By Moed Yousaf
When in early 2012 Pakistan touted a major shift in its Afghan policy, the move was cautiously welcomed given the influence—and spoiling power— Pakistan has displayed in Afghanistan in the past. This paper asks exactly what Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ entails, what are the motives behind it, and whether it opens any new opportunities for peace in Afghanistan.
This paper is published under the Wider Central Asia Initiative, a two year SIPRI project to promote and facilitate dialogue among the main external stakeholders in Afghanistan’s future. The project has included consultations with senior government officials and experts from Afghanistan, from Iran, Pakistan and five Central Asian states— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well as from Europe and North America. It is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Moeed Yusuf (Pakistan) is Senior Pakistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace and is responsible for managing the Institute’s Pakistan programme. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country. He has worked extensively on issues relating to South Asian politics, Pakistan’s foreign policy, the Pakistani US relationship, nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, and human security and development in South Asia. He is the co editor of the forthcoming volume South Asia 2060:
Envisioning Regional Futures (Anthem Press, 2013). He has also edited a volume on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Asia, scheduled for publication in spring 2014.
Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan
Assessing how genuine Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ is depends on the baseline against which Pakistan’s current behaviour is compared. If it is Pakistan’s aggressive push for strategic depth and its purely ethno-centric approach, the shift is real and tangible. Pakistan no longer wishes for outright Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
It does, however, want the Taliban to be given meaningful representation in a political reconciliation process that would allow them post-2014 political space.
This implies that Pakistan accepts that it must work with a broader set of Afghan stakeholders—both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Pakistani establishment has also moderated its goal from shutting India out of Afghanistan altogether to one of ensuring that India is not able to stir up trouble within Pakistan or help create a hostile Afghan dispensation.
The real change, however, has not been in Pakistan’s actions—which still seem highly destabilizing to an outside observer—but in the principal driver of Pakistan’s behaviour: domestic instability. The fact that Pakistan’s policies remain troubling to the Afghan Government and the West, and its failure to act decisively against the Afghan Taliban presence in Pakistan, are primarily because
of the domestic repercussions it fears from going after the sanctuaries, and its desire to create a scenario whereby the Taliban are willing to return to Afghanistan through a political deal.
Overall, Pakistan’s shift is more accurately represented as a moderation, rather than a transformation, of its mindset. Its most recent overtures and claims of a strategic shift are simply what it sees as the most effective way to pursue its objectives in a somewhat changed—even desperate—context as far as the Afghan endgame in concerned.
There is little reason for Pakistani planners to congratulate themselves on the situation today. The Pakistani establishment’s stakes have been kept alive in the Afghan endgame, but it can hardly be comfortable with the strategic repercussions
of its moves. The 1990s saw an outright tactical victory for Pakistan, only to be followed by a massive strategic blowback from its actions. The onus is on the Pakistani establishment to avoid a repeat of this. The good news is that there is a clearly discernible difference between the Pakistani establishment’s body language today and that in the pre-September 2001 days: it now seems to be more worried about the threat of chaos in Afghanistan than excited about the prospects of a tactical victory.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
The way forward ISAF cannot weaken the Taliban insurgency irreversibly in the months left
before its scheduled withdrawal. There is therefore no option but to push Forward the agenda of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban.
All of the main actors—the Afghan Government; Afghan political factions including the Taliban; Pakistan; and the USA—now need to agree and accept a formula to move ahead with Reconciliation.
The multiple, competing efforts to woo the Taliban into talks that have been pursued for too long have only increased suspicions among these actors. Whatever process is ultimately chosen
must have the blessing of all actors and must be allowed to function freely within
the parameters laid out.
The greatest possibility for success will be through a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. Pakistan, the USA and other external actors should only put forth their absolute non-negotiables—and these should be minimal—as they allow Afghan representatives to negotiate directly.
Pakistan has traditionally been the most aggressive of the regional actors; now that the Taliban’s presence in talks is likely to be meaningful, it must accept that its role is no more than a facilitator that constantly prods the hardliners among the Taliban to accept power sharing as the optimal outcome. The world, too, must not expect Pakistan to deliver more than this.
If the Taliban do find political space in post-2014 Afghanistan, Pakistan’s most important service would be to apply constant pressure on the Taliban leadership to moderate its views. A moderated Afghan Taliban will not only benefit Afghan politics but will also have a desirable spin-off effect in terms of denting support for the Pakistani Taliban, who continue to cite their ideological affinity with their Afghan counterparts to gain traction.
To achieve this, Pakistan must accept moderate Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan as its partners. It must continue expanding its nascent contacts with the former Northern Alliance factions in Afghanistan. This is all the more important given that Pakistan is vying for an inclusive set-up in Afghanistan that will necessarily involve representation from all major factions.
Pakistan and the USA must come to some agreement on the issue of Afghan militant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. As long as Pakistan does not confront the Afghan Taliban factions using the sanctuaries, but denies the USA a free hand to do so, this divergence will be irreconcilable. Common ground may be found with an understanding under which Pakistan agrees to pressure the Afghan Taliban to cease their attacks on Afghan and international forces and civilians while peace
talks are happening. Presumably, this would also involve a commitment from the USA to eciprocate with a localized ceasefire. Tools such as drone strikes would then only be used against Taliban factions if they breached their commitment.
On India, there is a need to transform the current Indian–Pakistani competition into cooperation in the Afghan context. Specifically, two dialogues need to be initiated between the two sides: on intelligence and on development. The intelligence dialogue could allay mutual fears of the rationales and motives behind their political and security activities in Afghanistan. The two intelligence
communities could institute a verifiable mechanism to address each other’s concerns.
The development dialogue could seek ways to cooperate on or readjust development activities in Afghanistan. Concentrating Indian investment activity in the north and west of the country could help to allay Pakistani suspicions about Indian projects near its border. Given India’s post-2014 vulnerability in Pashtun-dominated areas close to the Pakistani border, India may be willing to
accept this.
Pakistan must continue exploring avenues to expand its economic footprint in Afghanistan, even as security concerns dominate its approach in the run-up to December 2014. Commendably, Afghan–Pakistani trade has risen sharply in recent years.81 However, there is still huge untapped potential for these two geographically contiguous and intricately connected countries, with relative
freedom of movement across their shared border. The Afghan Government is already pitching to attract fresh investment after 2014 and the Pakistani private sector would do well to explore affordable options. As economic activity in Afghanistan increases, the country also remains a highly attractive destination for Pakistani services and labour.
Finally, the international community cannot be satisfied with merely blaming Pakistan for the failure in Afghanistan. Its approach to Pakistan has defied one of the fundamentals of realpolitik: it has conflated the doable with the desirable.
Rather than internalizing Pakistan’s self-defined outlook towards the region and its establishment’s vision for Afghanistan, and then crafting appropriate and relevant incentives to mould its behaviour in a desirable direction, external actors have sought to redirect Pakistani thinking through means they believe should appeal to its leaders, not what would actually be attractive to a Pakistani strategic calculus.
Monetary rewards and promises of long-term support have been prioritized over actions to address Pakistan’s regional insecurities. It is too late to go back to the drawing board on these. In the next two years, however, the international community should at least avoid any developments that may force Pakistani planners to reverse their recent enthusiasm towards supporting reconciliation
efforts in Afghanistan.
Source : Based on report of Swiss Institute for Peace .
When in early 2012 Pakistan touted a major shift in its Afghan policy, the move was cautiously welcomed given the influence—and spoiling power— Pakistan has displayed in Afghanistan in the past. This paper asks exactly what Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ entails, what are the motives behind it, and whether it opens any new opportunities for peace in Afghanistan.
This paper is published under the Wider Central Asia Initiative, a two year SIPRI project to promote and facilitate dialogue among the main external stakeholders in Afghanistan’s future. The project has included consultations with senior government officials and experts from Afghanistan, from Iran, Pakistan and five Central Asian states— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well as from Europe and North America. It is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Moeed Yusuf (Pakistan) is Senior Pakistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace and is responsible for managing the Institute’s Pakistan programme. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country. He has worked extensively on issues relating to South Asian politics, Pakistan’s foreign policy, the Pakistani US relationship, nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, and human security and development in South Asia. He is the co editor of the forthcoming volume South Asia 2060:
Envisioning Regional Futures (Anthem Press, 2013). He has also edited a volume on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in South Asia, scheduled for publication in spring 2014.
Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan
Assessing how genuine Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ is depends on the baseline against which Pakistan’s current behaviour is compared. If it is Pakistan’s aggressive push for strategic depth and its purely ethno-centric approach, the shift is real and tangible. Pakistan no longer wishes for outright Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
It does, however, want the Taliban to be given meaningful representation in a political reconciliation process that would allow them post-2014 political space.
This implies that Pakistan accepts that it must work with a broader set of Afghan stakeholders—both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Pakistani establishment has also moderated its goal from shutting India out of Afghanistan altogether to one of ensuring that India is not able to stir up trouble within Pakistan or help create a hostile Afghan dispensation.
The real change, however, has not been in Pakistan’s actions—which still seem highly destabilizing to an outside observer—but in the principal driver of Pakistan’s behaviour: domestic instability. The fact that Pakistan’s policies remain troubling to the Afghan Government and the West, and its failure to act decisively against the Afghan Taliban presence in Pakistan, are primarily because
of the domestic repercussions it fears from going after the sanctuaries, and its desire to create a scenario whereby the Taliban are willing to return to Afghanistan through a political deal.
Overall, Pakistan’s shift is more accurately represented as a moderation, rather than a transformation, of its mindset. Its most recent overtures and claims of a strategic shift are simply what it sees as the most effective way to pursue its objectives in a somewhat changed—even desperate—context as far as the Afghan endgame in concerned.
There is little reason for Pakistani planners to congratulate themselves on the situation today. The Pakistani establishment’s stakes have been kept alive in the Afghan endgame, but it can hardly be comfortable with the strategic repercussions
of its moves. The 1990s saw an outright tactical victory for Pakistan, only to be followed by a massive strategic blowback from its actions. The onus is on the Pakistani establishment to avoid a repeat of this. The good news is that there is a clearly discernible difference between the Pakistani establishment’s body language today and that in the pre-September 2001 days: it now seems to be more worried about the threat of chaos in Afghanistan than excited about the prospects of a tactical victory.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
The way forward ISAF cannot weaken the Taliban insurgency irreversibly in the months left
before its scheduled withdrawal. There is therefore no option but to push Forward the agenda of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban.
All of the main actors—the Afghan Government; Afghan political factions including the Taliban; Pakistan; and the USA—now need to agree and accept a formula to move ahead with Reconciliation.
The multiple, competing efforts to woo the Taliban into talks that have been pursued for too long have only increased suspicions among these actors. Whatever process is ultimately chosen
must have the blessing of all actors and must be allowed to function freely within
the parameters laid out.
The greatest possibility for success will be through a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. Pakistan, the USA and other external actors should only put forth their absolute non-negotiables—and these should be minimal—as they allow Afghan representatives to negotiate directly.
Pakistan has traditionally been the most aggressive of the regional actors; now that the Taliban’s presence in talks is likely to be meaningful, it must accept that its role is no more than a facilitator that constantly prods the hardliners among the Taliban to accept power sharing as the optimal outcome. The world, too, must not expect Pakistan to deliver more than this.
If the Taliban do find political space in post-2014 Afghanistan, Pakistan’s most important service would be to apply constant pressure on the Taliban leadership to moderate its views. A moderated Afghan Taliban will not only benefit Afghan politics but will also have a desirable spin-off effect in terms of denting support for the Pakistani Taliban, who continue to cite their ideological affinity with their Afghan counterparts to gain traction.
To achieve this, Pakistan must accept moderate Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan as its partners. It must continue expanding its nascent contacts with the former Northern Alliance factions in Afghanistan. This is all the more important given that Pakistan is vying for an inclusive set-up in Afghanistan that will necessarily involve representation from all major factions.
Pakistan and the USA must come to some agreement on the issue of Afghan militant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. As long as Pakistan does not confront the Afghan Taliban factions using the sanctuaries, but denies the USA a free hand to do so, this divergence will be irreconcilable. Common ground may be found with an understanding under which Pakistan agrees to pressure the Afghan Taliban to cease their attacks on Afghan and international forces and civilians while peace
talks are happening. Presumably, this would also involve a commitment from the USA to eciprocate with a localized ceasefire. Tools such as drone strikes would then only be used against Taliban factions if they breached their commitment.
On India, there is a need to transform the current Indian–Pakistani competition into cooperation in the Afghan context. Specifically, two dialogues need to be initiated between the two sides: on intelligence and on development. The intelligence dialogue could allay mutual fears of the rationales and motives behind their political and security activities in Afghanistan. The two intelligence
communities could institute a verifiable mechanism to address each other’s concerns.
The development dialogue could seek ways to cooperate on or readjust development activities in Afghanistan. Concentrating Indian investment activity in the north and west of the country could help to allay Pakistani suspicions about Indian projects near its border. Given India’s post-2014 vulnerability in Pashtun-dominated areas close to the Pakistani border, India may be willing to
accept this.
Pakistan must continue exploring avenues to expand its economic footprint in Afghanistan, even as security concerns dominate its approach in the run-up to December 2014. Commendably, Afghan–Pakistani trade has risen sharply in recent years.81 However, there is still huge untapped potential for these two geographically contiguous and intricately connected countries, with relative
freedom of movement across their shared border. The Afghan Government is already pitching to attract fresh investment after 2014 and the Pakistani private sector would do well to explore affordable options. As economic activity in Afghanistan increases, the country also remains a highly attractive destination for Pakistani services and labour.
Finally, the international community cannot be satisfied with merely blaming Pakistan for the failure in Afghanistan. Its approach to Pakistan has defied one of the fundamentals of realpolitik: it has conflated the doable with the desirable.
Rather than internalizing Pakistan’s self-defined outlook towards the region and its establishment’s vision for Afghanistan, and then crafting appropriate and relevant incentives to mould its behaviour in a desirable direction, external actors have sought to redirect Pakistani thinking through means they believe should appeal to its leaders, not what would actually be attractive to a Pakistani strategic calculus.
Monetary rewards and promises of long-term support have been prioritized over actions to address Pakistan’s regional insecurities. It is too late to go back to the drawing board on these. In the next two years, however, the international community should at least avoid any developments that may force Pakistani planners to reverse their recent enthusiasm towards supporting reconciliation
efforts in Afghanistan.
Source : Based on report of Swiss Institute for Peace .
