on all sides, the people of Chitral are just too desperate not to take a chance with this drive through hell.

Naila Shahid

Naila Shahid missed an interview for a job she was sure she would get because of the snows and the tunnel

And those who can't make it, rue it.

Naila Shahid is one of them.

A graduate in environmental sciences, she had to miss an interview for an assistant professor's job at a university in Dir district because that would mean living in a hotel room for a whole week - a social and financial impropriety.

"I was on top of the merit list. I received a call to appear for the interview. I knew I couldn't make it because the tunnel would have closed by the time I was finished and would next open only on the following Saturday," she says.

"There is no male member of the family available to accompany me for a week in a strange land. I cried last night. This job would have helped me enroll for a doctorate."

The new deadline for the tunnel's completion is 2017. Until then, every time the snows block the passes, many funerals are likely to be missed, many careers suffer setbacks and many tears are shed in Chitral.

Lowari Tunnel Traffic 

source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25972898

Pashtuns of Baluchistan Victim of Identity Crises and Political Power

Pakhtuns in Balochistan are  90% of Its Population 

Talimand Khan


Ignoring Pakhtuns, the Balochistan issue is mainly presented through the prism of Baloch’s eroded autonomy and lack of control over their resources

Pakhtuns in the province of Balochistan are victims of linear injustice. The most painful and mind-boggling aspect is the blurred understanding of the Balochistan issue among the common Pakistanis as well as intelligentsia. The Balochistan issue is mainly presented through the prism of Baloch’s eroded autonomy and lack of control over their resources in post-independence era. Yet, unlike Pakhtuns, living in the Balochistan province they do not face loss of identity, autonomy and status as major stakeholders.

Perhaps, Pakhtun is the only ethnic group, particularly in Balochistan, whose sufferings began with the advent of the British in the subcontinent and continues hitherto. In the post-independence era, especially in the 1970s, another layer of injustice was added by depriving them of whatever was left by the colonial power.

Baluchistan a Wrong Name and Misnomer and Creation of British : 

Before the British occupation, the name of Balochistan never existed in history to represent a geo-physical entity that was named by the British as British Balochistan and later by Pakistan as the province of Balochistan in the Constitution of 1973.

The Baloch and Brahvi were predominantly living in four princely states — 

1. Kalat, 

2. Kharan, 

3. Lasbela 

4.and Makran. 

Lasbela was  enjoying internal autonomy with a predominantly Baloch Tribal areas ( Still Under Article 247 as tribal Areas ) , Baluchis People of these tribal Areas although a Minority gave the name Baluchistan to this new British Created area . 

1. Marri,
2. Bugti,
3. Chagai
4. and Sinjrani

Khan of Kalat as Head Baluchistan Under Pashtun Durrani Afghan Empire before 1841. 

State of Kalat and its Khan of Kalat , was was Vasal of Afghanistan under ther Durrani Empire of Pashtuns, In the aftermath of the first Anglo-Afghan War, on October 6, 1841 the British handed over Quetta to Khan of Kalat on the occasion of his coronation.

Previously the State of Kalat under Khan of Kalat , remaining as a vassal of the Afghan kingdom of Pashtuns Durrani who,s rule also extended to Sind Karachi and over India till Delhi and Lahore .

State of Kalat carried immense strategic importance for the British expedition in Afghanistan.The British got Nasirabad and Nushki on lease from the Khan of Kalat. The strategic importance of Nushki was to extend railway line to the border of Iran.

The British also extracted the areas of Pishin, Sibi, Chaman, Shahrig, Shora Rud, comprising 95 percent Pakhtun population from Afghanistan that were called assigned districts under the infamous Gandamak Treaty signed on May 26, 1879 at Jalalabad Near Peshawar .

Pashtuns were now Named as British Balochistan a Missnomer although not still being considered a Province as Yet but area joined with NWFP / Pakhtunkhwa and being seperated from Durrand Line from Afghanistan to which it Previously Belonged . 

Ultimately, on November 1, 1887, the areas with 90 per cent of Pakhtun population were declared as Chief Commissioner Province of British Balochistan.

The British officer and later colonial governor of the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sir Olaf Caroe, admitted it was a misnomer given by the British. He suggested that it should be named British Afghanistan while Sir Herbert Aubrey Francis Metcalfe (agent to governor general for British Balochistan 1943) said that it should be named as British Pathanistan instead of British Balochistan.

In 1947, the members of the official jirga and Quetta municipality decided on behalf of the Chief Commissioner Province of the British Balochistan to join the state of Pakistan, whereas the lower and upper house of the Kalat State repudiated the accession of the Khan of Kalat in favour of Pakistan.

Until June 30, 1970, the Chief Commissioner Province of the British Balochistan and the Baloch areas, mostly comprising the princely states, never remained as one administrative unit in the history.

In 1952, the princely states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela were named as Balochistan States Union. In 1955, the Chief Commissioner Province of British Balochistan was named as Quetta Division and three states Kalat, Kharan and Makran of Balochistan States of Union along with Chagai, extracted from the Chief Commissioner Province, were declared as Kalat Division. Both the divisions had equal representation in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. The State of Lasbela was merged into the Karachi Division and Nasirabad was merged into Jacobabad Division that were later returned to Balochistan after the scrapping of one unit.

Further Implementing the British Polices by Punjabi Establishment 

On July 1, 1970, the one unit scheme was abolished by Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan. Consequently, the predominantly Pakhtun populated Quetta Division of the former Chief Commission Province and Baloch majority Kalat Division, along with Lasbela and Nasirabad, were merged into the province of Balochistan.

Pashtuns Lost their Identity and became Baluchistan Occupants now, but the final Blow came in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto time when it was separated from NWFP/ Pakhtunkhwa and NAP/ ANP did not Protest.  

Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai quit the National Awami Party (NAP) in protest over accepting the merger of Pakhtun belt into the Baloch areas and naming them as the province of Balochistan. He formed the Pakhtunkhwa National Awami Party before his martyrdom on December 2, 1973. His son, Mahmood Khan Achakzai, is carrying forward his father’s legacy of democratic struggle.

Political Compromise under a Barrel of a Gun 

Ironically, instead of correcting the injustice committed by the colonial power and the subsequent undemocratic forces, the Constitution of 1973 also endorsed the anomaly adding another ethnic and political fault line to the polarised society of Pakistan.

The leadership of the then NAP, particularly its Pakhtun leaders, either committed a political mistake or made a political compromise by agreeing to the scheme.

The Pakhtun in Balochistan perhaps also seem to be the victim of constituency politics as Pakhtun nationalist leaders from the north were more concerned about the identity and autonomy of the then NWFP and mostly gave a cold shoulder to the identity and autonomy of the southern Pakhtun in Balochistan.

The mainstream media and intelligentsia also ignored this important aspect that added another layer to the problem. Such a blurred understanding would render any solution to the current conflict a superficial one. A lack of attention and preference might be due to a political and democratic struggle adopted by the Pakhtun for attaining their identity and autonomy that seldom attained attention in Pakistan.

It is a rare political issue which is not contested by the Baloch and Pakhtun as the former also recognise the Pakhtun’s rights to identity and autonomy. For instance, Dr Wahid Baloch writes in his essay, “The Solution of Balochistan Problem”, published in The Pakistan Christian Post, “Balochistan’s boundaries need to be redrawn based on historical, ethnic and linguistic line and all Pashtun areas of Balochistan should be joined with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.”

However, making a choice should be the intrinsic democratic right of Pakhtuns whether they opt for a separate unit referred to as “Southern Pakhtunkhwa” by them or prefer to merge with other Pakhtun areas as a unit representing their historical ethnic identity on this side of the Durand Line.

Instead of redressing the colonial era injustices after independence, our security paranoid establishment further confounded the fault lines. Pakistan needs to bridge every fault line rather than take on only terrorism to bring peace and political stability. Needless to say that terrorism is just one manifestation of the flawed security paradigm.
source: http://tns.thenews.com.pk/pakhtuns-in-balochistan/#.VPIvR_mUega

Why Punjabi Establishment wants to Sell Taliban as Pashtuns Resistance erroneously.

Kaptan Taliban Khan PTI 

With a mix of horror and disbelief I watched the footage from Matanai where a school van was ambushed by militants. Even for senses numbed by scores of bombings every year, this came as a shock because the victims were children (aged between 8 to 14 years), and were deliberately targeted. One would think that even the most shameless of villains would not be low enough to own these killings, but within hours the Tehreek I Taliban Pakistan (TTP) proudly claimed full responsibility. Bravo!

The footage of the aftermath showed faces smitten with fear, a little girl, hardly six or seven lay in a state of shock; her blank expression and her blood soaked shirt spoke volumes about the horrors that she went through. Some of the survivors did speak to the media and the noticeable thing about their interviews was that they were either in Pashtu or in heavily accented Urdu.

It is important to highlight the accents and thus ethnicity of these children because the same are often ignored by those who perceive Taliban violence as a Pashtun backlash. Take the Chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek I Insaaf (PTI) for instance; in one of his sermons on YouTube titled “Imran Khan Explains War of Terror and Pakistani Taliban”, he declares the Taliban to be a “Pashtun Resistance”. But, how exactly does a Pashtun Resistance claim mostly Pashtun victims is something that Mr. Khan didn’t elaborate upon.

To prove this argument, references are often made to episodes of Pashtun resistance from the past. But the difference between Taliban leadership and historical figures such as Faqir of Ipi becomes very obvious if one considers their respective target selection. Mullah Powindah, Pir Roshan and Faqir of Ipi were not known for targeting Pashtuns, as all of them had a strong nationalistic bias; i.e. a Pashtun bias. The Taliban however, do not have any of that as proven by the fact that their victims are predominantly Pashtun. It should be obvious that when an insurgency fights in the name of an ethnicity then it does NOT target that ethnicity; the ETA is not known for killing Basques and neither was the Tamil Tigers known for killing Tamils. For this reason, it is downright disrespectful to term Taliban violence as a “Pashtun backlash”, because the Pashtuns themselves are its biggest victims.

While one feels disappointed with the former cricketer, one is absolutely horrified when the same logic is echoed by a group of Pakistan’s “Foreign Policy Elites” (FPE). A recent report by the Jinnah Institute (JI) and the US Institute for Peace (USIP), titled “Pakistan, the United States and the end game in Afghanistan” builds its case on the very same assumption. While the FPE rightly point out that a settlement in Afghanistan should not result in “negative spillovers” or cause “resentment” among Pakistani Pashtuns, their recommendation for ensuring that is quite perplexing, as they want inclusion of the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura in any post US setups in Afghanistan.

If such an arrangement is considered necessary for appeasing Pakistani Pashtuns, then the FPE need to move beyond books of history & genealogy, and instead concentrate on recent news reports, electoral results, and opinion surveys. The Pashtuns of Pakistan have been categoric in rejecting the Taliban; in 2008’s general election, the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) voted overwhelmingly for anti Taliban parties i.e. the ANP and the PPP. The PEW research survey for 2010 predicts that only 7% of KP approve of the Taliban, while the same is 15% for Pakistan and 22% for Punjab. Furthermore, TTP’s targeting of elected leaders in KP as well as that of the tribal elders of FATA, clearly indicates that the Taliban feel threatened by those who represent Pashtun consensus. This anti Taliban sentiment should be expected, given the chaos and destruction that the TTP has brought upon Pashtun lands.

If our FPE think that the alliance between the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be taken care of through some strategic parlaying, then they are sadly mistaken. Whether it’s supporting the Uighars in China, or the refusal to handover Osama, the Afghani Taliban have proven that when it comes to the Global Jihadi fraternity, strategic concerns are not that important to them. Thus, it should be obvious that if the Taliban get strengthened in Afghanistan, then the strengthening of the Pakistani ones is inevitable.

Lest one forgets, this September had quite a few reminders of what that strengthening could entail. Besides the attack on the 13th in Matanai that killed 5, on the 16th a suicide bombing in Dir claimed 27 lives, on the 19th another 8 were killed in Karachi, and on the same day 6 died in an attack on CD shops in Peshawar, and if that was not enough, then on the 20th they lined up 26 Shias in Mastung and gunned them down; and then ambushed two more who were on their way to the scene of the massacre. A sum total of 74 Pakistanis killed in 7 days for the “crimes” of working for the Government, listening to music and being Shia.

The underlying motivation for this violence is ideological, and this ideology is not likely to change whether the United States leaves Afghanistan tomorrow or doesn’t in the next ten years. It is also an ideology that declares a majority of us Pakistanis i.e. the Barelvis and the Shias to be Wajib Ul Qatal (dead men walking), and legitimizes the destructions of schools, shrines, Imam Bargahs and mosques. With the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network espousing the same ideology, their strengthening in Afghanistan should raise alarm bells for anyone concerned about Pakistan’s security interests.

If the potential “resentment” of Pakistani Pashtuns weighed heavily on the minds of our FPE, then the safety of the same Pakistanis should have had an even bigger impact, an impact that is certainly not evident in the conclusions to this report. For this reason, the Foreign Policy Elites need to reconsider their definition of Pakistan’s national interest. It is recommended however that before doing so, this group puts itself in the shoes of the parents of Matanai, it is very likely that the word “pragmatism” might have a different meaning then.

SOURCE: https://iopyne.wordpress.com/2011/09/30/elitist-misconceptions/

When Pashtun Deaths are Treated with Nod of Approval -Discriminating Among the Dead

When Pashtuns and Baluchi Deaths are a Favored  Policy 

In an ideal world all lives should be valued equally, but when the reaction to the loss of a life varies with the ethnicity, nationality, color or religion of the deceased, then for sure we have reached a less than ideal state of affairs. We Pakistanis are very quick to protest such behavior, especially when it comes to the Western media’s response to issues involving the death of Muslims.

But it so happens that for us Pakistanis, showing indignation is limited to issues where it doesn’t mean much. Many among us were heartbroken by the plight of the stranded in Gaza and fully supported the forced breaching of their economic blockade, but at the same time we are completely oblivious to the plight of our fellow Pakistanis in Kurram agency, who have also been cut off from essential supplies.

An area that is in desperate need of Pakistani indignation, is our media’s discriminatory coverage of the Taliban onslaught; a bomb blast in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or FATA somehow does not result in the same level of urgency and priority as a bomb blast in other parts of the country.

An example of this is the difference in coverage between two recent suicide attacks, one of which was in Darra Adam Khel on the 5th of November while the other was in Karachi on the 12th of November. If the loss of human lives is the measure of the importance of these incidents, then in that respect our media associated a much lower weight to the dead in Darra Adam Khel.

The 16 dead in Karachi resulted in dedicated talk shows, awareness loops and the suspension of regular programming. On the contrary, the 61 dead in Darra Adam Khel, were met with a considerably colder response; the suspension of regular programming was for a much shorter time and none of our major media pundits chose to dedicate their shows to the issue.

Back in 2009, I had the opportunity to put this question to the owner of one of our leading news channels. He simply replied that since he was running a business, he had to cater to his demand, implying that the indifference that comes on the screen is a reflection of the indifference that is felt by a majority of Pakistanis.

The probable reason for this could be the smoke screen that is created by Taliban apologists in politics as well as media. At its core are misperceptions about the supposedly stubborn nature of Pakhtuns. These perceptions have gone beyond the realm of racially motivated jokes, and are fast becoming an explanation for the persistence of the Taliban phenomenon. The Taliban conquered FATA is still seen by many as being the land of the free, where people are so angry with drone attacks that they have decided to head to Karachi and Lahore to exact revenge. While these points could result in short term political gains, in the long term the persistence of these beliefs has major consequences for the future of the Pakistani identity.

This selective indifference i.e. shoulder-shrugging on bombings in the North and revulsion on those in the South, is creating a divide between the Pakhtuns and Non-Pakhtuns of Pakistan. It is no secret that the Taliban are predominantly a Pakhtun movement. Naturally, in case of bombings in non Pakhtun areas the first response is to blame Pakhtuns for the attack. However this realization could be countered by equally highlighting the death and destruction brought about by the Taliban in Pakhtun areas. A lesser emphasis on these attacks robs the ordinary Pakhtuns of a legitimate defense that rather than being the perpetrators, they are in fact the biggest victims of Taliban atrocities, accounting for almost 70% of the dead in 2009. Furthermore, on the other side, this selective indifference causes resentment among Pakhtuns, who feel abandoned by the rest of Pakistan.

The fight against Talibanization is being fought on two fronts, i.e. the physical and the ideological. On the physical side we are dealing with an enemy that is becoming increasingly sophisticated; the number of killed per attack has risen from 1.3 in 2006 to 3.31 in 2009. This increased devastation, which is predominantly caused by the Taliban, should have resulted in a major victory on the ideological front, i.e. in terms of a loss in Taliban popularity. But according to the latest PEW research survey, Taliban approval has actually increased from 10% in 2009 to 15% in 2010.

The provincial breakup of the survey shows that at 22%, Punjab has the highest approval rate for the Taliban, a feat that could not have been achieved without the Taliban-neutral stance of its main political parties. The emphasis on drone strikes and indifference towards terrorist attacks within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, wrongly paints the Taliban as Pakhtun resistance to United States and thus creates support for their antics, but then the extra emphasis on attacks in non Pakhtun areas turns that misguided sympathy for the Pakhtuns into resentment against them.

Some might argue that comparing Karachi to Darra Adam Khel would be to ignore the importance of the former to Pakistan. While this argument would make sense if we were talking about natural disaster, in the case of the Taliban, the destruction between the two is interlinked. A peaceful Darra Adam Khel is a pre-requisite for a peaceful Karachi.

source: https://iopyne.wordpress.com/2010/12/07/discriminating-among-the-dead/

After the Dead Saudi King Grandson of Mullah Wahab ( Father of Wahabism ) What,s Next ?

The king is dead being grandson of Mullah Wahab father of Wahabism ( Deobandism in Indian Sub Continent ) and being Kinds from Daughter of Mullah Wahab who Married Ibn-Saud, Guarantees being a King of a Dictator saudi state an committing Human Rights Abuses on its citizen and Women Particularly . Tale of Abuses and Corruption and its Support by USA and Israel in Particular . 

Grand son of Mullah Wahab and King of Saudia Abadullah 

IT COULD hardly have come at a more challenging time for Saudi Arabia. On January 23rd Saudi state television announced that the 90-year-old ruler King Abdullah had died, nearly a month after being hospitalised for pneumonia. De facto ruler for two decades, Abdullah had nominated his successor, his half-brother Salman (see picture below), who was quickly elevated to king. King Salman's rule may not be long: he is 79 and, some say, suffering from dementia—though the palace vehemently denies this.

Ruling the kingdom is no small job. King Salman has inherited a realm that is the world’s top oil exporter at a time when prices have plunged; is home to Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina at a time when jihadist violence is at a peak; and has been dragged into turmoil in the region. At home, things are scarcely better: the country of 30m is the only one in which women cannot drive thanks to the struggle between reformists and conservatives. And the public accounts no longer balance without dipping into the country's, admittedly huge, reserves.

Sick Demented 79 Year old current Great Grand son of Mullah Wahabi King of Saudia 

Few reckon the new monarch will rock the boat. A former governor of Riyadh, he is thought to be similarly minded to Abdullah, albeit a little more conservative, and will be advised by the same people.

But challenges abound. Abroad, Saudi has taken a more activist stance of late, and not always with much success. The attempt to build a rebel army to oust President Bashar al-Assad of Syria failed; and Saudi Arabia is now involved in a war against the jihadists of Islamic State. Officials are particularly alarmed by America’s attempts to strike a deal with Iran, with which it vies for power, over its nuclear programme. Iran, champion of the Shia minority, has been expanding its influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The new king will have instant decisions to make after Yemen’s government fell to Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, overnight. Saudi Arabia had led attempts for a peaceful transition in the country after the toppling of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.

Saudi citizens are worried about blowback at home from Yemen, Islamic State and Iran. The Shia regime in Tehran has been critical of Saudi Arabia for guarding its market share of the oil trade by refusing to cut production to stop the price fall. This is starting to cause a pinch at home. In December Saudi Arabia said its budget deficit would rise to $39 billion in 2015, almost 5% of GDP. Thousands of graduates need work, and most seek jobs in the bloated public sector rather than in the fledgling private one. Decades-old talk of diversifying the economy has risen again.

Indeed domestically the obstacles are greater. By Saudi standards, Abdullah was a moderniser, appointing the first female government minister and in 2013 appointing 30 women to the Shura Council. These moves drew protests from the puritanical Wahhabi clerics and parts of the devout population, as well as reformers who point out that women are still unable to drive or fraternise with men who are not relatives. Free speech is curbed. A number of Saudis are pushing for religion to have less of a grip on the public sphere, the results of which are strict laws on blasphemy and a ban on cinemas.

After the Arab protests, Abdullah sent armoured vehicles to help crush Bahrain’s uprising by the island's mainly-Shia population against the Sunni ruling family. He kept his own population, especially the Shia in the east, quiescent by spending millions on government wages and housing, and setting up a Facebook page for citizens to air their grievances. How long Saudi Arabia's ageing rulers can continue such tactics is in question, and not just because of the cost. One of Abdullah’s great legacies has been funding scholarships that have sent thousands of young Saudis to study in Western universities where, some at least, have picked up democratic ideals.

By appointing Salman as his crown prince, Abdullah also avoided the looming difficulty of passing the crown down a generation in a system where power has been handed down between the sons of Abdel Aziz bin Saud, the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia in 1932. On taking the throne King Salman affirmed that his crown prince will be the youngest brother of the generation, Muqrin, a 69-year-old former pilot, intelligence chief and governor of Medina, who was last year appointed deputy crown prince by Abdullah.

Family Tree of Grand Sons of Mullah Wahabi from His daughter Married to Ibn-Saud 

Perhaps to avoid the next generation jostling for power, Salman quickly moved to appoint a nephew (descended of the his own Sudairi line) as deputy crown prince: Muhammad bin Naif, the interior minister, who has shown an iron fist when dealing with terrorism. To deal with the inevitable struggle for the crown, Abdullah in 2006 set up an allegiance committee composed of representatives of each of the sons of the founder. Unlike the current generation, who recall their Bedouin roots, many see many of the next generation as profligate, flashy and irresponsible, having grown up in times of great wealth. During his rule Abdullah cut the allowances to the thousands of princes and princesses, much to their chagrin.

Oil Status 

Oil Production over the Years and Budget of Saudia 

For both Saudis and foreign allies such as America, perhaps the toughest issue facing Saudi Arabia is the puritanical Wahhabi form of Islam that it has fostered; the Al Sauds rule in a pact with the Wahhabi clerics. Abdullah removed the most extreme teachings in school textbooks after the September 11th 2001 attacks on America, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers turned out to be Saudis. But recently voices near and far have been pointing out the contradiction between Saudi joining the coalition against Islamic State while implementing harsh punishments at home for transgressions of its devout religious strictures. The most striking example is the 1,000 lashes handed down to Raif Badawi, a liberal blogger who called for more freedom of thought (the flogging has been suspended after the first 50 lashes, on health grounds). The question for the outside world is whether the Saudi ruling family is part of the problem, or the best defence against the extremists.

Clarification: This article was changed to include the views of the Saudi palace.

source: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21640601-middle-east-after-abdullah-king-dead?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d

Saudi Customs not Related to Islam being Shoved down Throats of Muslims as Islam .

Mrs Obama without Hijab in Saudia Arabia 

COMMENTATORS, mainly non-Saudis, made a hullabaloo when Michelle Obama, America’s first lady, turned up in Saudi Arabia on January 27th in colourful, loose-fitting clothing and no headscarf. The oil-rich kingdom is known for its women being swathed in long, black cloaks known as abayas, usually paired with the hijab (headscarf) or niqab(which leaves a slit for the eyes), or a burqa (which covers the body from head to toe, with a mesh for the eyes). So what do women, Saudi and foreign, actually have to wear in Saudi Arabia?

The key to understanding Saudi customs is the country's history. When the modern nation was founded in 1932, it was based on an 18th-century pact between the ruling Al Saud monarchy and a devout bunch of clerics who followed a fiery version of Islam, dubbed Wahhabism (after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab). Ever since, Saudi Arabia’s laws have been based on this creed’s strict version of sharia, or Islamic law, which in reality incorporates many desert traditions that have been cloaked in Islam. The full covering for women is considered to be one of these customs. But today it is enforced by the religious police and zealous volunteers.

While all versions of Islam suggest a woman should dress modestly, often covering her hair and body, Saudi Arabia is one of the only Muslim-majority countries that legally imposes a dress code (Iran is another). Women, foreign and local, must wear an abaya (a few get away with long coats) in public places. Muslim—often equated with Saudi—women are said to have to wear a headscarf; foreigners needn’t. The face need not be covered, much to the chagrin of some hardliners. There are margins and uncertainties, too. The western coastal of Jeddah is far more relaxed than Riyadh, with abayas often brightly coloured or worn open to expose the clothing beneath. At home with relatives, in compounds and all-female settings, women can shed their outer layers. At some posh private Red Sea resorts, they go in bikinis. While many women head to aeroplane lavatories just before landing, not being fully covered is tolerated in the airport.

The strict dress code doesn’t mean there is no room for personal expression or fashion.Abayas come in different cuts, colours, styles and fabrics, from plain black to ones with cartoon characters on the back, and from cotton daywear to lacy or frilly ones fit for an evening out. Most women have a wardrobe of options; abaya shops abound. Moreover, women can wear whatever shoes they like, from trainers to Jimmy Choos. The accessory business is booming in Saudi Arabia as bags, sunglasses and jewellery become the markers of taste. A number of women are heavily made up. Some suggest that defeats the point. As with other rules in the kingdom, many young people find ways around them. But asurvey in January 2014 found that conservative attitudes remain pervasive among the population: despite half the sample saying women should be free to choose what to wear, two-thirds reckoned women should wear the niqab and another 11% the burqa—stricter forms of dress than the one currently enforced.

source: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains-20?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ee/tr/saudiarabiasdresscodeforwomen

ISIS Is Now Operating in Afghanistan formed from Pakistani Taliban Factions

Could a new front line emerge in South and Central Asia?

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Afghan officials confirmed for the first time this week that the terror organization ISIS, which controls large stretches of territory in Iraq and Syria, is operating in Southern Afghanistan. According to BBC sources, Islamic State fighters have been battling Taliban forces in the southwestern province of Helmand with about 20 people from both sides killed and injured.

The Associated Press reports that Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former corps commander under the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, had a falling out with the Taliban leadership in the Pakistani city of Quetta, after which he replaced White Taliban flags with the black flags of the Islamic State, donned black battle fatigues, and pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Saudi Style Beheadings by ISIS and Taliban are thier Trade Mark 

The Wall Street Journal reports of a 16 minute propaganda video published last Saturday, which purportedly shows a former Pakistani Taliban spokesman pledging his allegiance to the terror group Islamic State and claiming that a number of Taliban field commanders have defected with him. “We are gathered here with commanders from 10 units. They all want to pledge their allegiance to the caliph of all believers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” proclaims the former spokesperson, Shahidullah Shahid, according to Wall Street Journal reporters who have seen the video.

from White Taliban Flag to a Black Flag a Copy of Saudia Flag 

Afghan officials do not seem to be excessively worried that the group will gain traction with Afghans. The BBCquotes the Governor of Nimruz province: “Once they fought under al-Qaeda name, then as Taliban, and now IS, they are the same people with the same programmes.” A key difference, however, is that the Taliban does not endorse the pan-Islamic model of global jihad that ISIS does, and usually confines its operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A December UN report noted that there had been an increase in the activities of al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan over the past year. The report singles out ISIS as constituting a challenge to the fragmented Taliban movement, whose spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, has not been seen in public since 2001. The report notes that Afghan security forces have retrieved ISIS propaganda material from insurgents.

The report also emphasized that, “Taliban leadership was concerned that the success of ISIL in parts of northern Iraq would draw young people who were potential Taliban recruits to join ISIL in Iraq.” It said that two prominent supporters of the Taliban have publicly endorsed the leader of the terror group Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Most interestingly, the UN report noted that several Afghan media articles have reported that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had lived in Kabul under the Taliban regime under the alias Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and that he worked closely with al-Qaeda groups in the country at that time.

While could just be motivated by opportunism inspired by the recent successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the emergence of this new militant force in Afghanistan could pose a challenge to efforts by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to re-launch peace talks with the insurgents. As The Diplomat reported last week, the Taliban has rejected Ghani’s recent peace overtures and turned down cabinet positions in the new Afghan government.

source: http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-is-now-operating-in-afghanistan/