Sunday, September 28, 2014

77 Rifles for Whole FR Peshawar - Who are Idiots Running it ?

Who are the Idiots who think they can Run whole District of Semi tribal FR Area with 77 Rifles while no Police , Frontier Corps Rangers  and  No FC Constabulary works there as it is Sent to Islamabad for VIP duties are 77 Rifles enough to Keep Criminals and terrorist away in FR Peshawar Embedded inside of Pakhtunkhwa . 

Government Policy of Denying Governance in FR Area  to help Taliban and Criminals as a Policy . 




Policing the frontier: Over 100 new levies to be recruited for FR Peshawar

Published: September 28, 2014

Officials familiar with the matter told The Express Tribune that at the moment 202 levies personnel are deployed in FR Peshawar. PHOTO: FILE
PESHAWAR:

In order to increase the strength of the levies force in Frontier Region (FR) Peshawar, the political administration will recruit 128 new personnel who will be trained by the security forces.

Management hurdles

Officials familiar with the matter told The Express Tribune that at the moment 202 levies personnel are deployed in FR Peshawar. However, they said, since the FR is a vast semi-mountainous area, it is difficult for a small force to manage it even with the help of the Frontier Constabulary and security forces which are also deployed there.

One insider said the levies are usually an ill-equipped force in the agencies and they face the same issue in the frontier regions.

For the 202 levies men deployed in FR Peshawar, there are only 77 AK-47’s available which speaks volumes of how neglected the force is, he said.

He added the levies force is also not paid on time which also causes hindrance in their performance. “Many people from poor families join the levies due to a lack of employment opportunities in the region,” he said.

Improving the force

Assistant Political Agent (APA) Muhammad Arif told The Express Tribune the region’s levies force is not active because all personnel cannot be armed. However, he maintained the administration has brought the matter to the interior ministry’s notice and has been promised that arms will be made available.

“We will recruit 128 men on merit by October 15 and the candidates will have to pass a physical fitness test,” said Arif.

Taken

He said 28 positions had been left unfilled since December 2012 when militants kidnapped and subsequently killed more than 20 levies personnel, and later five others quit. “We are recruiting one hundred more men and with the additions, the levies will become a proper law-enforcement authority,” added Arif.

Elaborating on training facilities for the force, Arif said previously new recruits were trained by the Frontier Corps, but now they will be trained by the army for six months.

The APA explained the basic salary of the recruits will be Rs5,000 but with the addition of allowances it will be increased to Rs12,000.

According to Arif, Governor Mehtab Abbasi is taking a keen interest in the affairs of the tribal areas and has decided the levies should be trained in traffic management, bomb disposal, investigation and evidence gathering techniques.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 28th, 2014.

source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/768215/policing-the-frontier-over-100-new-levies-to-be-recruited-for-fr-peshawar/

Right to Information is Incomplete Law and is not Extended to Tribal Areas FATA, PATA and Baluchistan




International Right to Know Day: CGPA urges citizens to use RTI laws

Published: September 28, 2014

The handout stated the right to know is incomplete without the right to information. Right to Information is Denied to Triabls and Baluchistan FATA and PATA ( Where Most of Missing Person are found ) and also it is Incomplete Law as it does not Have Right to information, as Government can deny certain Information. 

PESHAWAR:

The Centre for Governance and Public Accountability (CGPA) urged citizens of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab to use the Right to Information law to improve transparency and accountability in public service delivery.

Filing requests for information under these laws is not only a legal and constitutional privilege, but should also be taken as an obligation, stated a press release issued by the CGPA on Saturday to commemorate International Right to Know Day.

The day is marked on September 28 around the world. The handout stated the right to know is incomplete without the right to information. Therefore, the centre urged advocates of the law to promote its implementation on Right to Know Day.

CGPA Executive Director Muhammad Anwar said there has been remarkable progress in ensuring citizens’ right to information in Pakistan over the last year.

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Punjab introduced excellent legislation in the form of the K-P RTI Act 2013 and the Punjab Transparency and RTI Act 2013.

These laws will allow the public to ensure there is transparency in public service delivery if they are implemented in their true spirit, said the statement. On International Right to Know Day, the CGPA urged the K-P and Punjab governments to notify rules under their respective laws, said Anwar.

The executive director said the Punjab and K-P RTI laws must not be restricted to the provinces and any citizen should be able to access information without providing a reason.

However, he stated that Sindh and Balochistan were yet to introduce such strong legislation. Anwar said the Federal Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002 needed to be replaced with the Right to Information law as per Article 19-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.

The CGPA also demanded the K-P government extend the law to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Pata).

Similarly, he added there should also be a Right to Information regulation for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). The CGPA urged the media and civil society groups to play their role in raising awareness and use the law for investigative reporting.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 28th, 2014.

source : http://tribune.com.pk/story/768203/international-right-to-know-day-cgpa-urges-citizens-to-use-rti-laws/

How Afghans gave Indian Subcontinent Various Religions and Culture over Thousands of Years

History



Excavation of prehistoric sites suggests that early humans lived in northern Afghanistan at least 50,000 years ago and that farming communities in Afghanistan were among the earliest in the world. After 2000 bc successive waves of people from Central Asia moved into the area. Since many of these settlers were Aryans (speakers of the parent language of the Indo-European languages), a people who also migrated to Persia (now Iran) and India in prehistoric times, the area was called Aryana, or Land of the Aryans.
By the middle of the 6th century bc the Persian Empire of the Achaemenid dynasty controlled the region of Aryana. About 330 bc, Alexander the Great defeated the last Achaemenid ruler and made his way to the eastern limits of Aryana and beyond. After his death in 323 bc several kingdoms fought for control of his Asian empire. These kingdoms included Seleucids, Bactria, and the Indian Mauryan Empire.
A. Buddhist Period:
About the 1st century ad the Kushans, a central Asian people, won control of Aryana. Buddhism was the dominant religion from the 3rd century to the 8th century ad. Ruins of many monasteries and stupas, or reliquary mounds (structures where sacred relics are kept or displayed), from that period still remain. They line what was once a great Buddhist pilgrimage road from India to Balkh, in northern Afghanistan, and on into Central Asia.
Kushan power was destroyed at the end of the 4th century ad by a Turkic people of central Asian origin called the White Huns or Ephthalites. After the Ephthalites, the area was divided among several kingdoms, some Buddhist, some Hindu.
B. Islamic Period
In the 7th century ad Arab armies carried the new religion of Islam to Afghanistan. The western provinces of Herāt and Sistan came under Arab rule, but the people of these provinces revolted and returned to their old beliefs as soon as the Arab armies passed. In the 10th century Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara in what is now Uzbekistan, extended their influence into the Afghan area. A Samanid established a dynasty in Ghaznī called the Ghaznavids. The greatest Ghaznavid king, Mahmud, who ruled from 998 to 1030, established Islam throughout the area of Afghanistan. He led many military expeditions into India. Ghaznī became a center of literature and the arts.
The Ghaznavid state grew weaker under Mahmud’s descendants and gave way in the middle of the 12th century to the Ghurid kingdom, which arose in Ghur, in the west central region of present-day Afghanistan. The Ghurids in turn were routed early in the 13th century by the Khwarizm Shahs, another central Asian dynasty. They were swept away in about 1220 by the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan, who devastated the land.
Near the end of the 14th century the central Asian military leader Tamerlane (Timur Lang) conquered the region of Afghanistan and moved on into India. His sons and grandsons, the Timurids, could not hold Tamerlane’s empire together. However, they ruled most of present-day Afghanistan from Herāt.
The period from the Ghurid through the Timurid dynasty produced fine Islamic architectural monuments. Many of these mosques, shrines, and minarets still stand in Herāt, Qal‘eh-ye Bost, Ghaznī, and Mazār-e Sharīf. An important school of miniature painting flourished at Herāt in the 15th century.
A descendant of Tamerlane on his father’s side and Genghis Khan on his mother’s side, Babur (Zahiruddin Muhammad) took Kābul in October 1504 and then moved on to India, where he established the Mughal Empire.
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the rulers of the Mughal Empire, centered in India, and those of the Safavid dynasty, in Persia. Usually the Mughals held Kābul and the Persians held Herāt, with Kandahār frequently changing hands. The Pashtun tribes increased their power, but they failed to win independence.
C. An Afghan Empire:
In the 18th century, Nadir Shah, the king of Persia, employed the Abdali tribe of Pashtuns in his wars in India. Ahmad Shah, an Abdali chief who had gained a high post in Nadir Shah’s army, established himself in Kandahār after Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747. An assembly of tribal chiefs proclaimed him shah, and the Afghans extended their rule as far east as Kashmīr and Delhi, north to the Amu Darya, and west into northern Persia.
Ahmad retired from the throne in 1772 and died in Kandahār, whereupon his son Timur Shah assumed control. The Afghan empire survived largely intact through the next 20 years. He established his capital in Kābul to draw power away from his rivals in Kandahār, as well as to be closer to his richest province, the Punjab of India. Following Timur’s death in 1793, palace rivalries and internal conflicts led to the disintegration of the empire. Two sons of Timur, Shah Shuja and Shah Mahmud, fought over the remnants of the Afghan empire, with Shuja finally going into exile in India and Mahmud withdrawing to Herāt, as a number of other small principalities emerged throughout Afghanistan.
Dost Muhammad Khan emerged as the new ruler, or emir, in Kābul by 1826. Among the most pressing problems he faced was repelling the westward encroachment of the Sikhs, who gained control of the Punjab and the region up to the Khyber Pass, including the important trading post of Peshāwar. In 1837 Dost Muhammad’s forces defeated the Sikhs at Jamrūd, but failed to recover Peshāwar. This conflict and the arrival of a new Russian envoy in Kābul made the British, who were allies of the Sikhs, extremely nervous about the security of the western frontier of their growing empire in India. These events played out during the so-called Great Game between the Russian “bear” and the British “lion,” with both empires vying for regional dominance and Afghanistan becoming caught between them. In 1838 Lord Auckland, the British governor-general of India, ordered military intervention in Afghanistan to protect British interests, thereby setting off the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). With British and Sikh manipulation and support, Shah Shuja returned to Afghanistan to overthrow Dost Muhammad, as a British garrison was established in Kābul and elsewhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.
A revolt by Dost Muhammad’s son Muhammad Akbar Khan led to the forced withdrawal of the British garrison from Kābul in the winter of 1842. Ambushed during the retreat, nearly all of the some 4,500 British troops and their 12,000 camp followers were killed. Dost Muhammad was able to return to Kābul, from where he spent the next 20 years reunifying parts of Afghanistan until his death in 1863.
Dost Muhammad designated his third son, Sher Ali, as his successor, but civil war erupted as rivals to Sher Ali vied for control. Sher Ali defeated his rivals, notably his brother Afzul Khan, by 1868. At the same time he tried to maintain good relations with the British Raj (British-ruled India). However, the Russian conquests in Central Asia had brought that empire to the Amu Darya river on the northern border of Afghanistan by 1847. The negotiations of a Russian envoy in Kābul renewed the unease of the British, who consequently invaded Afghanistan, instigating the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880). Sher Ali was deposed in 1879, but the British, realizing the difficulties of ruling from within Afghanistan, in 1880 invited a nephew of Sher Ali, Abdur Rahman Khan (Afzul Khan’s son), to rule at their behest. However, the British limited his power beyond the borders of Afghanistan by securing control of Afghan foreign relations.
Known as the Iron Emir, Abdur Rahman recognized the threat from the expansionistic Russians and the defensive British. As a result he allowed the foreign delineation of his borders to encompass a smaller territory than he actually considered to be Afghanistan. The emergence of the present-day configuration of the country, with its narrow panhandle of the Wakhan Corridor projecting to China on the northeast, is an example of the establishment of a classic buffer state, in which, to avoid inadvertent conflict, the borders of the Russian and British empires were to have no contact points in common. Similarly, the establishment of the Durand Line, the southeastern border of Afghanistan, divided the territory of the militant Pashtun tribe into two halves, with one half under the control of the British Raj, and the other inside Afghanistan. This divide-and-rule policy allowed some nominal control of a difficult region, but problems related to the tribally unpopular (and for them, unrecognized) border have continued to the present day.
D. Modern Afghanistan:
Abdur Rahman Khan extended his control throughout the territory within the new boundaries of Afghanistan. His son, Habibullah, who reigned from 1901 until 1919, took the first steps toward the introduction of modern education and industry. Habibullah’s son and successor, Amanullah, initiated a brief war, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, in 1919 to end British control over Afghan foreign affairs. The resulting peace treaty recognized the independence of Afghanistan.
Amanullah was determined to modernize his country. In 1926 he took the title of king. His reforms, including efforts to induce women to give up the burka, or full-length veil, and to make men wear Western clothing in certain public areas, offended religious and ethnic group leaders. Revolts broke out, and in 1929 Amanullah fled the country.
Order was restored in 1930 by four brothers who were relatives of Amanullah. One of them, Muhammad Nadir Shah, became king, but he was assassinated in 1933. His son, Muhammad Zahir Shah, succeeded him. Power remained concentrated in the hands of Zahir and the royal family for the next four decades. In 1946 Afghanistan joined the United Nations (UN).
In 1953 Muhammad Daud, a nephew of Nadir Shah, became prime minister. Daud began to modernize Afghanistan rapidly with the help of economic and especially military aid from the USSR; the modern Afghan army was largely created with Soviet equipment and technical training. The United States declined to assist in this process. Social reform proceeded slowly because the government was afraid to antagonize conservative ethnic group leaders and devout Muslims. Relations with Pakistan deteriorated after Daud called for self-determination for the Pashtun tribes of northwestern Pakistan.
In 1963, hoping to halt the growth of Soviet influence and to improve relations with Pakistan, Zahir Shah removed Daud as prime minister. In 1964 Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, changing the country from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The armed forces still depended on the Soviet Union for equipment and training. A severe drought in the early 1970s caused economic hardship, and the popularity of the regime declined.
E. End of Monarchy
In 1973 Muhammad Daud overthrew the king in a coup. He declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as president. Daud announced ambitious plans for economic development and tried to play the USSR against Western donors, but his dictatorial government was opposed both by radical left-wing intellectuals and soldiers and by traditionalist ethnic leaders. The leading leftist organization was the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had been founded in 1965 and in 1967 split into a pro-Soviet Parcham faction and a much more radical Khalq faction. The two groups joined forces in 1976 to oppose Daud.
F. Leftist Coup and Soviet Invasion
In April 1978, after Daud launched a crackdown against the PDPA, leftist military officers overthrew him. PDPA leader Noor Muhammad Taraki became prime minister, subsequently assuming the title of president as well. Taraki and his deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, both members of the Khalq faction, purged many Parcham leaders. Taraki announced a sweeping revolutionary program, including land reform, the emancipation of women, and a campaign against illiteracy. In late 1978 Islamic traditionalists and ethnic leaders who objected to rapid social change began an armed revolt against the government. By the summer of 1979 the rebels controlled much of the Afghan countryside. In September Taraki was deposed and later killed. Amin, his successor, tried vigorously to suppress the rebellion and resisted Soviet efforts to make him moderate his policies. The government’s position deteriorated, however, and on December 25, 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. They quickly won control of Kābul and other important centers. The Soviets executed Amin on December 27 and installed Babrak Karmal, leader of PDPA’s Parcham faction, as president. Karmal, whom the Soviets considered to be more susceptible to their control, denounced Amin’s repressive policies, which reportedly included mass arrests and torture of prisoners, and promised to combine social and economic reform with respect for Islam and for Afghan traditions. But the government, dependent on Soviet military forces to bolster it, was widely unpopular.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan played out in the waning days of the Cold War, as the leaden economy and political repressions of the Soviet Union were just beginning to show signs of strain. Despite the Soviet Union’s own domestic difficulties and high-level internal advice against such a move, the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan’s government and eventual full military invasion was a long-considered and reasonably well-thought-out plan. From its earliest foreign aid in construction of military-quality bridges and highways, to its progressive planting of special agents within the Afghanistan bureaucracy and military, the Soviet Union displayed an unremitting interest in expanding its influence in the country and moving farther south toward the warm-water ports and hydrocarbon riches of the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan’s location along part of the Soviet Union’s southern border made the installation of a Soviet-friendly government there all the more desirable. The leftist coup of 1978 in Kābul seemingly assured that the Soviets would not lose the strategic position that they had patiently established through expensive and pervasive efforts over the prior quarter-century. Elsewhere in the country, however, there was only minimal support for the emerging Communist government in Kābul; opposition to it mounted nationwide, eventually even including significant portions of the Afghan military. The Soviet Union’s large-scale military intervention aimed to protect its interests in the region by helping the Soviet-installed government to put down this widespread opposition.
Nevertheless, resistance to the Communist government and the Soviet invaders grew spontaneously throughout Afghanistan so that by the mid-1980s there were about 90 areas in the country commanded by guerrilla leaders. The guerrillas called themselves mujahideen (Muslim holy warriors). They had gained prominence by their fighting prowess rather than through the customary routes within traditional social structures. The resistance was roughly organized into seven major mujahideen parties, largely of Sunni background, based in Peshāwar, Pakistan, in the 1980s. Other mujahideen parties were based in Iran. The mujahideen were sustained by weapons and money from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China. By the mid-1980s the United States was spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year to aid Afghan rebels based in Pakistan.
During the 1980s Soviet forces increasingly bore the brunt of the fighting. By 1986 about 118,000 Soviet troops and 50,000 Afghan government troops were facing perhaps 130,000 mujahideen guerrillas. Although the Soviet troops used modern equipment, including tanks and bombers, the mujahideen were also well armed, and they had local support and operated more effectively in familiar mountainous terrain. In 1986 the United States began supplying the mujahideen with Stinger missiles able to shoot down Soviet armored helicopters.
The effects of the war on Afghanistan were devastating. Half of the population was displaced inside the country, forced to migrate outside the country, wounded, or killed. About 3 million war refugees fled to Pakistan and about 1.5 million fled to Iran. Estimates of combat fatalities range between 700,000 and 1.3 million people. With the school system largely destroyed, industrialization severely restricted, and large irrigation projects badly damaged, the economy of the country was crippled. Despite some negative reaction, the presence of so many refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran actually improved Afghan relations with those countries. In addition, many of the refugees improved their lives considerably by leaving Afghanistan and the dangers of war therein. Because the majority of the refugees were religious, their fellow Muslims in Iran and Pakistan accepted them, even while the Iranian and Pakistani governments were striving to bring about the fall of the Communist regime in Kābul.
In May 1986 Karmal was replaced as PDPA leader by Mohammad Najibullah, a member of the Parcham faction who had headed the Afghan secret police. In November 1987 Najibullah was elected president.
G. Soviet Withdrawal
When Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985, he gave high priority to getting Soviet troops out of the costly, unpopular, and apparently unwinnable war in Afghanistan. In May 1988 Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the United States signed agreements providing for an end to foreign intervention in Afghanistan, and the USSR began withdrawing its forces. The Soviet withdrawal was completed in February 1989. See also Soviet-Afghan War. H. Civil War
The mujahideen, who did not sign the agreement concerning the Soviet withdrawal, maintained their fight against the Afghanistan central government with weapons that they continued to get from the United States via Pakistan. They rejected offers from Najibullah to make peace and share power, and refused to consider participating in any national government that included Communists. Thus the civil war continued. The United States and Pakistani sponsors prompted the Peshāwar-based rebels to besiege Jalālābād, a strong point for Najibullah in southern Afghanistan. After months of fighting, however, the Afghan government scored a clear victory. A March 1990 coup attempt also failed to bring down Najibullah. He continued to receive Soviet food, fuel, and weapons to help maintain his control. However, rebels persisted in terrorizing the civilian population by rocket bombardment of Kābul and other cities. Finally in late 1991 the USSR and the United States signed an agreement to end military aid to the Kābul government and to the mujahideen rebels.
In 1992 as the resistance closed in on Kābul, the Najibullah government fell, in part because of the defection of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek from northern Afghanistan whose militia had served the PDPA government. Two mujahideen parties from Peshāwar, both considered fundamentalist, joined forces with Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik military commander, in the north and central mountains of Afghanistan. They won control of Kābul, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, became interim president from July through December 1992, taking office as full president in January 1993. A strong attempt was made to keep the Pashtun leaders, who traditionally held the power in Afghanistan, out of the most important government positions. Kābul was besieged beginning in 1992, first by various mujahideen groups and then by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, which sought to reestablish Pashtun dominance in the capital.
The Taliban emerged in the fall of 1994 as a faction of mujahideen soldiers who identified themselves as religious students. The movement started in the south and worked its way toward Herāt in the northwest and Kābul in the east. It made outstanding military gains using armor, heavy rocket artillery, and helicopters against government forces. The Taliban’s stated mission was to disarm the country’s warring factions and to impose their strictly orthodox version of Islamic law. Some experts suspected the Pakistani government of supporting the Taliban, in order to keep the combat within Afghanistan and out of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which is a major part of the Pashtun homeland. During the many vagaries of shifting alliances, as Afghans sought a new political equilibrium, one fundamentalist and one moderate party from the Peshāwar-based mujahideen groups contributed considerable personnel to the Taliban.
The term of Rabbani’s government expired in December 1994, but he continued to hold office amid the chaos of the civil war. Factional fighting since the beginning of January 1994 kept government officers from actually occupying ministries and discharging government responsibilities. Most cities outside of Kābul were administered by former resistance commanders and their shuras (councils). In June 1996 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had resigned as prime minister in 1994 to launch a military offensive against forces loyal to Rabbani, again assumed the post, this time to help Rabbani’s government fight the Taliban threat. Despite their efforts, the Taliban took Kābul in September 1996. By that time, the capital had been devastated by the civil war.
Rabbani and Hekmatyar fled north to join the northern-based anti-Taliban alliance led by the military commanders Massoud and Dostum. The alliance was a coalition of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras who were opposed to the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. The alliance took the name United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, commonly known as the United Front or the Northern Alliance. Massoud was the military commander of its chief political wing, Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society). The Taliban advanced north toward the mountain strongholds of the Northern Alliance and by the late 1990s had taken control of almost all of Afghanistan. Northern Alliance forces held a small portion of the country’s territory in the north. I. Taliban Regime
After taking over Kābul, the Taliban created the Ministry for Ordering What Is Right and Forbidding What Is Wrong to impose and enforce its fundamentalist rules of behavior. The Taliban’s laws particularly affected women, who were ordered to cover themselves from head to toe in burkas (long, tentlike veils), forbidden from attending school or working outside their homes, and publicly beaten if they were improperly dressed or escorted by men not related to them. The Taliban also made murder, adultery, and drug dealing punishable by death and made theft punishable by amputation of the hand. Many of the laws alarmed human-rights groups and provoked worldwide condemnation. Most countries did not recognize the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
In 1998, after terrorist bombings struck U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launched cruise missiles at alleged terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan. The camps were reportedly connected to an international terrorist ring allegedly run by Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian expatriate named by U.S. officials as the mastermind behind the embassy bombings. Bin Laden was active in the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation forces during the 1980s, and toward the end of that war he established al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the Base”), an organization based in Afghanistan that, according to U.S. officials, connects and coordinates fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups around the world. Al-Qaeda also supported the Taliban regime, with its special forces, called the Arab Brigade, fighting alongside Taliban troops in the civil war against the Northern Alliance.
On September 9, 2001, pro-Taliban suicide bombers assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Two days later in the United States, terrorists hijacked passenger airplanes and deliberately crashed them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, killing thousands of people (see September 11 Attacks). The U.S. government identified bin Laden as the prime suspect behind the attacks. Mullah Muhammad Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban, refused U.S. demands that the Taliban surrender bin Laden. The U.S. government built an international antiterrorism coalition, securing the approval of many nations for a war on terrorism. American and British forces began aerial bombings of al-Qaeda camps and Taliban military positions on October 7. The Northern Alliance, meanwhile, continued its front-line offensive north of Kābul and other strategic areas. Many Afghans fled to refugee camps in border areas of Pakistan and Iran to escape the bombings, adding to the millions of Afghans already displaced from more than two decades of war.
While the United States and Britain continued the aerial bombardment in November, Northern Alliance forces captured several strategic cities, including Kābul. In late November hundreds of U.S. marines landed near Kandahār in the first major infusion of American ground troops into Afghanistan. The Taliban surrendered Kandahār, their last remaining stronghold, by December 10. The U.S.-led offensive then focused on routing out al-Qaeda forces holed up in the rugged Tora Bora cave region of eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan. In March 2002 U.S. troops undertook a mission, known as Operation Anaconda, to clear Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from the Shah-i-Kot Valley, in the vicinity of Gardēz in eastern Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the whereabouts of bin Laden remained unknown.
J. Afghanistan After the Taliban
United Nations-sponsored negotiations in Bonn, Germany, resulted in agreement on December 5, 2001, among four major Afghan factions to create an interim post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, a widely respected Pashtun leader, was chosen to head the interim administration, which took power in Kābul on December 22. An international peacekeeping force maintained a measure of law and order in the capital.
J.1. Transitional Government
Karzai’s administration was given up to six months to prepare the country for the introduction of a broad-based, multiethnic transitional government. In January 2002 international donors—including more than 60 countries, major development institutions, and nongovernmental organizations—pledged more than $4.5 billion in aid to Afghanistan over a period of five years. In April deposed Afghan king Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan, ending nearly three decades of exile, in order to serve a symbolic role in the country. In June he formally convened the loya jirga, or grand council, which was responsible for electing a transitional government to rule the country for 18 months, until general elections scheduled for 2004. The loya jirga elected Karzai interim president of Afghanistan.
J.2. New Constitution
In January 2004 the loya jirga ratified a new constitution and Karzai signed it into law. The new constitution created a strong presidency, a two-chamber legislature, and an independent judiciary. It recognized Islam as the country’s sacred religion but guaranteed protections for other religions. It also recognized equal rights for women and language rights for minorities.
The adoption of the new constitution paved the way for elections, originally scheduled for June 2004 but then postponed due to the continued lack of security in many parts of the country. The Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, who had regrouped as a military force despite new U.S.-led offensives to combat them, were waging a sporadic guerrilla campaign against the Karzai government and the international forces stationed in the country. In March 2004 Pakistan conducted a military operation along its border with Afghanistan in an attempt to flush out the insurgents.
About 18,000 non-Afghan troops were stationed in Afghanistan in 2004 to fight Taliban forces and offer protection for the Karzai government. Of these, about 8,500 were U.S. troops, and about 3,000 soldiers came from other coalition partners. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stationed about 6,000 troops in Afghanistan. NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003 and for the first time played a military role outside of Europe. The ISAF was authorized by the United Nations Security Council to act as peacekeepers in the Afghan capital, Kābul, and surrounding areas. By the end of 2005, about 19,000 U.S. troops and about 9,200 ISAF troops remained in Afghanistan.
In October 2006 about 12,000 of the 20,000 U.S. troops then serving in Afghanistan became part of the ISAF forces as NATO reportedly assumed primary responsibility for international military operations in Afghanistan. The remaining 8,000 U.S. troops were assigned to counterterrorism efforts and to training Afghan security forces as part of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. The ISAF consisted of about 31,000 troops and faced an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Taliban fighters in October 2006.
J.3. Presidential Election
Afghanistan held its first-ever presidential election on October 9, 2004. Large numbers of Afghans turned out to vote in the election, which was largely free of the violence threatened by the country’s former Taliban leaders. Karzai won 55.4 percent of the vote, easily beating 15 other candidates in the first round of voting. His victory was officially announced on November 3, following an investigation into charges of electoral fraud. According to a three-member United Nations panel set up to examine the complaints—made mostly by the losing candidates—the election’s “shortcomings…could not have materially affected the overall result.”
Karzai’s top goals after forming a new government included curbing the power of regional warlords, building an effective national security force, and pursuing national redevelopment plans. Uniting the country despite its longstanding ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries remained one of Karzai’s highest priorities.
J.4. Parliamentary Elections
Elections to the lower house of the National Assembly took place in September 2005, and in December 2005 President Karzai used his constitutional powers to appoint the members of the upper house. On December 19 Afghanistan’s first democratically elected legislature in more than 30 years officially convened. The new legislature represented a wide spectrum of the country’s political groupings and factions, including former warlords and former Taliban officials.
J.5. Continued War Against a Taliban Insurgency
Despite its initial defeat following the U.S. invasion of 2001, the Taliban regrouped, using remote areas of Pakistan for refuge and staging sporadic guerrilla attacks in areas of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border. By 2007 the Taliban adopted tactics that included suicide bombings and roadside bombs, while also besieging remote U.S. and NATO outposts in the countryside. In June 2007 U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates expressed cautious optimism that the military campaign was having success against the resurgent Taliban. Defense Department officials said they believed NATO operations had helped thwart a planned spring offensive by the Taliban.
However, Afghan civilian support for the U.S. and NATO military operations waned in the spring of 2007, particularly after a series of attacks that resulted in civilian casualties. In early May, following an April ground attack and air strike on a small village in western Herāt province in which about 50 civilians were reportedly killed, Afghan president Karzai told U.S. and NATO officials that civilian deaths had reached an “unacceptable level.” About a week later lawmakers in the upper house of parliament, the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire with the Taliban and for setting a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Many of the legislators cited an incident in March in which a U.S. Marine Special Operations force opened fire on civilians lining a highway as the marines fled the scene of a suicide bombing attack. The incident in the eastern Afghanistan province of Nangarhār resulted in the deaths of 19 Afghan civilians and the wounding of about 50 others. A U.S. military commander later determined that the marines had used excessive force and he referred the incident for a possible criminal inquiry.
By June 2007 the Associated Press reported a death toll of 2,300 in insurgency-related violence in 2007 alone. The International Red Cross said that violence was occurring throughout Afghanistan. The Department of Defense reported nearly 400 U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion, and the United Kingdom reported the deaths of 60 British soldiers during that same period.
United Nations (UN) figures showed that the death toll in Afghanistan totaled more than 8,000 people in 2007, including about 1,500 civilians. The average monthly death toll soared to 566 from an average of 465 in 2006. About 230 troops from the U.S.-NATO coalition were killed in 2007, the highest yearly number since the war began.
As 2008 began the director of national intelligence for the United States, Michael McConnell, reported that the security situation for the Afghan government had deteriorated. McConnell told the U.S. Congress that the Taliban had made inroads in the western part of Afghanistan and around the capital, Kābul, as well as in southern Afghanistan. In July 2008 the number of U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the second straight month, with 46 U.S. personnel killed in Afghanistan compared to 31 in Iraq. By August the total U.S. death toll for 2008 was around 100. A U.S. Defense Department report found that Taliban attacks on U.S. and NATO forces increased by 40 percent in 2008 compared with the previous year. The same report noted two distinct Taliban insurgencies, one based in Kandahār in southern Afghanistan and another in eastern Afghanistan, where the insurgents often obtained refuge in neighboring Pakistan’s rugged North-West Frontier Province.
The insurgency was described as a loosely organized alliance of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and Afghan warlords. The forces operating in northeast Afghanistan and around the capital were led by former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar was believed to be allied with the Taliban but not formally part of the movement. The insurgency in the east, southeast, and southern parts of Afghanistan was thought to be led by remnants of the original Taliban, foreign fighters, and al-Qaeda.
The Taliban was also establishing shadow, or parallel, governments in regions where they exerted control or where the central government in Kābul had only a loose hold on security. In some cases the shadow governments consisted of judges and other officials, along with finance and defense councils. Some experts estimated that the insurgency controlled as much as 40 percent of Afghanistan. Many Afghans reportedly welcomed the security that the Taliban provided from criminal elements or saw the Taliban as an alternative to corruption in the central government. In some cases the Taliban provided services that the government could not. Still others gravitated toward the insurgents in response to U.S. air strikes that often mistakenly killed civilians.
In August 2008 a U.S. air strike on a suspected Taliban compound in the village of Azizabad near Herāt killed a large number of civilians. The Afghan government, backed by a United Nations investigation and accounts from independent observers, alleged that more than 90 civilians were killed in the attack. The U.S. military initially dismissed the charges, saying that at most only 6 or 7 civilians were killed, but a subsequent military investigation concluded that 30 civilians, including women and children, had died. U.S. air strikes increased 31 percent from January 2008 to September 2008 compared with the same period in 2007. During the first nine months of 2008 U.S. and NATO aircraft flew about 14,000 missions and dropped about 3,000 bombs. U.S. military officials said the air strikes were necessary because ground troops were thinly dispersed throughout the country. As of mid-November 2008, there were about 65,000 allied troops in Afghanistan, of which about 36,000 were U.S. troops.
The U.S. role in Afghanistan became an issue during the U.S. presidential election with Democratic candidate Barack Obama promising to redeploy U.S. troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, in part to strengthen the ground presence and make the U.S.-NATO coalition less reliant on air strikes. Following a November air mission that mistakenly strafed a wedding party in the village of Shah Wali Kot in southern Afghanistan, killing 40 civilians, Afghan president Hamid Karzai called on President-elect Obama to cease all air strikes that might risk civilian casualties. The same month Karzai extended an invitation to Taliban leader Mohammed Omar, promising him safe passage if he agreed to negotiate a peace settlement. Omar was believed to be based in Quetta, Pakistan. However, the Taliban rejected the overture.
Once in office, Obama followed through on his promise and committed an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 53,000. Obama said the increase was necessary due to the deteriorating security situation. He also promised a review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan while saying that he believed the conflict could not be resolved “solely” through military means. In the meantime the United Nations released figures for the civilian death toll in Afghanistan in 2008, reporting that it rose 40 percent to 2,118 from 1,523 in 2007. More than 50 percent of the deaths were caused by the insurgents, while 39 percent were caused by pro-government forces.
J.6. 2009 Presidential Elections
Afghanistan held its second presidential election in August 2009. The weeks preceding the election saw a rise in insurgent violence. The day of the election, August 20th, was one of the most violent days since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. The wave of violence contributed to a voter turnout estimated to be only 35 percent.
The preliminary results showed Karzai winning approximately 47 percent of the vote and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah winning approximately 33 percent of the vote. With no candidate winning more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off election seemed likely. There were also numerous accusations of voter fraud leveled against Karzai and his followers. As a result, Abdullah threatened to not accept the outcome of the vote, raising the possibility of additional violence.
Contributed By:
John Ford Shroder, B.S., M.S., Ph.D.
Regents Professor of Geography and Geology, University of Nebraska. Editor, Himalaya to the Sea: Geology, Geomorphology, and the Quaternary and other books.

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

THE FATHER OF TALIBAN –USA Funded Jihadist Textbooks Created in University of Nebraska

1984-1994: CIA Funds Militant Jihadi Textbooks for Afghanistan and Pakistan : 
The US, and CIA through USAID and the University of Nebraska, and through Thomas Gouttierre,( Father of Taliban and thier Jihadi literature ),  spends millions of dollars developing and printing textbooks for Afghan schoolchildren. The textbooks are “filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to spur resistance to the Soviet occupation.” For instance, children are “taught to count with illustrations showing tanks, missiles, and land mines.” Lacking any alternative, millions of these textbooks are used long after 1994; the Taliban will still be using them in 2001.
Dr Thomas Gouttierre with His Wife and Son in Afghanistan while in Peace Corps 1964-74.
Dr Thomas Gouttierre with His Wife and Son in Afghanistan while Peace Corps 1964-74.
Thomas Gouttierre went to Afghanistan in 1964 as a Peace Corps volunteer. He returned to the United States in 1967 and earned a master’s degree in Islamic Studies at Indiana University. In 1969 he went back to Afghanistan as a Fulbright Scholar. He stayed on to work for the Fulbright Foundation’s Afghan-American Education Commission after the conclusion of his two-year fellowship. In 1974 Gouttierre became director of the Center of Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha
Dr Thomas Gouttierre Served in Afghanistan in 1964-69 in Peace Corps and Had Links with Taliban since then .
Dr Thomas Gouttierre Served in Afghanistan in 1964-69 in Peace Corps and Had Links with Taliban since then .
In 2002, the US will start producing less violent versions of the same books, which President Bush says will have “respect for human dignity, instead of indoctrinating students with fanaticism and bigotry.” (He will fail to mention who created those earlier books.) (Stephens and Ottaway 3/23/2002; Off 5/6/2002) A University of Nebraska academic named Thomas Gouttierre leads the textbook program. Journalist Robert Dreyfuss will later reveal that although funding for Gouttierre’s work went through USAID, it was actually paid for by the CIA.
Af-Pak Jihadi Text Book Printed in  Pakistan ISI  via Afghan Lyceum and Supplied to Afghan refugees to Develop Jihad for Great Game
Af-Pak Jihadi Text Books About 13 Million in last 30 Years Printed in Pakistan via ISI and Afghan Lyceum and Supplied to Afghan refugees to Develop Jihad for Great Game
These Book were distributed in Afghan refugees camps in peshawar and FATA and Pakhtunkhwa area from a office in Peshawar run by Mujahideen and Al-qaeda Memeber under ISI and CIA , Project known as Afghan Lyceum and it was still running now in Islamabad even today .
Enron Gives Taliban Millions in Bribes in Effort to Get Afghan Pipeline Built .
Unocal will pay Gouttierre to work with the Taliban (see December 1997) and he will host visits of Taliban leaders to the US, including trips in 1997 and 1999 (see December 4, 1997 and July-August 1999). (Dreyfuss 2005, pp. 328) 1996-September 11, 2001:
The Associated Press will later report that the Enron corporation bribes Taliban officials as part of a “no-holds-barred bid to strike a deal for an energy pipeline in Afghanistan.” Atul Davda, a senior director for Enron’s International Division, will later claim, “Enron had intimate contact with Taliban officials.
” Presumably this effort began around 1996, when a power plant Enron was building in India ran into trouble and Enron began an attempt to supply it with natural gas via a planned pipeline through Afghanistan (see 1995-November 2001 and June 24, 1996). In 1997, Enron executives privately meet with Taliban officials in Texas (see December 4, 1997). They are “given the red-carpet treatment and promised a fortune if the deal [goes] through.” It is alleged Enron secretly employs CIA agents to carry out its dealings overseas.
Dr Thomas Gouttierre of University of Nebraska USA .
Dr Thomas Gouttierre of University of Nebraska USA .
According to a CIA source, “Enron proposed to pay the Taliban large sums of money in a ‘tax’ on every cubic foot of gas and oil shipped through a pipeline they planned to build.” This source claims Enron paid more than $400 million for a feasibility study on the pipeline and “a large portion of that cost was pay-offs to the Taliban.” Enron continues to encourage the Taliban about the pipeline even after Unocal officially gives up on the pipeline in the wake of the African embassy bombings (see December 5, 1998).
An investigation after Enron’s collapse in 2001 (see December 2, 2001) will determine that some of this pay-off money ended up funding al-Qaeda. (Barrett 3/7/2002)
June 24, 1996: Uzbekistan Cuts a Deal with Enron :
Uzbekistan signs a deal with Enron “that could lead to joint development of the Central Asian nation’s potentially rich natural gas fields.” [Houston Chronicle, 6/25/1996] The $1.3 billion venture teams Enron with the state companies of Russia and Uzbekistan. [Houston Chronicle, 6/30/1996] On July 8, 1996, the US government agrees to give $400 million to help Enron and an Uzbek state company develop these natural gas fields. [Oil & Gas Journal, 7/8/1996]
Unocal Establishes Pipeline Training Facility Near Bin Laden’s Compound: 
Thomas Gouttierre. [Source: University of Nebraska] Unocal pays University of Nebraska $900,000 to set up a training facility near Osama bin Laden’s Kandahar compound, to train 400 Afghan teachers, electricians, carpenters and pipe fitters in anticipation of using them for their pipeline in Afghanistan.
Dr Thomas Gouttierre of University of Nebraka Omaha who Wrote these Jihadi Books for Mujhaideen and Taliban
Dr Thomas Gouttierre of University of Nebraka Omaha who Wrote these Jihadi Books for Mujhaideen and Taliban
One hundred and fifty students are already attending classes in southern Afghanistan. Unocal is playing University of Nebraska professor Thomas Gouttierre to develop the training program. Gouttierre travels to Afghanistan and meets with Taliban leaders, and also arranges for some Taliban leaders to visit the US around this time (see December 4, 1997). (Lees 12/14/1997; Coll 2004, pp. 364)
December 4, 1997: Taliban Representatives Visit Unocal in Texas Taliban representatives in Texas, 1997: 
It will later be revealed that the CIA paid Gouttierre to head a program at the University of Nebraska that created textbooks for Afghanistan promoting violence and jihad (see 1984-1994).Gouttierre will continue to work with the Taliban after Unocal officially cuts off ties with them. For instance, he will host some Taliban leaders visiting the US in 1999 (see July-August 1999).
[Source: Lions Gate Films] Representatives of the Taliban are invited guests to the Texas headquarters of Unocal to negotiate their support for the pipeline. Future President George W. Bush is Governor of Texas at the time. The Taliban appear to agree to a $2 billion pipeline deal, but will do the deal only if the US officially recognizes the Taliban regime.
The Taliban meet with US officials. According to the Daily Telegraph, “the US government, which in the past has branded the Taliban’s policies against women and children ‘despicable,’ appears anxious to please the fundamentalists to clinch the lucrative pipeline contract.” A BBC regional correspondent says that “the proposal to build a pipeline across Afghanistan is part of an international scramble to profit from developing the rich energy resources of the Caspian Sea.” (BBC 12/4/1997; Lees 12/14/1997)
It has been claimed that the Taliban meet with Enron officials while in Texas (see 1996-September 11, 2001). Enron, headquartered in Texas, has an large financial interest in the pipeline at the time (see June 24, 1996).
The Taliban also visited  Thomas Gouttierre,( Father of Taliban and thier Jihadi literature )  an academic at the University of Nebraska, who is a consultant for Unocal and also has been paid by the CIA for his work in Afghanistan (see 1984-1994 and December 1997). Gouttierre takes them on a visit to Mt. Rushmore. (Dreyfuss 2005, pp. 328-329) July-August 1999: Taliban Leaders Visit US About a dozen Afghan leaders visit the US. They are militia commanders, mostly Taliban, and some with ties to al-Qaeda. A few are opponents of the Taliban. Their exact names and titles remain classified. For five weeks, they visit numerous locales in the US, including Mt. Rushmore.
All their expenses are paid by the US government and the University of Nebraska. Thomas Gouttierre, an academic heading an Afghanistan program at the University of Nebraska, hosts their visit.
Gouttierre is working as a consultant to Unocal at the time, and some Taliban visits to the US are paid for by Unocal, such as a visit two years earlier (see December 4, 1997). However, it is unknown if Unocal plays a role in this particular trip. Gouttierre had previously been paid by the CIA to create Afghan textbooks promoting violence and jihad (see 1984-1994).  (Berens 10/21/2001)
July-August 1999: Taliban Leaders Visit US
About a dozen Afghan Taliban Leaders visit the US. They are militia commanders, mostly Taliban, and some with ties to al-Qaeda.
A few are opponents of the Taliban. Their exact names and titles remain classified. For five weeks, they visit numerous locales in the US, including Mt. Rushmore. All their expenses are paid by the US government and the University of Nebraska.Thomas Gouttierre, an academic heading an Afghanistan program at the University of Nebraska, hosts their visit.
Taliban in Texas as Guest of George Bush Governor Texas and Unicol
Taliban in Texas as Guest of George Bush Governor Texas and Unicol
Gouttierre is working as a consultant to Unocal at the time, and some Taliban visits to the US are paid for by Unocal, such as a visit two years earlier (see December 4, 1997).
However, it is unknown if Unocal plays a role in this particular trip. Gouttierre had previously been paid by the CIA to create Afghan textbooks promoting violence and jihad (see 1984-1994). It is unknown if any of these visitors meet with US officials during their trip. [Chicago Tribune, 10/21/2001]
source:  http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a84textbooks&printerfriendly=true

China Looses Patience with Pakistan and it Terrorists Crazies.

Terror Suspect? A Paki Student Held by the Chinese Police
A Pakistani student in China was detained and interrogated on suspicion of terror by the Chinese police earlier this month. Jamal was studying on scholarship at Communication University of China, one of China’s leading universities with the top ranking in media education.
China leads the world in internet surveillance. The major internet websites including Google, Facebook and Twitter are also banned in China.
The whole fiasco was based on some banal joke about Jihad that Jamal made with his friends in an online private chat. Speaking to The Laaltain, Jamal told that earlier in June he was called by the university officials regarding some official matter. Upon reaching the venue, he was tricked by the officials and handed over to the police. The police, including officers from China’s notorious Special Weapons & Tactics Unit (SWAT), and other officials harassed and interrogated him for hours. It was after quite some time that the police actually told him the reason for his detention. He was handed over long excerpts of his internet chat, all in Chinese, that Jamal was unable to read. Finally he was made to sign a document in Chinese that again he could not understand, and released with a warning.
Upset over what he had to go through, Jamal commented, “They treated me inhumanly, bullied me and terrorized me. I was not given a right to defend myself. This is a violation of my human rights and totally unjustified.” Despite being angry, Jamal is not willing to take some remedial step owing to the strict nature of the Chinese system which he has witnessed very closely for about two years. Along with the brutal policing, China leads the world in internet surveillance. The major internet websites including Google, Facebook and Twitter are also banned in China. Facing troubles in places like Xinjinag, China uses the surveillance system most aggressively.
Upon asking about the content of the disputed chat, Jamal, a secular activist himself, retorted, “I do not believe in Jihad. Such concepts have nothing to do with me.”
*The name has been changed to protect identity of the student
source: http://www.laaltain.com/terror-suspect-pakistani-student-held-chinese-police/

Sunday, September 21, 2014

VIP culture - Army Generals can do it but Politicians cant

Policeman Handcuffed and Taken to Corps Commander Lahore Offices as Punishment and Police GD-19 Officer SP suspended for Doing the Right thing Shameful Vip Culture. 

LAHORE, Oct 16: Model Town division SP Syed Ahmed Mobin Zaidi was transferred and directed to report to the central police office (CPO) in the wake of an incident on Tuesday night when a police team stopped the car of a major-general’s family at a picket near Ghalib Market, Gulberg.



Model Town division ASP Muhammad Ali Nikokar has already been asked to report to the CPO. Besides, Ghalib Market SHO Shahid Chaddar has been suspended and Constable Nazir booked under Section 506.

The police had stopped the car on Tuesday night to remove its tinted glass, which was banned by the Punjab government for security reasons following the murder of MNA Maulana Azam Tariq.

The driver, who was reportedly in army uniform, introduced the family on board. But constable Nazir Ahmad refused to let them go because “no body was exempted from the ban”.

This led to an argument between the two which attracted other policemen present there who intervened in the matter and allowed the family to go with the tinted glass still intact.

Before leaving, the general’s driver reportedly threatened the policemen with dire consequences. His threat meterialized within minutes as the senior army command got into action and asked the police hierarchy to take strict action against the constable, Ghalib Market SHO and Model Town division SP and ASP.

The police command not only booked constable Nazir Ahmed but also allowed the army to take him to the corps headquarters handcuffed for “further interrogation”. He managed his release on Wednesday after getting bail from a local court.

Sources said SP Syed Ahmed Mobin Zaidi did try to use his connections in the army but failed to stop his transfer due to “enormous pressure” on the police hierarchy.

According to an army official, the action has been taken to “condemn the police conduct at pickets”.

Soon after the incident, vehicles of the army and the judiciary were exempted from the ban.

SOURCE: http://www.dawn.com/news/120505/sp-also-punished-for-stopping-general-s-car

Malalaa Yousafzai Pride of Pashtuns -Her Profile

Everyone who laid eyes on Malala Yousafzai knew the Pakistani schoolgirl was something special. When her mountain town of Mingora, in the Swat Valley, fell under Taliban rule, her courage made her a powerful symbol. And now, after last fall’s near-fatal attempt to silence the 15-year-old, she is more dangerous to Pakistan’s status quo than ever before.
Marie Brenner learns how the media handed a megaphone to a kid who wanted more from her country.
y Marie BrennerPhotograph by Asim Hafeez SHINING YOUNG LADY Malala Yousafzai at 13, at her father’s school in Mingora, in the Swat Valley.
One day in November 2007, on an editing console in the Dawn television news bureau in Peshawar, Pakistan, the bright brown eyes of a young girl popped from the computer screen. Just three hours to the northeast, in the Swat Valley, the mountain town of Mingora was under siege.


Walking by the desk of the bureau chief, a reporter named Syed Irfan Ashraf stopped to take a look at the edit, which was being translated into English for that night’s news, and heard the girl’s voice. “I’m very frightened,” she said crisply. “Earlier, the situation was quite peaceful in Swat, but now it has worsened.
Nowadays explosions are increasing We can’t sleep. Our siblings are terrified, and we cannot come to school.” She spoke an Urdu of startling refinement for a rural child. “Who is that girl?,” Ashraf asked the bureau chief. The answer came in Pashto, the local language: “Takra jenai,” which means “a shining young lady.” He added, “I think her name is Malala.” The bureau chief had driven to Mingora to interview a local activist, the owner of the Khushal Girls High School & College.
On the roads, Taliban soldiers in black turbans pulled drivers out of cars at checkpoints, searching for DVDs, alcohol, and anything else in violation of Shari’a, or strict Islamic law. In a lane near the market, a low wall protected the two-story private school. Inside, the bureau chief visited a fourth-grade class, where several girls shot up their hands when asked if they wanted to be interviewed.
Seeing girls speak out in public was very unusual, even in the Swat Valley, a cultivated, 3,500-square-mile Shangri-la with 1.5 million inhabitants. That night, the brown-eyed girl’s sound bite led the news. Later that evening the bureau chief ran into the school’s owner, Ziauddin Yousafzai, who said, “The girl who spoke on your broadcast. That Malala is my daughter.” The highly educated Yousafzai clearly understood that in the rigid class system of Pakistan he was an invisible member of the rural underclass, unseen by the elite of Lahore and Karachi.
For his family, a moment on national news was huge. Like his daughter, Ziauddin spoke excellent English. Ashraf, who had been a professor at the University of Peshawar, could not get the image of Malala’s piercing gaze out of his mind. “She was an ordinary girl, but on-camera extraordinary,” he said. His beat at Dawn television included covering the bombings that were devastating remote villages all through Swat, and he determined to meet Malala and her father the next time he was on assignment in Mingora.
L ast autumn, I contacted Ashraf at a computer lab in Carbondale, Illinois, where he is studying for a doctorate in media studies at Southern Illinois University. On October 9, he had seen in a news flash the horrifying image of Malala Yousafzai lying bandaged on a stretcher, after having been shot by an unknown extremist on her school bus.
For the next three days, Ashraf did not leave his cubicle as the world grieved for this teenager who had stood up to the Taliban. Then he wrote an anguished column in Dawn, Pakistan’s most widely read English-language newspaper, which seemed like a profound mea culpa. Ashraf was savage regarding his role in Malala’s tragedy. “Hype is created with the help of the media while the people wait for the dénouement,” he wrote.
He decried “the media’s role in dragging bright young people into dirty wars with horrible consequences for the innocent.” On the telephone he told me, “I was in shock. I could not call anyone.” He described his mute agony watching the TV coverage. “It is criminal what I did,” he said in an apoplectic tone.
“I lured in a child of 11.” Ashraf had watched the news as Malala was later rushed to a hospital in Birmingham, England, where army trauma victims are treated.
She was mysteriously separated from her family for 10 days. Many wondered why no relative had been allowed to travel with her. In Pakistan, thousands held candlelight vigils and carried posters that read: we are all malala.
Before she was flown to Birmingham, General Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistan Army chief and former head of the all-powerful Inter-services Intelligence agency (ISI), had gone to the hospital in Peshawar where she struggled for life on a ventilator.
The question arose: Why would the most powerful man in Pakistan’s military rush to the provincial capital? Other girls had been assaulted, and the government had hardly reacted.
A country of conspiracy theorists, Pakistan has a long history of Kabuki theater masking the ISI’s and the army’s possible involvement in silencing anyone who attempts to expose the military’s links with extremists.
At least 51 journalists have been killed there since 1992. The attack on Malala exposed not only the dark side of an army unable to provide security but also the abysmal quality of education in Pakistan.
Only 2.3 percent of its gross domestic product is allocated to education. Pakistan spends seven times more on its military. According to a recent U.N. study, 5.1 million children are out of school—the second-highest number in the world—and two-thirds of them are female.
“We have a national lie. Why do we have to tell the truth to the world?” says Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States.
“The national lie is that the Swat Valley has been liberated from the bad Taliban.
Young Malala and her father mess up that narrative.” Suddenly a 15-year-old who traded copies of The Twilight Saga with her friends was being talked about as a possible future prime minister, if she could just recover from the bullet wound she had sustained while sitting on her school bus after taking an exam on the Holy Koran.
I told Ashraf I wanted to understand how a girl from a remote village had become a cosmic force for change as well as a focus for a number of complex agendas. He said, “We had to get the story out. No one was paying attention to what was happening in Mingora.
We took a very brave 11-year-old and created her to get the attention of the world. We made her a commodity. Then she and her father had to step into the roles we gave them.” At first I thought he must be exaggerating. The Gifted Child T he capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, Peshawar in 2007 was a boomtown for local journalists.
At the Pearl Continental hotel, reporters jockeyed for the services of a freelance professor or writer who might want to earn $200 a day to guide them safely into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a poor, mountainous region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and long a refuge for the Taliban and other jihadists from around the world.
Editors who had interviewed Osama bin Laden a decade earlier could command $500 for a three-hour session with a reporter from the West. In 2006, Dawn had begun hiring for the launch of its national TV channel in an effort to grab a market share of Pakistan’s recently deregulated airwaves.
The explosion of cable networks set off a hiring frenzy for instant experts who could do a decent two-minute stand-up on the terrorist chiefs, the al-Qaeda-related Haqqani network, and the dozens of Taliban groups that passed between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
To interview the Taliban commanders and tribal chiefs, foreign reporters darkened their hair, grew beards, and went with a Pashtun fixer who could use his contacts to ensure their safety. You entered another world when you drove from Peshawar into the mountains. no foreigners allowed past this point, warned signs along the entrances to FATA.
Pakistan’s history of intrigue, coups, and assassinations had long paralyzed its dealings with the frontier. In the lower Swat Valley was the town of Mingora, a remote getaway for much of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital.
Many of Pakistan’s most popular Pashtun singers, dancers, and musicians came from the area, and in summer, tourists from around the world would arrive in Mingora for its Sufi music and dance festivals.
The area was close to a UNESCO site of ancient Gandhara Buddhist art and ruins. In recent years, however, the Taliban had changed all that; the Pearl Continental hotel was now empty except for a few reporters and their fixers.
On a cement wall at a corner on Haji Baba Road, the red sign of the Khushal school carried the school crest—a blue-and-white shield with Muhammad’s words in Arabic: oh, my lord, equip me with more knowledge—as well as the Pashto phrase learning is light.
Inside, beneath a portrait of Sir Isaac Newton, some of the girls would remove their headscarves and throw their backpacks on benches. Zahra Jilani, a young American working at a local NGO, recalled walking into the school for the first time: “I heard all this laughter, and girls running in the halls.” She told Malala and her class on one visit, “Girls, you must speak up for what you believe.” Malala asked her, “What is it like in America? Tell us!” The question was hardly casual.
Malala had spent years observing her teachers shrouding themselves in burkas to shop at the bazaar, as if they were living under the Taliban in the 1990s.
In Islamabad many young women went to work without even scarves. Down the alley from the school, Malala lived in a concrete house with a garden. Small rooms opened off a central hall, and Malala kept her royal-blue school uniform on a hook near her bed. At night, her father often read the poetry of Rumi to her and her two younger brothers.
Yousafzai was himself a poet, and recitation had played a large part in his education. “I have the right of education. I have the right to play. I have the right to sing I have the right to speak up,” Malala would later tell CNN.
As a young teenager, she was reading Paulo Coelho’s The Alchemist and watching her favorite show, My Dream Boy Will Come to Marry Me, on Star Plus TV—until the Taliban cut all cable to the valley.
The Khushal school was an oasis of enlightenment, a tiny dot in a surrounding theater of war, where classes were taught in English. The city of 180,000 had 200 schools for girls.
The curriculum at the Khushal included English, Pashto, Urdu, physics, biology, math, and Islamic studies, imposed by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the religious fanatic who seized power in a 1977 coup and later declared Islamic law.
Mingora has long been dominated by tribal culture dictated by the vast number of Pashtun inhabitants, whose religion and tradition braided together.
For outsiders, one of the most difficult aspects of the culture to understand was Pashtunwali, a personal code that stamps every aspect of Pashtun life, including morality, hospitality, independence, and revenge. Pakistan’s Pashtuns were closely connected to Afghanistan’s, making the frontier a staging area for the military and the ISI well before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, in 1979.
In recent times, the Pashtuns have been divided between extremists and pro-democracy nationalists who push for greater autonomy. It was commonly known that the army’s and ISI’s links to jihadist groups such as the Taliban ran far deeper than was ever acknowledged. There were frequent explosions in the area, and power could be cut for days. The Taliban became a well-established presence in Swat.
A decade earlier it had taken over the Mingora airport. A rriving in Mingora in 2007, Ashraf quickly grasped the danger in the surrounding hills. “The most important district official refused to come on-camera,” he said. “ ‘Appearing on TV is not Islamic,’ he told me. This was the government representative.
” The musicians who had made the city a tourist draw were now putting ads in the newspapers pledging to lead pious lives. Swat was a microcosm of the shifting loyalties in a dusty war for control of Pakistan among the military, the Islamists, and the progressives.
Everyone in Swat understood the significance of the name of Yousafzai’s school. As a young man, Yousafzai had learned to be a passionate nationalist in part by reciting the verse of Khushal Khan Khattak, the 17th-century Pashtun warrior-poet known for his courage against the conquering Moguls.
The man to see in Mingora, Yousafzai served on the city’s Qaumi Jirga, or assembly of elders, and fought a constant battle with the army and the local authorities over the woeful conditions in the city—power outages, unclean water, unsanitary clinics, inadequate education facilities.
Funds for textbooks took months to arrive and were often stolen by bureaucrats. The vast gulf between Pakistan’s cities and its rural areas was a travesty; FATA and Swat were ruled by Draconian laws based on tribal practice and a code that dated back to the colonial era.
Yousafzai wrapped himself in optimism, convinced that he could make a difference in the city by applying the principles of peaceful dissent promoted by the 20th-century Pashtun leader Abdul Ghaffar (Badshah) Khan, known as “the Frontier Gandhi,” who also fought for the establishment of an autonomous nation—Pashtunistan.
“I used to warn him, ‘Ziauddin, be careful. There are people out to get you.’ He never listened,” said the author Aqeel Yousafzai, a war reporter based in Peshawar.
Ziauddin named Malala after Malalai, the Afghan Joan of Arc, who died in battle, carrying ammunition to the freedom fighters at war with the British in 1880. As a teenager, Ziauddin had experienced the changes when Swat became the training ground for jihadists on their way to fight in Afghanistan.
His favorite teacher tried to persuade him to join the crusade. “I had nightmares all through those years,” he said recently. “I loved my teacher, but he tried to brainwash me.” Education saved him, and he determined to spend his life trying to improve schools for children, especially girls.
A man with a desperate mission, he would drive every few weeks to Peshawar to alert the media to the increasing danger in his area, and he sent reporters there e-mails describing the failure of the army to keep order and the anarchy created by a new Taliban squad on the edge of Mingora. The Taliban presence in Swat, he told the writer Shaheen Buneri, “was not possible without the tacit support of the government and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies.
Both view militant organizations as strategic assets.” ‘A re you an actress or a circus performer?” the tutor to the young Prince of Swat asked Life photographer Margaret Bourke-White when she visited the principality in 1947. No one in Swat, Bourke-White noted in her book Halfway to Freedom, had ever seen a woman in slacks. For years Swat was a British princely state, under the rule of an appointed regent, the Wali of Swat.
The bearded wali, whom Bourke-White photographed, ruled his feudal land of 500,000 subjects with a few telephones connecting his fortresses. But his son, the prince, was determined to bring the outside world into Swat. The wali had been known for his English suits and his rose garden.
In 1961, Queen Elizabeth II visited the enchanted Brigadoon and praised it as “the Switzerland of the British Empire.” Each morning the new wali toured his principality—about the size of Delaware—to see how he could help his subjects. Passionate about education, the wali built tuition-free colleges, which every child could attend.
Swat became a province of Pakistan in 1969, and its universities turned out many freethinkers, including Ziauddin Yousafzai, who was the president of the Pashtun Student Federation.
“Right from the beginning, Malala was my pet,” Yousafzai told me. “She was always in the school and always very curious.” “They went everywhere together. Ziauddin loves all children too much. And no one more than Malala,” said Maryam Khalique, the principal of Khushal school, who lived next door to the family. Ziauddin teased his young sons by calling them “those naughty little boys,” but his daughter was special.
For the first years of Malala’s life, the family lived in a two-room apartment in the school. She had the run of all the classrooms. “She would sit in the classes when she was only three, listening, her eyes sparkling,” Khalique said. “A little girl taking in the lessons of the older children.” Malala’s mother was traditional and chose to remain in purdah, but in private she backed Malala’s independence, friends say.
Later, in front of reporters, Malala would listen quietly when her father was chided for not allowing her mother the freedom he encouraged in his students. Ziauddin once asked Zebu Jilani, a granddaughter of the last wali and founder of the Swat Relief Initiative, who lives in Princeton, New Jersey, to speak to his Jirga.
“Five hundred men and I, the only woman? And an American woman at that?” she asked him. Ziauddin obliged her by taking his wife, completely covered.
As a child, Malala could go anywhere as long as she was escorted by a male relative, usually her father. She would even sit by his side when he met in the house with the Jirga. “He encouraged Malala to speak freely and learn everything she could,” one teacher told me. She wrote long compositions in perfect penmanship.
By the fifth grade she was winning debating contests. Urdu poetry was part of the curriculum, and Faiz Ahmed Faiz, the revolutionary poet and former editor of the Pakistan Times, was a favorite writer: “We shall witness [the day] that has been promised when … the enormous mountains of tyranny blow away like cotton.
” Khalique had one strict rule for her students: no shortwave radio from the two channels that broadcast Maulana Fazlullah, the shock jock who had declared himself the leader of the Swat Taliban.
The Rising Terror ‘W e need to fight against America! We need to stop the NATO forces. They are infidels!” In the autumn of 2007, the big get for Peshawar’s TV journalists was the hard-line radio mullah who was terrorizing the Swat Valley. Fazlullah’s emblematic white horse grazed outside his compound. One of Ashraf’s first assignments for Dawn TV was to get Fazlullah on-camera.
Why, Ashraf wondered, would anyone take seriously a fat killer who had dropped out of his madrassa and for a time run the local chairlift? In the villages, Taliban squads with Kalashnikovs stood by cots covered with gold jewelry that Fazlullah’s followers had been exhorted to donate for his cause. “Turn off your TV,” he told his listeners.
“Shows like Dallas are the instruments of the Great Satan.” Ziauddin said of him, “He was not a sane person. He was against polio vaccinations. He burned TVs and cassettes A crazy madman.
And one has to speak out against that.” At first, “Maulana Radio” was considered a joke, a Talib cartoon with gaps between his teeth. Shortwave and battery-operated radio was crucial in rural Pakistan, where few could read and there was hardly any electricity. Fazlullah hijacked two FM channels for his twice-daily broadcasts, and he threatened to kill anyone who tried to compete on the area’s 40 stations.
For Swatis, Fazlullah’s harangues became a favorite entertainment. Pakistan’s think tanks warned of “Talibanization” in rural areas, but mullahs such as Fazlullah were perceived as Robin Hoods, who promised to fight the endless corruption and decrepit infrastructure of the frontier.
There was only one public, dial-up computer in Mingora. Every day Ashraf struggled to get online, trudging through Green Square, where Fazlullah’s thugs would dump the bodies of apostates they had flogged. Crowds would gather at Fazlullah’s mosque to witness the floggings.
“The government says we shouldn’t do things like this public punishment, but we don’t follow their orders. We follow the orders of Allah!,” Fazlullah screamed into his P.A. system. New Yorker writer Nicholas Schmidle, as a young visiting scholar, was able to penetrate the area with a fixer.
He saw men on roofs with rocket launchers, scanning the rice paddies and poplar fields for anyone who opposed them. “Are you ready for an Islamic system? Are you prepared to make the sacrifices?,” Fazlullah would yell. “Allahu Akbar! [Allah is the greatest!]” the crowd responded, raising their fists in the air.
It could take Ashraf four hours to transmit 28 seconds of film when the computer was able to connect, but there were days with no power. By the summer of 2007, women had been told not to leave their houses.
There were rumors that a revered dancer had been found dead in the town square. “I had the story more or less to myself,” Ashraf said, but no one paid much attention. A news editor in Islamabad said, “Why is no one else reporting this?” By November 2007 they were.
Islamabad’s Red Mosque was in ruins, badly damaged in July, when the government sent troops to clean out hundreds of extremists. The mosque was a few blocks from the ISI headquarters, a symbol to many of how complex the political alliances were. Soon Fazlullah declared an all-out war on Swat.
The first target was a girls’ school in a town 20 minutes from the Khushal school. The explosions occurred at night, when there were no children in school, for Pashtuns believe that children must never be harmed in an act of revenge. In December 2007 former prime minister Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan to seek re-election, and millions turned out to greet her.
In one of her last interviews Bhutto said that al-Qaeda could be “marching on Islamabad in two to four years.” In late December she was assassinated by terrorists, and the country erupted.
There were more than 500 attacks in a two-year period, aimed at politicians, reporters, hotels, mosques, and civilians. Soon terror chiefs were living openly in Lahore. In Mingora, girls whose schools had been destroyed now attended the Khushal school. Government schools were not an option.
The monthly budget of two dollars per student that Pakistan allots “could not cover the community schools in the poorest areas, not even in the refugee camps,” said the author Fatima Bhutto, a niece of Benazir Bhutto. “Teachers were political appointees chosen for their loyalty to the ruling party.
” Rarely shielded from seeing the injured and the dead, Malala learned to navigate in a war zone, taking on her father’s determination to change the lives of Swatis. All that year, terror came to Mingora. By December 2008, helicopters and tanks scoured the area, but 10,000 army troops could not take out Fazlullah’s 3,000 guerrillas.
One third of the city fled. “The rich have moved out of Swat, while the poor have no place but to stay here,” Malala later wrote. She dreaded Fridays, “when suicide attackers think that killing has special meaning.” Reporters struggled to persuade people to talk on the record, and Ziauddin always would.
“There was never any sign of fear,” my colleague Pir Zubair Shah, who then worked for The New York Times, recalled. Shah, who is from a prominent Pashtun family, knew where to get a true sense of what was transpiring. “I would come to see Ziauddin, and Malala would serve us tea,” he said. The Right Girl ‘W ould you consider hiring on for a month or so to work with the video journalist Adam Ellick?,” New York Times documentary producer David Rummel e-mailed Ashraf in December, after meeting him in Peshawar.
Ellick had reported from Prague, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, and was now producing short videos that took viewers inside a compelling personal story. Flying into Islamabad from Kabul, Ellick had the bushy beard of a Talib, but he had little if any experience in Pakistan.
He could appear oblivious to tribal codes and brisk to Ashraf when the reporter went through the elaborate greetings dictated by Pashtunwali. “I was used to being called ‘sir’ by my students,” Ashraf told me, “and suddenly someone younger would say to me, ‘Focus on your work. When we work, we work.
Why are you shaking hands all the time?’ ” Working with Ellick was a big break for Ashraf. In graduate school, Ashraf had written his thesis on how Pakistan was perceived in The New York Times. For hours, the two would sit together as Ellick coached him on editing and interviewing techniques.
It was a dangerous time for reporters in Pakistan. Working on the links between Taliban extremists and the army, New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall was attacked in her hotel room in Quetta by ISI agents, who took her computer, notebooks, and cell phone.
Pir Shah was held by Talib commanders for three days in FATA. Aqeel Yousafzai was almost killed in a Taliban camp outside Peshawar. Brutally beaten, he lost half his teeth before he was rescued. As conditions in FATA grew worse, Dawn’s bureau chief had Ashraf focus completely on Mingora.
The tipping point there came in January 2009 when a dancer named Shabana was murdered, her bullet-ridden body left on display in Green Square.
Malala saw it all. “They cannot stop me,” she would later say on-camera. “I will get my education, if it is home, school, or any place. This is our request to all the world. Save our schools. Save our world. Save our Pakistan. Save our Swat.” The English teacher at the school, before announcing that he was leaving, asked Ashraf, “How can I teach these children Keats and Shelley when such things are happening three blocks from our school?
” Over the next six months, a million refugees would flee. Then Fazlullah decreed that, as of January 15, all of the girls’ schools in Swat would be closed. Ashraf saw this as a call to action. “I went to Adam Ellick and I convinced him this is what we should launch as part of the video forum.
Education is the most important issue to me, not militancy. I met him in Islamabad, and he said, ‘Go for it.’ Adam asked, ‘Who could be the protagonist who could carry this story?’ ” Ashraf suggested Malala. “When Adam said yes, I went to Ziauddin and said, ‘We can launch this issue in a global forum.’ ” Did it occur to him, I asked, that Malala could be in danger? “Of course not,” he said. “She was a child.
Who would shoot a child? The Pashtun tradition is that all children are spared from harm.” As a fixer, Ashraf had often been fearful of putting foreign reporters in danger. Now he no longer considered himself just a reporter, but a partisan.
Along with his closest friend, the BBC’s Abdul Hai Kakar, he was part of a secret resistance operation with Ziauddin and several others. “We would write and report from Fazlullah’s camp half the day and try to stop him the other half of the day,” Ashraf said. He compared their situation to that of the French Resistance.
“I was undercover 15 days of the month. I would tell everyone in Mingora I was leaving for Peshawar, but I would stay, trying to gather information about what was going on.” He and Kakar developed good relations with Fazlullah’s deputies and frequently interviewed the cocky mullah himself, who hoped to use the reporters for propaganda.
“Fazlullah, your ambitions will do you in,” Kakar warned him. “They will riot in Islamabad if you try to stop the schools.” By then Malala and her cousins had been forbidden to leave their house, a four-minute walk from school. ‘I ’m looking for a girl who could bring the human side to this catastrophe.
We would hide her identity,” Kakar told Ashraf. “An Anne Frank?,” Ashraf answered, going on to explain the power of the girl in Amsterdam who became an icon through her diary.
Meanwhile, Kakar and Ashraf got many queries from French and English news organizations, asking if they knew fixers who could get into the region. In New York, Dave Rummel saw how powerful a story on the closing of the Swat schools could be. He knew Pakistan well, however, so he was concerned about safety in an area controlled by the Taliban.
From Islamabad, Ellick e-mailed Ashraf: We need a main character family to follow on both the final days of school (jan 14–15) and again on the possible new days of school (jan 31-feb 2) We want it to play out like film, where we don’t know the ending That is narrative journalism.
And most of all, the family and daughters should be expressive and have strong personalities and emotions on the issue. They must care! … Remember, as we discussed several times on Monday, safety first. Don’t take any risks. … If you have fear, that is ok. Simply stop reporting.
Ashraf read the e-mail many times and kept coming back to the term “narrative journalism.” He told me, “I had no idea what it meant.” But he had exactly the family in mind he believed would cooperate. Narrative journalism is almost unknown in India and Pakistan, where stories are told mostly through facts and critical analysis.
The intimate narrative—its requirements of real-life emotions and private moments—could be considered a violation in a very traditional area, and for a Pashtun, schooled in hospitality, it would be incomprehensible that such a sensitive line would be crossed.
The complexities of personality are considered the work of novelists. “If this is O.K. with Ziauddin, let’s do it,” Ellick told him. Ashraf said, “I had to convince Ziauddin. I told him it was important for both of us—and for our cause.” Ziauddin rushed to Peshawar with Malala to discuss the idea, since it was too dangerous for foreign reporters to enter Mingora.
Ashraf would be the co-producer and make every decision in Mingora. Ashraf told me, “Ziauddin was very reluctant. He thought it was going to be about all of the schools in Mingora. I kept telling him in Pashto, ‘Don’t worry about the security.’ This was criminal on my part.”
At their meeting, Ellick pressed Ziauddin about the danger involved, but no one had to tell a Pashtun about danger. “I will give up my life for Swat,” he told Ashraf on-camera. “Fortunately or unfortunately, Malala answered questions very quickly,” Ziauddin later said.
At one point, Malala answered in perfect English, “The Taliban are trying to close our schools.” “I was opposed,” said Ziauddin. “I did not want to impose my liberalism on my daughter, but a close friend said, ‘This documentary will do more for Swat than you could do in 100 years.’
I could not imagine the bad consequences.” Later, under an assumed name, Malala would give a speech, “How the Taliban Is Trying to Stop Education,” that was reported in the Urdu press. Inside the Times there was tremendous concern about the risk. “All of the editors were pulled in,” said Rummel.
They finally agreed that—given the urgency of the situation—Ziauddin’s role as an activist made the risk one they could take. W hat Ashraf didn’t know was that Ziauddin had already decided on his own to reach out to the international media. “Would you consider allowing one of your students to blog about this order [to close the schools]?,”
Abdul Kakar had asked him a few weeks earlier. “The BBC needs to broadcast this to the world.” No parent that Ziauddin approached was willing to take part, however. “Would you consider allowing my daughter?,” Ziauddin finally asked. “She’s young, but she can do it.” To protect her identity, Kakar chose the name Gul Makai, the heroine of a Pashto folktale.
Her conversations with Kakar would be brief—only a few minutes, just time enough for him to take down a paragraph or two. Kakar always called her on a special line that would be difficult to trace. “I would start off with her in Pashto. ‘Are you ready? Let’s start.’ ”
Then they would switch to Urdu. Later, there would be accusations that Kakar had coached her. “They ran unedited,” he told me. On January 3, Malala posted, “On my way from school to home, I heard a man saying ‘I will kill you.’ I hastened my pace and after a while I looked back [to see] if the man was still coming behind me.
But to my utter relief he was talking on his mobile.” There would be 35 entries in all, the last on March 4. Malala was cautious, but in one entry, she criticized the army: “It seems that it is only when dozens of schools have been destroyed and hundreds [of] others closed down that the army thinks about protecting them. Had they conducted their operations here properly, this situation would not have arisen.” In one entry she almost tipped her hand: “My mother liked my pen name Gul Makai and said to my father ‘why not change her name to Gul Makai?’
… I also like the name, because my real name means ‘grief stricken.’ My father said that some days ago someone brought the printout of this diary, saying how wonderful it was. My father said that he smiled but could not even say it was written by his daughter.”
The Last Day of School A shraf drove to Mingora in the middle of the night with his cameraman. He had 24 hours to get in and out of the city. “To be seen with a camera was an invitation to be killed,” he told me. Coming over the mountains in the darkness, Ashraf heard the muezzins’ call to prayer.
“I had a sense of disaster,” he said. Just before dawn, as he approached the city, Ashraf called Yousafzai. “It is too early,” Ziauddin said. “I was not expecting you.” He told Ashraf that Malala’s uncle was staying with them, and he was strongly opposed to having journalists present on this last day of school.
There was no mention of Malala’s blog. Ashraf was completely unaware of the calls she had made with Kakar. “I told no one,” Kakar later said. It was clear to Ashraf, however, that something had happened to frighten Yousafzai. “He was clearly upset. He did not want me there.
” From a friend’s house, just before dawn, Ashraf called Ellick. “Adam said, ‘Shoot everything from the moment Malala gets up and has her breakfast to every moment of her last day at school.’ Nothing was to be left out.” Ashraf told him, “Ziauddin is reluctant.” Ellick said, “But he has promised us.”
Ashraf was suddenly caught in a dilemma: upset his close friend or fail. “I didn’t know what to do,” he said. “I decided I must try to convince him directly.” Terrified that he might be stopped by soldiers, he hurried to Yousafzai’s house. “What are you doing here?,” Yousafzai said, clearly angry that Ashraf was putting his family in danger.
“It was criminal on my part,” Ashraf said later. “I talked to him about the danger we were in, and that this was the moment he could alert the world. I explained that we needed to stay with Malala all day, shooting her, and Ziauddin said, ‘What!’ ” It was clear he had never understood that Malala would be the star of the video.
“I was in a panic,” Ashraf told me. “He said, ‘I thought it would be only about all the other schools.’ I said, ‘No, to make this important, we need to follow Malala and you the entire day.’ ” Ashraf now believes that the code of Pashtunwali made it impossible for Yousafzai to refuse.
A worried father, he was also driven by nanawatai, the obligation to give shelter. When Malala woke up, Ashraf and the cameraman were in her bedroom, setting up for a shot. Outside the window was the sound of shelling. “Malala did not understand what we were doing there,” Ashraf said.
“She was shy. I had to say to her, ‘Malala, imagine this is your last day of school.’ It was her last day, but we had to work with her. Trying to brush her teeth, she kept looking at us. I said, ‘Be natural. Don’t look at the camera. Pretend we are not here.’ It took her hours to understand.
We helped to mold her into a part—a part she very much believed.” Ashraf’s voice broke as he described to me the rush of adrenaline that came over him as they struggled to get every shot. Half the classes at the school were empty, and there were nearby explosions all day.
For hours, the camera stayed on Malala and her father, who sat in his office calling parents who had pulled their children out. “Pay us some of your dues,” he said. “Ziauddin was adamant. He did not want us taking pictures of the girls at school. Soon he said, ‘Enough. You must leave.’
” But after Ziauddin left the school, Ashraf continued to film in the courtyard, where one scene would jump out at viewers. Wearing headscarves, eight girls line up, and one with a veiled face reads her essay directly into the camera, demanding, “Why the peace and innocent people of the valley are targeted?”
Ashraf recalled with emotion, “I arranged that. I grouped them in the courtyard and said, ‘Girls, tell me how you feel about your school.’ ” What guided him, he said, was his trust in Islam: “Children are never attacked. They are sacred.” W atching “Class Dismissed,” the 13-minute video, a viewer is struck by the raw power of Malala, timidly determined to express her deeply held beliefs, which would be very simple if she lived in the middle-class world of Lahore, or Karachi, or New York.
At one point she declares, “I want to become a doctor. It’s my own dream. But my father told me that ‘you have to become a politician.’ But I don’t like politics.” Ashraf would later have to deal with a question that plagues all journalists: What are the consequences of exposure?
He would also have to ask himself a corollary question: What would have been the implications of deciding not to expose the horrors of Mingora? Ashraf still blames himself for teasing her strong beliefs out of a child who would be seen as an exemplary agent for change in one world and as a danger that had to be stopped in another.
All through February, Malala continued to blog. She reported on the peace negotiations as the army capitulated and signed off on turning Swat over to strict Islamic law. Britain and some other countries immediately protested; the United States did not. The Taliban seemed to be appeased, but they continued to kidnap government officials and assassinate reporters.
“In a valley where people do not even hear the voice of a girl, a girl comes forward and speaks a language that the local people cannot even think of. She writes diaries for the BBC, she speaks up in front of diplomats, on television, and her class follows,” said Jehangir Khattak, the former news editor of Peshawar’s Frontier Post. “Ziauddin allowed his daughter to rise in a society where she was seeing dead bodies every day.
She didn’t hear about the threat—she lived it. In a closed society, she did not mince words.” Going Public ‘Y ou are right now in a car going into a city where you are a wanted man,” Ellick says off-camera in a second New York Times Web video, “A Schoolgirl’s Odyssey,” which is 20 minutes long. Six months had passed since the Taliban moved into Swat.
The Yousafzais had fled, along with 1.5 million other refugees from the area. As many as one million moved into camps, where often the only relief organizations providing food were religious Islamic groups with ties to the Taliban, who delivered it with invective about foreign enemies. “There was no sign of the army or the police,” Ziauddin told Ellick. Malala and her mother went to stay with relatives. Ziauddin, in Peshawar, moved in with three close friends from the Jirga.
For months Mingora was under siege. And still the army could not—or would not—put the resources into annihilating the Taliban. That spring of 2009, Mingora became a ghost town as the Taliban advanced on nearby Buner, only 100 miles from the capital. Finally the army sent more troops, backed by helicopters and rockets, to the area.
In the video, Malala and her father return to the school and find total devastation. Discovering a message left in a student’s composition book, Malala says, “They have written something.” Then she reads, “I am proud to be a Pakistani and a soldier of the Pakistani Army.” Looking angrily at the camera, she says, “He doesn’t know the spelling of ‘soldier.’ ”
They find a letter intended for Ziauddin: “We have lost so much dear and precious lives of our soldiers. And this is all due to your negligence.” Looking at a hole blasted in one wall, Malala says, “The Taliban destroyed us.” Later in the video, Malala and her father meet the late Richard Holbrooke, America’s special envoy, in Pakistan to inspect the refugee camps.
Holbrooke seems surprised by the tone the girl takes with him. “If you can help us in our education, please help us,” Malala tells him. “Your country faces a lot of problems,” Holbrooke replies. Later, Urdu bloggers would use this footage against her as proof that she was “a Zionist agent” and “a C.I.A. spy.” “I was sick when I saw the video for the first time,” Ashraf told me.
“In New York, the editors had added footage of Taliban floggings.” Now convinced that Malala was a possible target, he e-mailed Ellick that he was alarmed. “I was thinking we were making a commodity out of this small and graceful shining little girl.
This conflict should not have been fought by Malala—it should have been fought by my army, my military, my police. This should not have been Malala’s job. That was a camouflage! This was an excuse for us to focus on Malala—not on the forces behind Malala, who were doing little to help the people of Mingora.
” Fazlullah had fled to Afghanistan, but his troops remained in the hills. Interviewing in the refugee camps, Pir Shah and New York Times bureau chief Jane Perlez heard reports that the army was kidnapping and killing anyone thought to be an extremist. Footage of suspected army assassinations came to them and ran in the Times.
Soon Perlez’s visa was not renewed, and Shah, threatened by the ISI, left Pakistan. M alala now spoke much more openly. In August, she appeared on Geo TV star anchor Hamid Mir’s news show. She talked about the two years her city had been under constant shelling. “What would you like to be?,” Mir asked her. “I would like to be a politician. Our country is full of crisis. Our politicians are lazy.
I would like to remove the prevalent laziness and serve the nation.” As Pakistan imploded, Ellick filed story after story from Karachi and Islamabad. “At dinners and over tea, I would tell my urban middle-upper class friends about what I had witnessed in Swat—and about Malala,” he posted on Facebook. “I could not get anyone to care.
They looked at me like I had a contagious disease—as if I was describing an atrocity in a village in Surinam.” In 2010, one year after making his film, he returned there during a period of devastating floods. “I found hundreds and hundreds of kids that were furious at the fact that their schools had not been rebuilt and they openly said to me, ‘You know our government is corrupt.’
” It had become an open secret that Malala was the blogger known as Gul Makai. “I am going to apply Malala for the International Children’s Peace Prize,” Ziauddin told Kakar, referring to the annual awards of the KidsRights Foundation, in Amsterdam.
Later, Kakar told him, “Do not chase after fame. Malala is already known and could go abroad to study.” He explained, “I was worried they [reporters] would ask Malala a question: ‘What would you do if the Taliban comes?’ She would not know what to say. This question is not about education.
Instead she would tell them, ‘Listen to me, the Taliban is very bad.’ ” A s Malala increased her TV appearances, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States deteriorated severely. In 2011, C.I.A. agent Raymond Davis was arrested and later released in Lahore, Osama bin Laden was assassinated, Pakistan cut NATO supply lines after an accidental bombing killed soldiers on the border, and drone strikes resulted in a large number of civilian casualties.
When Malala appeared on the talk show A Morning with Farah, she was dressed modestly in a pastel tunic and headscarf. Farah Hussain, glamorous in a black shalwar kameez and high heels, could hardly disguise her condescension.
“Your Urdu is so perfect,” she told Malala, and then brought up the Taliban. Malala said, “If a Talib is coming, I will pull off my sandal and slap him on his face.” For a country girl of 14, she was approaching a dangerous line. Ziauddin and Malala often received threats, and rocks were thrown over the walls of the school and their house.
The government offered protection, but Ziauddin turned it down, saying, “We cannot have normalcy in our classes if there are guns.” Malala used the consolation-prize money she had received from her own government to buy a school bus. In June the threats continued: “Malala is an obscenity.” “You are befriending the kaffir [infidels].”
In May, the local newspaper, Zama Swat, reported the killings of numerous prisoners under mysterious circumstances while they were in police custody.
For months, the menace from the army had gone unreported—the looting of forests by army patrols, assassinations without trials, local people roughed up at checkpoints.
With the end of the school year, the Sufi dance festival resumed and field flowers covered the hills. Each year Yousafzai arranged a school picnic at the waterfall in Marghazar, 30 minutes away. Days later someone dropped a note over the wall: “You are giving our girls loose morals and spreading vulgarity by taking the girls to the picnic spot where they run around without purdah.”
In June the owner of the Swat Continental Hotel, in Mingora, an outspoken critic of the army’s failure to root out the extremists, was gunned down in the street.
Then Zahid Khan, the head of the hotel association, was attacked on the way home from his mosque. “I wanted an inquiry,” he told me.
“Why were these Taliban not attacking anyone in the army? No one was arrested.” The Jirga reacted by announcing that its members would not take part in the Independence Day celebration on August 14, when the military would demonstrate its presence in Swat.
Immediately they were summoned to the base to have tea with the brigadier, which one member saw as a chilling threat. They decided not to accept the invitation, but Yousafzai persuaded them to negotiate. He later told a friend, “The meeting was a success.
I cannot take on the Pakistani Army.” “Ziauddin, you are on a list to be killed,” Aqeel Yousafzai told him in September. “You must stop allowing Malala to speak out in public. Or leave the country.” Close friends had already advised Ziauddin to leave and get a scholarship somewhere for Malala. “I came early in the morning,” Aqeel told me. “Malala was asleep.
Ziauddin awakened her, and she came and joined us. ‘Your uncle Aqeel thinks we are in a lot of danger,’ he said. ‘He thinks you should leave.’ Malala looked at me and said, ‘My uncle is a very good man, but what he is suggesting does not fit with the code of bravery.’ ”
“They want to silence every critic,” said former presidential media adviser Faranahz Ispahani, the wife of former ambassador Husain Haqqani, who was once the target of a trumped-up smear. “So how do they do it? They silence dissident voices, whether it is Benazir Bhutto, [Punjab governor] Salman Taseer, or Malala.
With my husband, they called him a traitor. Ziauddin would not shut up, so they put a bullet into his daughter. They did not expect that all of us Pakistanis have reached a point where pluralistic progressive Pakistan is standing up and saying, ‘No more.’ ” The Attack O n October 9 last year, Ziauddin was at the press club, speaking out against the local government, which was trying to impose control over private schools. “Hold my phone,” he told his friend Ahmed Shah.
Shah saw the number of the Khushal school on an incoming call, and Ziauddin indicated for him to answer it. The caller said, “Someone has attacked the bus. Come quickly.” Shah told me, “We rushed to the clinic. Yousafzai said, ‘It could be that someone has come after Malala.’
The first sight of her there was blood coming out of her mouth. She was weeping. Then she passed out.” One officer described the shooter as a teenager with shaking hands, but the story changed constantly.
A few moments after the bus left the school, the girls started singing. Someone in the road who looked friendly waved for the bus to stop, then asked, “Which one of you is Malala?” No one saw a gun in his hand.
They looked toward their friend. Then the assassin put a bullet in Malala’s head, and perhaps his unsteadiness saved her life. The bullet only grazed her skull, but it damaged the soft tissue underneath, which controls the face and neck.
Two other girls were also badly injured. “Look at this map,” Aqeel Yousafzai told me in New York as he drew a diagram. “The checkpoint was a four-minute walk away. The driver screamed for help.
No one came. Twenty minutes passed. No one came. Finally they had to rush from the school with the police. Why? Many people believe the military is responsible.
The feeling is Malala and her father had to be silenced.” The Tehrik-I-Taleban Party, Fazlullah’s umbrella group, took credit for the attack. By defying Pashtun tradition, Malala was “a clear sinner” who had violated Shari’a and “a spy who divulged secrets of the mujahideen and Taliban through BBC and in return received awards and rewards from the Zionists.”
They accused her of wearing makeup in interviews. In a seven-page statement, they announced that Ziauddin would be next. Reports in the press mentioned Yousafzai’s desire for asylum. Within hours of Malala’s attack, Ashraf received a phone call from Ellick: “Are we responsible?”
Later, Ashraf recalled, Ellick consoled him, saying, “We did nothing wrong. If you feel you must write about it, you should. It could be a catharsis.” Ellick also e-mailed Ziauddin expressing his own sense of guilt, Yousafzai said.
On WGBH, Boston’s public-television station, discussing the ethics of putting a child on-camera, Ellick said, “I’m part of a system that continuously gave them awards … which emboldened her … and made her more public, more brash, more outspoken.” A ll over Pakistan, editorials demanded the obvious:
Were the military’s ties to extremists more important than human rights? Shouldn’t the government guarantee a proper education for girls? Within 24 hours, General Kayani was in Peshawar.
Soon a curious counter-narrative began to grow in the Urdu press. Malala’s picture with Richard Holbrooke was widely distributed. Yousafzai, who had always spoken openly with reporters, was suddenly incommunicado.
In Mingora, posters were distributed with the headline: who is the bigger enemy, the u.s. or the taliban? The bullet in Malala’s cranium had become a political instrument.
At the hospital one doctor said, “We do not know if we can save her, but we think that if she lives she will be completely paralyzed.” Ziauddin said, “My God, who could do this to a child?” He was in shock as the Peshawar hospital filled with dignitaries, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik.
When Ziauddin finally appeared before the press, Malik was by his side. Ziauddin said he would not be seeking asylum, and he thanked General Kayani. “I was not thinking about what general or what president I was in a great trauma,” Ziauddin said. He was now dependent on the very establishment he had spent years criticizing.
When he was finally allowed to fly to Birmingham, the hospital there arranged for a press conference. But Yousafzai took no questions. In the last decade, 36,000 people have been killed in Pakistan, and the situation seems to worsen every week. In Birmingham, Ziauddin Yousafzai monitors the news from Pakistan as Malala recovers from two more delicate operations to replace part of her skull with a titanium plate.
She plans to write a memoir. For Vital Voices, the women’s organization that has raised $150,000 for the Malala Fund, she announced in a widely distributed video, “I want to serve. I want to serve the people. I want every child to be educated. For that reason we have organized the Malala Fund.”
Publishers have offered more than $2 million for the rights to her book. “I will not allow Malala’s story to be used for someone’s agenda I love Pakistan, and I loved my land before it was Pakistan,” Ziauddin said.
Hamid Mir, who almost lost his life when he discovered a bomb under his car before it exploded, said, “Malala called me. She spoke very softly. She said I must not lose courage. I must fight.”
She also called Geo TV reporter Mahboob Ali in Mingora, the day Fazlullah’s forces blew up a nearby mosque, where 22 were killed. “Please do not let them put anyone in danger,” she said. “I don’t want my name to cause harm.” Meanwhile, in Mingora, the government renamed a school after Malala.
Within a short time it was attacked. I n a phone conversation Ali had a day before Malala’s video was launched, he said that Ziauddin seemed resigned to a life that was no longer his to control. He told Ali, “You are a person who can go from one place to another in our town.
And I cannot now. Sometimes I become very desperate. I feel I should go back to Pakistan and be in my own village and my own state.” Later he added, “This is a fourth life for me. I did not choose it. This is a great country with great values, but when you are taken from your own land, you even miss the bad people of your area.
” In January, the Jirga demanded a full judicial commission to investigate “the mayhem that has occurred in Swat and is still happening”—an obvious reference to the military involvement, insiders say. Not long after I spoke briefly with Yousafzai on the phone, it was announced that he was going to work as a global-education consultant for the Pakistan High Commission in Birmingham.
Malala will remain in England, recovering from the damage caused to her speech and hearing. Her left jaw and facial nerves have been reconstructed.
A cochlear implant will lessen the deafness in her left ear. Pakistan recently announced that, by the end of 2015, girls’ education will be a compulsory legal right. In February, Malala was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. If she recovers, she has been primed to campaign, as Benazir Bhutto once did, against all religious extremism.
“That little girl stood up and was not deterred,” said Faranahz Ispahani.
source: http://m.vanityfair.com/politics/2013/04/malala-yousafzai-pakistan-profile?mbid=social_retweet