Peshawar School Massacre Revisited

'There is no God but Allah': Chilling boast of Taliban death squad who posed for pictures in front of extremist banner before slaughtering 132 innocent children , Taliban release photographs showing six men who carried out massacre , Heavy armed fighters posed in front of white Islamic banner before attack , Flag behind reads: 'There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is Allah's Messenger'
Spokesman vowed Taliban would carry out similar attacks in the future ,Added that Peshawar massacre was 'just the trailer' for other atrocities, Maulana Fazlullah ordered yesterday's bloody slaughter of 132 children ,Previously demanded the death of teenage education campaigner Malala

By JOHN HALL FOR MAILONLINE and DAVID WILLIAMS and SAM MARSDEN FOR THE DAILY MAIL

PUBLISHED: 09:29 GMT, 17 December 2014 | UPDATED: 23:45 GMT, 17 December 2014

|Criminal Umar Narai, Known as of FR Peshawar tribal Area under Islamabad Operational head of Taliban in Peshawar 

Posing proudly in front of a Taliban banner declaring ‘There is no God but Allah’, this is the hand-picked suicide cell responsible for the cold-blooded slaughter of 132 schoolchildren.

Clutching an array of rocket launchers and machine guns, the crazed gunmen are shown both in traditional clothing of Taliban fighters and the Pakistan military uniforms they wore to avoid suspicion immediately before storming the Army School in Peshawar.

The pictures – apparently taken in the hours before Tuesday’s attack – were released yesterday by the Taliban, together with a threat to carry out similar attacks despite the outrage at the horrific, carefully planned massacre in which 132 children and more than a dozen teachers were killed.

In an email released this morning, Khurasani attempted to justify the attack by claiming that the Pakistani army has long killed the innocent children and families of Taliban fighters.

But he vowed more such militant attacks and told Pakistani civilians to detach themselves from all military institution, adding: 'We are still able to carry out major attacks. This was just the trailer.'

Mr.  Narai  Flanked on Left and Right by his 6 Taliban Murderers and Serial Killers from Tribal Areas under Control of Islamabad under FCR draconian Laws of Lord Curzon   

Depraved: The Taliban gunmen who slaughtered 148 innocent people, including 132 children, are pictured just hours before the massacre. The white banner they pose in front of is the flag of the Pakistani Taliban and reads: 'There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger’

Strategic Assets of Pakistan Army in Afghanistan all from Tribal Area of Pakistan under Tight control of Islamabad  

In disguise: The photographs show the six heavily armed men wearing both traditional clothing of Taliban fighters and the Pakistan military uniforms they wore to avoid suspicion before storming the school

FATA Serial Killers Mercenaries 

FATA Serial Killers Mercenaries

Killers: Photographs of the six men responsible for murdering 132 children were released by the Taliban this morning, along with an emailed statement revealing the terrorists plan more attacks at schools in Pakistan

Serial Killers Mercenaries 

FATA Serial Killers Mercenaries

Militants: All six gunmen were shot dead by Pakistan security officials - but not until they'd killed 132 children

Mercenaries and Paid Serial Killer made for Pakistan Policy Objectives 

Serial Killers Mercenaries 

Warped: These two-cold blooded killers stare menacingly into the camera before carrying out the massacre

FATA Serial Killers Mercenaries Strategic Assets of Punjabi Establishment 

Armed: Released by the terror group's spokesman Mohammad Khurasani a third group shot shows the same men wearing full military fatigues - an outfit that would outed them as Taliban to security guards

Illiterate Mullah Fazullah with No Education who People are led to Think runs Taliban and complex Operation with High tech Precision 

Terror leader: Maulana Fazlullah - the firebrand militant, whose thick black beard reaches halfway down his chest - took control of the Pakistani Taliban 13 months ago

In the email, the terror group warned Muslims to avoid places with military ties, saying it attacked the school to avenge the deaths of children allegedly killed by soldiers in tribal areas.

It accused the students at the army school of 'following the path of their fathers and brothers to take part in the fight against the tribesmen' nationwide.

The warning came as the Prince of Wales joined the international condemnation of the attack, describing it as ‘sickening’ and a ‘horrific reminder that Muslims themselves are the victims of the violent intolerance of the extremists’.

Speaking at the Syrian Orthodox Church in London, Prince Charles added: ‘The many, many families in Pakistan who have lost children, other relatives, friends and colleagues in the massacre are in my prayers.’


The Peshawar atrocity is said to have been ordered by Maulana Fazlullah, head of the Taliban in Pakistan and the man who ordered the shooting of teenage education campaigner Malala Yousafzai, this year’s winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Fazlullah is understood to have demanded that his lieutenant Umar Naray managed the operation, and communicated with the gunmen directly from his base over the border in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s army chief of staff, Raheel Sharif, flew to Kabul to seek help in tracking him down.


His communications have been intercepted as well which helped security agencies in tracing his location and whereabouts which was urgently shared not only with the Afghan army but also with Nato forces,' a security source was quoted as telling Peshawar's Dawn newspaper.

The firebrand militant, whose thick black beard reaches halfway down his chest, took control of the Pakistani Taliban 13 months ago. It is thought the massacre may have been his barbaric revenge for Malala, 17, being award the Nobel Peace Prize earlier this year.

Whatever his twisted motive, Fazlullah has succeeded in uniting the world in revulsion once again.


Funeral prayers in Pakistan as PM vows to continue war on terror. 

Sacrificial Lambs of Strategic Depth Pashtuns and Baluchis 

Mrs Qazi and Her Son who claimed she was not burned on his Facebook Profile 

Tahira Kazi (left), the principal of the Army Public School and College in Peshawar, was set on fire by jihadists who slaughtered 148 people, most of them children. 

A Pakistani woman holds up a placard showing a number of the victims of the savage Taliban attack

Sacrifice of Pashtun and Baluchis to Feed the Overpopulated Punjab for Dollars and Riyals 

Tragic: Among the victims of the slaughter are (from left to right) Talha Munur Paracha, Rafiq Bangash, Hassan Javed Khan and Muhammad Yasseen. 

Victims: Rafiq Bangash (left) and Mubeen Shah Afreedi (right) were among the children slaughtered by jihadis

Mobeen Afrid Slaughtered for Riyals and Dollars 

Muhmmad Ali Slaughtered for Dollars and Riyals to feed Over Populated Punjab . 

Amish Salman from Pashtun Family was a Avid Car Enthusiast 

Friends took to social media to pay tribute to Amish Salman, who was among the murdered Class 9 pupils

In a society usually reluctant to criticise the Taliban, there was an outpouring of anger across Pakistan yesterday.

At a vigil in the capital Islamabad, Fatimah Khan, 38, said: ‘I don’t have words for my pain and anger. They slaughtered those children like animals.’

Naba Mehdi, 16, had a message of defiance for the Taliban.

‘We’re not scared of you,’ she said. ‘We will still study and fight for our freedom. This is our war.’

As the photographs of the murders were released by the Pakistani Taliban, all six men were named on Twitter. But their personal details have not yet been independently verified.

The government in Islamabad immediately responded by instructing schools across the country to increase their security and to rehearse escape routines.

It came as mass funerals took place across Peshawar on the first of three days of national mourning and as Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, ordered a moratorium on the death penalty to be lifted for terror-related cases.

Government spokesman Mohiuddin Wan said: 'It was decided that this moratorium should be lifted. The prime minister approved... Black warrants [execution orders] will be issued within a day or two.'

Inside the military-run school where 150 people were killed

Rivers of Blood were flown to show International Community 

Harrowing: A blood-splattered doorway leading to an auditorium at the school in Peshawar, with spectacles on the floor belonging to one of the victims of the massacre

Politics of Carnage 

Shocking: The scene of the where Suicider Blew himself in Midst of Lady Teacher Common Room Near Administration Block where Lady Principal Also Died 

 Mrs Kazi's office, Intact but  she died near common Room where a terrorist blew himself up during a nine-hour rampage

Horror: This morning the first devastating images emerged of the blood-soaked classrooms where 132 innocent children and nine teachers were massacred by the Taliban

Foreign Journalist were Given VIP Tours while Paki media was kept on Leash by Army Men . 

Carnage: A journalist surveys the staff office at the Army Public School attacked by the Taliban in Peshawar. 

Failure of Zarb I Azab to protect Pashtuns or Policy of Strategic Depth to conquer Afghanistan ?

The moratorium on civilian executions had been in place since 2008. Only one execution has taken place since then.

Amid harrowing scenes, dozens of small wooden coffins were carried for burial together with those of their teachers. Rows of children and fellow pupils stood in silence, some weeping, their hands clasped in front of them beside the lines of caskets draped in blankets.

People across the country lit candles and held vigils for the 148 who were killed – seven more of the critically injured died in hospital yesterday.

‘They finished in minutes what I had lived my whole life for – my son,’ said labourer Akhtar Hussain, tears streaming down his face as he buried 14-year-old Fahad.

He said he had worked for years in Dubai to earn a livelihood for his children, adding: ‘That innocent one is now gone in the grave, and I can’t wait to join him, I can’t live any more.’

Among the best attended of the funerals was that of teacher Afsha Ahmed, 24, who confronted the gunmen when they burst into her classroom and told them: ‘You can only kill my students over my dead body.’

She was burned alive as she stood in front of her pupils.

Photo OPs and Scare Mongering Policy of Dead Bodies Gets More dollars from West 

This first funeral ceremonies for victims of the attack on the Army Public School took place this afternoon.

Poltics and Strategy of Dead Bodies by Punjabi Establishment 

Anger by Pashtun civil Society agianst Punjabi Establishment 

Death to Strategic depth Policies 

Anger: Pashtun men take to the streets to protest against the Taliban's savage murder of 132 schoolchildren: 

Prayer: Dozens of men gather in Peshawar to say prayers for those killed in the Peshawar terror attack

The family of another teacher torched alive in front of her class gathered to say funeral prayers.

Tahira Kazi, the principal of the Army Public School and College in Peshawar, was set on fire by jihadists who slaughtered so many.

It is believed she was targeted because she is married to a retired army colonel, Kazi Zafrullah. The picture obtained by MailOnline shows her standing proudly next to a student believed to be her son.

Prime Minister Sharif said Pakistan stood united to ensure the deaths of the children were not wasted, after a meeting of all party leaders in Peshawar. He promised that in military action, there would be no distinction between ‘good and bad’ Taliban.


Britain has been just ‘days away’ from a terrorist atrocity like the Sydney siege, the UK’s top policeman said yesterday.

Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe said five terror plots in London had been foiled in the past four months alone, including one gang who came ‘very, very close’ before the security services pounced.

The Scotland Yard chief said on LBC Radio there was ‘no doubt’ there were extremists in the UK as dangerous as the gunman behind the Sydney siege, and some plotters had been ‘very close to hurting somebody badly, or killing them’.

‘We have resolved to continue the war against terrorism till the last terrorist is eliminated,’ Mr Sharif said. ‘We must not forget these scenes. The way they left bullet holes in the bodies of innocent kids, the way they tore apart their faces with bullets.’

He said he spoke to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to discuss how both countries could do more to fight terrorism. Significantly, the two agreed to launch operations on their respective sides of the border, and pledged to ‘clean this region from terrorism’.

Yesterday, the first devastating images also emerged of the blood-soaked classrooms where 132 innocent children and nine teachers were massacred by the Taliban.

Horrifying pictures revealed the carnage wrought by seven extremist gunmen who sprayed children with bullets as they sat receiving first aid tuition and exploded suicide bombs in a room of 60 pupils.


Pictures of a blood splattered doorway leading to an auditorium and the scene of the final gun battle also emerged.

In a grim tour of the building photographers were shown inside the auditorium.

The floor is caked in blood in places and dozens of chairs lie in disarray, knocked over by children running for cover as the terrorists hosed them with bullets.

The lucky ones, it transpired, survived by playing dead under these chairs as the gunmen stalked the room, searching for children they'd missed.

Pashtuns and Baluchis Blood Gets More Dollars for Punjab and its Establishment 

Tragic scene: Pakistani journalists film and photograph inside an auditorium of the Army Public School

Chairs are upturned and blood stains the floor at the Army Public School auditorium

Chairs are upturned and blood stains the floor at the Army Public School auditorium

Survivor Ehsan Elahi told how gunmen burst into the auditorium and fired at children for a full 10 minutes . 

Commando's were too late 

Army commandos fought the Taliban in a day-long battle until the school was cleared and the attackers dead 

Suicide Blast in Hall 

Books and note paper litter the floor of the school, dropped as children ran for their lives 

Picture Opportunity for Strategic Depth and US Dollars for Punjabi Establishment 

Nightmare scene: The pictures of the school's interior emerged as Pakistan began three days of mourning

Pellets of Suicide Bomber who are 90% Made in Pakistan . 

A local reporter walks past a damaged wall of the Army Public School, riddled with bullet holes

Pakistan Armywho Made Taliban in 1970,s 

Bleak: Pakistani soldiers walk amidst the debris as a journalist takes pictures behind them.

Bullet Holes in Class Room 

Barbaric act: The terrorists left the school walls scarred with bullet holes as they went on their rampage

The barbaric slaughter at the Peshawar school was ordered by the Taliban's leader Maulana Fazlullah, who took over the running of the group last November.

Born Fazal Hayat in 1974 in the Swat Valley, Fazlullah is a member of the Yousafzai tribe - the same group of ethnic Pashtuns from which Malala takes her surname.

Aged 18 he became the leader of the local terror group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi after its leadership was decimated by arrests following the September 11 attacks in New York.

Is He really the Master Mind ?? a Illiterate Mullah or his Handlers in Pakistan 

Killer: The slaughter of 132 children at a school in Pakistan was ordered by Maulana Fazlullah

In the hope of cementing his legitimacy as leader, Fazlullah married the daughter of Sufi Muhammad, who founded Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi in 2002. Rumours that his henchmen kidnapped the bride and forced her to marry him have dogged Fazlullah ever since.

While in jail, Muhammad ordered Fazlullah to adopt his new name and sent him reams of radical Islamic literature designed to assist and guide his son in law.

By the time Muhammad was released from prison in 2008, Fazlullah's leadership was secure enough for its founder not to resume control.

Later that year Fazlullah allied Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi with the Pakistani Taliban, and he started taking direct orders from Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud.

This relationship would allow Fazlullah to become increasingly close to senior figures in the terror group.


While taking orders from the Pakistani Taliban, Fazlullah controlled more than 4,000 fighters - helping him to effectively run a parallel government in the Swat Valley and impose strict Sharia law across 57 villages.

It was while governing the Swat Valley that Fazlullah began using FM radio stations to broadcast his firebrand sermons in the area, earning him the nickname Radio Mullah.

His rantings about 'sins' such as television, music, and computers were deemed compulsory listening among the villagers as the Taliban imposed a rigorous version of Islamic law, publicly beheading and flogging wrongdoers and burning schools. 

Malalaa was First to Point Taliban as Education Enemies and was Ridiculed by People who Never thought Punjabi Establishment can Make these Taliban 

Maulana Fazlullah's previous crimes include ordering the murder of campaigner Malala Yousafzai (pictured)

Later in 2007 the Pakistani military forced the band of jihadis out of Swat Valley and arrested Fazlullah's brother. Fazlullah fled to Afghanistan where he was believed to have been seriously injured in 2009 before returning to Swat.

That same year Fazlullah told BBC's Urdu Service that he planned to launch fresh attacks on the Pakistani military in the area.

Over the following three years Fazlullah's band of militants carried near constant cross-border raids on the Swat Valley and seized more and more territory along the frontier region. In 2012 Reuters indicated that Fazlullah controlled a 12 miles stretch of land in Afghanistan's Nuristan province.

It was during this time that Fazlullah ordered the death of Malala Yousafzai - the teenage education campaigner who almost died when a masked gunman in Swat Valley jumped into a vehicle taking girls home from school and shouted 'Who is Malala?' before shooting her in the head.

Last November Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a U.S. drone strike, leading to the Taliban's supreme council electing Fazlullah as its new head.

Since then, the militant has specialised in the kind attention grabbing savagery that deflects attention away from the Taliban's declining influence in Swat Valley, which has been eroded by bitter feuds broke out with local clans - including the traditionally dominant Mehsud tribe.

Fazlullah has also found his power reined in by the Pakistani military's fresh push into the Taliban's former North Waziristan stronghold.

Most of Taliban come from Madrissah in Punjab and Read write and Urdu Perfectly and thier Pashto is Poor and not as First Language 

Rise to power: Maulana Fazlullah was elected as head of the Pakistani Taliban after the death in a U.S. drone strike of long-term leader Hakimullah Mehsud (pictured centre in brown hat)

In September Fazlullah also declared the Taliban's support for the Islamic State and vowed to send fighters to assist the terror group as it was wages bloody war in Syria and Iraq.

'Oh our brothers, we are proud of you in your victories. We are with you in your happiness and your sorrow,' Pakistani Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid said in a statement issued to mark the Muslim holy festival of Eid al-Adha.

'In these troubled days, we call for your patience and stability, especially now that all your enemies are united against you. Please put all your rivalries behind you,' he added.

'All Muslims in the world have great expectations of you . We are with you, we will provide you with Mujahideen [fighters] with every possible support,' he said.

Yesterday's brutal massacre of schoolchildren is widely seen as an attempt by Fazlullah to prove to his rivals that the Taliban is still a relevant force.

The strategy may not be particularly well thought out, however, as it is only likely to add to the tribal divisions that have drastically weakened the group over the past year.
The BBC faced criticism yesterday for not using the word ‘terrorist’ to describe the Taliban fanatics behind the school massacre in Pakistan. The broadcaster’s TV, radio and online reports called the extremists who carried out the bloody attack ‘militants’ or ‘gunmen’. Tory MP Conor Burns said the Peshawar gunmen were ‘clearly terrorists’ and called on the BBC to stop toning down its language.


source : http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2877174/Radio-Mullah-bloodthirsty-Taliban-leader-planned-Pakistani-school-massacre-ordered-hit-Malala.html

Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan

By Moed Yousaf

When in early 2012 Pakistan touted a major shift in its Afghan policy, the move was cautiously welcomed given the influence—and spoiling power— Pakistan has displayed in Afghanistan in the past. This paper asks exactly what Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ entails, what are the motives behind it, and whether it opens any new opportunities for peace in Afghanistan.

This paper is published under the Wider Central Asia Initiative, a two year SIPRI project to promote and facilitate dialogue among the main external stakeholders in Afghanistan’s future. The project has included consultations with senior government officials and experts from Afghanistan, from Iran, Pakistan and five Central Asian states— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well as from Europe and North America. It is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Moeed Yusuf (Pakistan) is Senior Pakistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace and is responsible for managing the Institute’s Pakistan programme. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country. He has worked extensively on issues relating to South Asian politics, Pakistan’s foreign policy, the Pakistani US relationship, nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, and human security and development in South Asia. He is the co editor of the forthcoming volume South Asia 2060:

Envisioning Regional Futures (Anthem Press, 2013). He has also edited a volume on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Asia, scheduled for publication in spring 2014.

Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan 

Assessing how genuine Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ is depends on the baseline against which Pakistan’s current behaviour is compared. If it is Pakistan’s aggressive push for strategic depth and its purely ethno-centric approach, the shift is real and tangible. Pakistan no longer wishes for outright Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

It does, however, want the Taliban to be given meaningful representation in a political reconciliation process that would allow them post-2014 political space.

This implies that Pakistan accepts that it must work with a broader set of Afghan stakeholders—both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Pakistani establishment has also moderated its goal from shutting India out of Afghanistan altogether to one of ensuring that India is not able to stir up trouble within Pakistan or help create a hostile Afghan dispensation.

The real change, however, has not been in Pakistan’s actions—which still seem highly destabilizing to an outside observer—but in the principal driver of Pakistan’s behaviour: domestic instability. The fact that Pakistan’s policies remain troubling to the Afghan Government and the West, and its failure to act decisively against the Afghan Taliban presence in Pakistan, are primarily because
of the domestic repercussions it fears from going after the sanctuaries, and its desire to create a scenario whereby the Taliban are willing to return to Afghanistan through a political deal.

Overall, Pakistan’s shift is more accurately represented as a moderation, rather than a transformation, of its mindset. Its most recent overtures and claims of a strategic shift are simply what it sees as the most effective way to pursue its objectives in a somewhat changed—even desperate—context as far as the Afghan endgame in concerned.

There is little reason for Pakistani planners to congratulate themselves on the situation today. The Pakistani establishment’s stakes have been kept alive in the Afghan endgame, but it can hardly be comfortable with the strategic repercussions
of its moves. The 1990s saw an outright tactical victory for Pakistan, only to be followed by a massive strategic blowback from its actions. The onus is on the Pakistani establishment to avoid a repeat of this. The good news is that there is a clearly discernible difference between the Pakistani establishment’s body language today and that in the pre-September 2001 days: it now seems to be more worried about the threat of chaos in Afghanistan than excited about the prospects of a tactical victory.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

The way forward ISAF cannot weaken the Taliban insurgency irreversibly in the months left
before its scheduled withdrawal. There is therefore no option but to push Forward the agenda of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban.

All of the main actors—the Afghan Government; Afghan political factions including the Taliban; Pakistan; and the USA—now need to agree and accept a formula to move ahead with Reconciliation.

The multiple, competing efforts to woo the Taliban into talks that have been pursued for too long have only increased suspicions among these actors. Whatever process is ultimately chosen
must have the blessing of all actors and must be allowed to function freely within
the parameters laid out.

The greatest possibility for success will be through a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. Pakistan, the USA and other external actors should only put forth their absolute non-negotiables—and these should be minimal—as they allow Afghan representatives to negotiate directly.

Pakistan has traditionally been the most aggressive of the regional actors; now that the Taliban’s presence in talks is likely to be meaningful, it must accept that its role is no more than a facilitator that constantly prods the hardliners among the Taliban to accept power sharing as the optimal outcome. The world, too, must not expect Pakistan to deliver more than this.

If the Taliban do find political space in post-2014 Afghanistan, Pakistan’s most important service would be to apply constant pressure on the Taliban leadership to moderate its views. A moderated Afghan Taliban will not only benefit Afghan politics but will also have a desirable spin-off effect in terms of denting support for the Pakistani Taliban, who continue to cite their ideological affinity with their Afghan counterparts to gain traction.

To achieve this, Pakistan must accept moderate Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan as its partners. It must continue expanding its nascent contacts with the former Northern Alliance factions in Afghanistan. This is all the more important given that Pakistan is vying for an inclusive set-up in Afghanistan that will necessarily involve representation from all major factions.

Pakistan and the USA must come to some agreement on the issue of Afghan militant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. As long as Pakistan does not confront the Afghan Taliban factions using the sanctuaries, but denies the USA a free hand to do so, this divergence will be irreconcilable. Common ground may be found with an understanding under which Pakistan agrees to pressure the Afghan Taliban to cease their attacks on Afghan and international forces and civilians while peace
talks are happening. Presumably, this would also involve a commitment from the USA to eciprocate with a localized ceasefire. Tools such as drone strikes would then only be used against Taliban factions if they breached their commitment.

On India, there is a need to transform the current Indian–Pakistani competition into cooperation in the Afghan context. Specifically, two dialogues need to be initiated between the two sides: on intelligence and on development. The intelligence dialogue could allay mutual fears of the rationales and motives behind their political and security activities in Afghanistan. The two intelligence
communities could institute a verifiable mechanism to address each other’s concerns.

The development dialogue could seek ways to cooperate on or readjust development activities in Afghanistan. Concentrating Indian investment activity in the north and west of the country could help to allay Pakistani suspicions about Indian projects near its border. Given India’s post-2014 vulnerability in Pashtun-dominated areas close to the Pakistani border, India may be willing to
accept this.

Pakistan must continue exploring avenues to expand its economic footprint in Afghanistan, even as security concerns dominate its approach in the run-up to December 2014. Commendably, Afghan–Pakistani trade has risen sharply in recent years.81 However, there is still huge untapped potential for these two geographically contiguous and intricately connected countries, with relative
freedom of movement across their shared border. The Afghan Government is already pitching to attract fresh investment after 2014 and the Pakistani private sector would do well to explore affordable options. As economic activity in Afghanistan increases, the country also remains a highly attractive destination for Pakistani services and labour.

Finally, the international community cannot be satisfied with merely blaming Pakistan for the failure in Afghanistan. Its approach to Pakistan has defied one of the fundamentals of realpolitik: it has conflated the doable with the desirable.

Rather than internalizing Pakistan’s self-defined outlook towards the region and its establishment’s vision for Afghanistan, and then crafting appropriate and relevant incentives to mould its behaviour in a desirable direction, external actors have sought to redirect Pakistani thinking through means they believe should appeal to its leaders, not what would actually be attractive to a Pakistani strategic calculus.

 Monetary rewards and promises of long-term support have been prioritized over actions to address Pakistan’s regional insecurities. It is too late to go back to the drawing board on these. In the next two years, however, the international community should at least avoid any developments that may force Pakistani planners to reverse their recent enthusiasm towards supporting reconciliation
efforts in Afghanistan.

Source : Based on report of Swiss Institute for Peace . 

Who’s killing Pakistan’s Shia and why?

BY Professor C. Christine Fair

According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2013 nearly 700 Shia were killed and more than 1,000 were injured in more than 200 sectarian terrorist attacks. Over 90 percent of those attacks occurred in Quetta, Karachi, Kangu, Parachinar, Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Since the beginning of 2000, nearly 4,000 persons have been killed and 6,800 injured (see figure below).  Who is hunting Pakistan’s Shia and, most importantly, why?

The explanation for Pakistan’s deadly sectarian present lies in the communal politics of Pakistan’s pre-history and the subsequent decisions that Pakistani elites made in the early years about nation building in the new state.  The current path of violence and intolerance may have been paved well before Pakistan became independent in 1947.

Pakistan: Born to Other

As the British appetite for maintaining the Raj declined after World Wars I and II, it became increasingly clear that the declining imperial power would accede to mounting Indian nationalist demands to quit the subcontinent. However, it was not clear what political order would rise from the detritus of the erstwhile Raj.  Some Muslims associated with the All India Muslim League feared that, in a Hindu-majority state, Muslims would be subjected to separate and unequal status.  The Congress Party, which claimed to represent all groups in India and which enjoyed a pan-Indian presence, challenged these claims. However, some within the Congress Party increasingly began to evidence communal sentiments which further discomfited some Muslims in India.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who is widely considered to be the founder of Pakistan, propounded a minoritarian and communal discourse called the “Two Nation Theory.”  Jinnah’s dual claims that he was the “sole spokesman” for India’s Muslims and that his Muslim League best aggregated their interests were contested. In the 1937 elections, the League suffered a thrashing. The Muslim-majority areas that are now a part of today’s Pakistan either voted for the Congress or provincial parties. By the 1940s, Jinnah and the League gained traction and in the 1946 provincial elections, the Muslim League redeemed itself by winning 425 out of 496 seats reserved for Muslims.

However, the idea that the Two Nation Theory ineluctably meant partition is flawed. Jinnah explained the lineaments of the Two Nation Theory in a March 23, 1940 speech in Lahore.  He argued that Muslims and Hindus comprised equal nations. That Muslims were a numerical minority was immaterial because they were a nation on par with the nation of Hindus. Jinnah explained that “If the British Government are [sic] really in earnest and sincere to secure [the] peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into  ‘autonomous national states.’” Historians note that this expression is ambiguous and left open the possibility of a federal solution. Nowhere did the address mention the word Pakistan or partition. (Despite these facts, Pakistanis refer to this speech as the “Pakistan Resolution” and celebrate March 23 as a national holiday to commemorate its passage.)

In fact, the Two Nation Theory was a rhetorical and political argument through which Jinnah sought first to receive equal representation in the national parliament of an independent India. In the end, the Congress party refused to acquiesce to this demand, insisting upon a one-person, one-vote scheme. Congress feared that a failure to reach an agreement with the League would delay Britain’s departure. In the end, Congress and the League decided that it would be best if an independent Pakistan was carved from the Raj. And that is what happened. Jinnah was not prepared for the creation of a new state in large part because for so many years, this was never the goal of his negotiations.

The Objectives Resolution

Pakistan came into being through the bloody process of partition. The Punjab, which became the western wing of Pakistan, bore the brunt of this bloodshed in which Hindus and Sikhs engaged in barbaric communal savagery in an effort to cleanse Muslims from Muslim minority areas, and Muslims slaughtered Sikhs and Hindus in areas where those groups were a minority for the same goal of communal cleansing. The butchers won. Violence also happened in Bengal, which became the eastern wing of Pakistan, but on a lesser scale.

Once Pakistan had its bloodied borders, the long process of state and nation-building began. One of the most contentious issues was the nature of the state itself.  Was it to be an Islamic state or was it to be a state for South Asia’s Muslims? If it were to be an Islamic state, what Islamic tradition would comprise the foundations of the fledgling state? This was a non-trivial question because the territory was home to numerous Sunni as well as Shia interpretative traditions. What would be the political standing of Pakistan’s substantial non-Muslim minority?  At the time of Partition, about one fourth of Pakistan’s citizens were non-Muslim. While most of these were Hindus concentrated in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), the west also had substantial Hindu, Christian, Parsee and even Sikh populations.  To garner the most support possible for the notion of Pakistan, Jinnah said contradictory things to different people.  This enabled proponents of one vision or another to use and arrange his various speeches selectively like pieces of plastic in a kaleidoscope. In any event, Jinnah died shortly after partition, taking whatever vision of the state he had with him.

Pakistan took the first and irreversible step towards an Islamist state with the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which declared that sovereignty belonged to Allah alone and that “the Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.”  The resolution was passed over the objections of Pakistani secularist and minorities. The Objectives Resolution was, in turn, incorporated into Pakistan’s constitution and has since become a fixed feature of Pakistani constitutional law.

However, the Objectives Resolution opened a sluice gate for Islamists who vied to define who qualified as a Muslim and whose interpretation of Sharia was superior. Naturally, Pakistan’s religious minorities became the first casualty of the emerging constitutional disposition. (Pakistan’s constitution stipulates that the president and prime minister must be Muslims. Moreover, all senior officials—including members of parliament—are required to take an oath to “protect the country’s Islamic identity.”)

Islamists next targeted Pakistan’s Ahmedi community and mobilized to have them declared non-Muslim.  Islamists in Pakistan and elsewhere do not accept the Ahmedis as Muslims because they do not accept Muhammad as the final prophet.  This was ironic: many of the key leaders of the Muslim League were Ahmedi, as were many of Pakistan’s high-profile civilian and military personnel.  After decades of agitation by anti-Ahmedi Islamists, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto acquiesced and declared them to be constitutionally non-Muslim in 1974.  The effects of this legislation have been profound for the Ahmedis. Because Ahmedis consider themselves to be Muslim, offer Muslim prayers, recognize the Quran as their holy book and congregate in facilities they call masjids (mosques), Pakistan’s extremists view them as apostates and even blasphemers.  With this law, the state of Pakistan now permitted and even encouraged persecution as well as prosecution of Ahmedis.  They were no longer allowed to call their places of worship “masjids” or even recite the Quran, among other practices Ahmedis view as fundamental to their faith.  Persecution of Ahmedis even continues beyond death: Pakistan’s police have been involved in defacing Ahmedi graves buried in Muslim cemeteries ostensibly to “prevent clashes.” Pakistan’s only Nobel Prize winner, Abdul Salaam, had his grave defaced.  Where it previously read that Salaam became “the first Muslim Nobel Laureate,” it now reads that he became “the first Nobel Laureate.”

With this victory under their belts, Islamists—particularly led by those associated with the Deobandi interpretative tradition—aimed to have Pakistan’s Shia declared non-Muslim.

Shia: Caught in the Regional Cross Hairs

In 1974, under Zulfiqar ali Bhutto, Pakistan set up a cell within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to undertake covert operations.  Mohammed Daoud Khan had just ousted King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan and begun a liberalization program under Soviet patronage.  Afghan Islamists opposed this, and Daoud violently repressed them.  Many of these Islamists fled to Pakistan, where the ISI developed them for covert operations in Afghanistan.  Once Zia ul Haq seized the Pakistani government in a coup in 1977, he began to shape Pakistan into a Sunni Islamist state.  Some of his efforts, such as imposing the payment of zakat, were specifically antagonistic to Pakistan’s Shia who do not accept Sunni interpretations of zakat.  As Shia came under pressure, they began to mobilize.

Next door, Iran was convulsing into its Shia Islamic Revolution. Not only did Iran seek to export its revolution, it also saw itself as the key protector of Shia across the world.  Iran began supporting Shia militant groups fighting Zia’s efforts to render Pakistan a Sunni Islamic state.  When Iran and Iraq fell into war, Iraq involved itself in Pakistan’s emerging sectarian conflict.  As rival Sunni militant groups—most of which wereDeobandi—began to mobilize against Shia in Pakistan, Iraq began resourcing anti-Shia militant organizations.  Soon the Arab Gulf states joined in to help marginalize Pakistan’s Shia, who were seen as Iran’s pawn in the region.  Thus Pakistan soon became the site of an elaborate sectarian proxy war between Shia Iran and its Sunni strategic competitors.

The Christmas day Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further catalyzed events that cultivated Pakistan’s sectarian killing fields.  Zia’s efforts to make Pakistan a Sunni Islamist state dovetailed with the growing need for (mostly) Sunni militants in Afghanistan.  (Zia preferred Sunni Islamist militants to fight a “jihad” in Afghanistan rather than an ethno-national insurgency against Soviet occupation.  He feared that the latter would precipitate renewed ethnic conflict in Pakistan, principally among its restive Pashtun populations who lived on the border with Afghanistan.)  Once President Carter left office, U.S. and Pakistani policy aligned.  President Reagan threw the weight of his government behind the Zia regime.  The Saudis also funded the manufacturing of jihadis by matching the U.S. contribution dollar for dollar.

When the Soviets finally left Afghanistan in 1989, the United States withdrew from the region.  However, Pakistan continued to use its well-developed stock of Sunni militants to help forge a pro-Pakistan disposition in Afghanistan.  At the same time, Indian mismanagement and malfeasance in Kashmir gave rise to an indigenous insurgency there.  Pakistan deployed the battle-hardened militants from the Afghan theatre to Kashmir.  By the early 1990s, Pakistani militants had overtaken the local insurgency and transformed the conflict from a local insurgent movement into one of international terror.

9/11: Disorientation of the Mullah, Militant and Military Alliance

Throughout the 1990s and up until 2001, Pakistan’s military and intelligence agency supported, armed, and trained numerous Islamist militants for operations in Afghanistan and India.

The largest cluster of militant groups was Deobandi in orientation.  Deobandi groups included the Afghan Taliban, anti-Shia groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)/Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) (which now go by the name of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)), and several that were ostensibly fighting the Indians (e.g. Jaish-e-Mohammad).  These Deobandi groups share a vast infrastructure of madrassahs and mosques and have overlapping membership with each other and with the Deobandi Islamist political groups, most notably the factions of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam (JUI).

Throughout the 1990s, sectarian attacks continued.  However, by the 1990s, the Pakistani state crushed the anti-Sunni militias, leaving the anti-Shia Sunni militants intact.  During the mid-1990s, groups such as LeJ/SSP also fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, illustrating their utility to the state.

With the terror attacks of 9/11, Pakistan was forced to cooperate with the United States in its war in Afghanistan.  The militant groups that were most aggrieved by this were the Deobandi groups, as they had the closest relations with the Afghan Taliban.  Moreover, because they often fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan and shared militant training infrastructure with al-Qaeda, they were also most loyal to Osama bin Laden.  By late 2001, some Deobandi militants, under a break-away faction of Jaish-e-Mohammad named Jamaat ul Furqan, began targeting the Pakistani state. They believed the Musharraf government had joined the infidel forces in ousting the Taliban and threating al Qaeda.  They began a series of suicide attacks against the Pakistan military.

As the Pakistan military began moving in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where numerous local, regional and international militants are ensconced, Pakistan’s internal militant situation continued to change.  Local militant commanders in the FATA began targeting the Pakistani military, paramilitary and intelligence agency. By 2007, a suite of anti-state militias coalesced under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistan Taliban). While many viewed the TTP as a largely Pashtun phenomenon because it emerged in the tribal areas, in fact, the movement had a very strong backbone of Punjab-based Deobandi militants.  The most vicious TTP activists were those associated with the anti-Shia terror groups (LeJ/SSP/ASWJ).

No One Is Safe Now

When Hakimullah Mehsood assumed command of the TTP, Pakistan’s sectarian killings became more frequent.  Hakimullah had a long history of association with the ASWJ.  Under him, the TTP began targeting any sect of Islam that these Deobandi militants considered to be “munafaqeen” (those who spread discord).  Not only were Pakistan’s Shia under attack (in addition to Ahmedi and Pakistan’s religious minorities), so were Pakistan’s massive Sufi population, frequently referred to as Barelvis.  The TTP began openly attacking Sufi shrines.

Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders have yet to come to any consensus on a political strategy to contend with these militants who have claimed tens of thousands of Pakistani lives since 2001.  The military, for its part, is reluctant to take them on for several reasons. First, parts of the military still see Islamist militants as important tools of foreign policy in India and Afghanistan.  In fact, for some, the loyal Islamist militants will become even more important as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan and as Pakistan needs militants that are loyal to the Pakistani project.  Second, because these Deobandi militant groups share overlapping membership with each other and with the JUI, the JUI provide their militant allies with political cover. Third, the military is unwilling to eliminate them in entirety because it believes that some of them can be rehabilitated and persuaded to aim their guns, suicide vests, and vehicle-born IEDS away from the Pakistani state and towards Afghanistan or India. (Yes. This does mean the Pakistan army—which has received some $27 billion from Washington for being a “partner in the Global War on Terrorism”—is encouraging its militants to kill Americans and their allies in Afghanistan.)  Fourth, the army’s will is no doubt conditioned by its ability.  While the army could certainly do more, its record at combating Pakistan’s domestic enemies is mixed at best and has come at a high human cost in terms of civilian casualties and massive internal displacement.  This is why Pakistan’s security and intelligence agencies rely upon the U.S. drone program to take out the terrorists it cannot.  Finally, for national counter-terrorism efforts, Pakistan’s police should take the lead.  But it is well-known that Pakistan’s police are not up to that task.

As for the civilian government, it is likely amenable to some sort of a political compromise with the TTP.  Even if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is himself a right-of-center politician, prefers more coercive solutions, he fears the TTP. He also relies upon those voters in the Punjab who support the agenda of the TTP and their anti-Shia sectarian allies.  Sharif fears that, should he muster the testicularity to support military actions against the militants, his chief rival, Imran Khan, would strip away some of his electoral base.  Like Sharif, Khan contested the 2013 general election under the banner of reconciling with the TTP, opposing military actions against them, and denouncing the drone program which has killed many TTP leaders.

Pakistan’s Shia: Caught in Strategic Crosshairs

(LUBP’s note: The Iran-Saudi proxy war theory does not explain that Deobandi terrorists who are killing Shias are also killing Sunni Sufis/Barelvis in Pakistan. It also does not explain that persecution of Shia Muslims is more than 1400 years old in the history of Islam.)

With the U.S. ouster of Saddam Hussein and the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan, Iran’s position in the region has improved since 2001.  Both Saudis and Pakistanis fear a rising Iran in Afghanistan.  For Pakistan’s part, Iran has partnered with India for its work in Afghanistan.  For Saudi Arabia’s part, a rising Shia Iran threatens to undermine the status that Saudi Arabia has arrogated to itself: leader of the Muslim world in general and protector of Sunni interests in particular.  Some Pakistanis in and out of government have often suspected that Iran can manipulate Pakistan’s Shia to achieve Tehran’s varied national and ideological interests, many of which are at odds with those of Pakistan.  Because of fears that Iran can work through these Shia to undermine Pakistan’s interests, no Pakistani government has seriously sought to completely extirpate those Deobandi groups that slaughter Shia.  In contrast, Pakistan’s government vigorously worked to eliminate Shia militias that targeted Sunnis.

Iran and Pakistan share a sensitive border in Balochistan.  In Iran’s Sistan-o-Balochistan province, many residents are Sunni Baloch.  Iran has suffered ethno-sectarian violence there because the residents believe they are second-class citizens owing to their ethnicity and their sectarian beliefs. Iran has often looked apprehensively towards Pakistan, suspecting that it is a source of support for these Sunni Baloch militants. Pakistan, for its part, has problems with its own Baloch, some of whom have waged an ethnic separatist struggle against the Pakistan state.  The Baloch nationalist insurgents have enjoyed support from India and Afghanistan.  This brings to the fore the most vulnerable of all Shia in Pakistan right now: the Hazaras of Quetta.

The Hazaras, who live in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, are easily recognized by their “Mongolian” facial features.  Hazaras of Balochistan are in danger due to a toxic mix of domestic developments, which have resulted in rising ethnic and sectarian intolerance, as well as regional political factors pertaining to fraught Iran-Pakistan relations.  While Pakistanis tend to view Shia generally with suspicion because of their presumed ties with Iran, Hazaras are viewed with even greater dubiety.  Unlike other Shia in Pakistan who speak Urdu and other vernacular languages, Hazaras speak Farsi and its variants.  This fosters suspicion that they are Iranian spies or even that they are trying to fulminate a Shia revolution in Pakistan.  (The Hazaras in Afghanistan receive support from Iran, and they were frequently the victims of violence in Afghanistan when the Taliban ruled uncontested.)  The Hazaras draw the ire of Deobandis and Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies because they oppose the Afghan Taliban, whose allies include the sectarian killers of the SSP/LeJ/ASWJ, and because they refuse to fight the ethnic Baloch separatists in the province.  The Hazaras and ethnic Baloch separatists may indeed be allies of sorts because both reject the multi-pronged efforts of the state and militants to make Pakistan a Sunni Islamist state.

Sadly, at some point it becomes difficult to discern whether persons are killed by the state or by the terrorists, because in some cases the state outsources its domestic violence to terrorists such as LeJ/SSP/ASWJ.

Should the United States Care and Why?

While it may be tempting to dismiss the senseless slaughter of Shia in Pakistan as an internal Pakistani matter, this is short-sighted for several reasons apart from humanitarian concerns.

First, these anti-Shia Deobandi groups have been the organizations to which al-Qaeda has outsourced its attacks in Pakistan, whether against Pakistani or international targets.

Second, these groups have long had a presence in Afghanistan where they have helped erect a Sunni Islamist regime in Afghanistan with Pakistani overt and covert support.

Third, Pakistan’s sectarian terrorists share overlapping membership with those groups that ostensibly focus upon India (e.g. Jaish-e-Mohammad).  It is very likely that Rawalpindi would like to woo some of these sectarian killers to battlefields in Afghanistan or India.  A terrorist attack in India or against Indian assets in Afghanistan may well be the precipitant of the next Indo-Pakistan crisis.  India’s recent general elections hoisted up the notorious Hindu nationalist, Narendra Modi, as India’s prime minister.  Modi may be more assertive in dealing with Pakistan-based terrorism aggressive than was the previous prime minister, Manmohan Singh.

Finally, it is inherently in the U.S. interest that Pakistan retains some modicum of stability.  The anti-sectarian groups, with their Punjab base, and their track record of successfully hitting high value military and civilian targets and even infiltrating the military, may well be a bigger concern to Washington than they are to either the civilian government in Islamabad or the army headquartered in Rawalpindi.

C. Christine Fair is an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Source: War on the Rocks

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